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Foreword 
 
These proceedings contain the papers selected for presentation at the second edition of ACM 
Workshop on Security and Privacy in GIS and LBS (SPRINGL 2009) which is being held in 
conjunction with the ACM SIGSPATIAL GIS conference.   
The aim of the workshop is to lay the foundation and agenda for research and development in the 
area of geospatial data security and privacy. Today’s world is witnessing a dramatic increase and 
dissemination of geospatial data in several application contexts including homeland security, 
environmental crises, and natural and industrial disasters. Geospatial infrastructures are being 
leveraged by companies to provide a large variety of location-based services (LBS) able to tailor 
services to users. However, despite the increase of publicly accessible geospatial information only 
little attention is being paid on how to secure geospatial information systems (GIS) and LBS. 
Privacy is also of increasing concern given the sensitivity of personally-identifiable location 
information. This is despite major advancements that have been made in secure computing 
infrastructures and the secure and privacy-preserving management of traditional (relational) data 
in particular. Given these pressing needs for securing GIS and LBS as well as assuring privacy, it 
is compelling to investigate security and privacy aspects as they relate to the management of 
geospatial data and the development of both emerging LBS and mission-critical geographic 
applications. 
This year’s program is organized in three sessions:  security policies and context-based security 
for GIS; location anonymization; and privacy and location trustworthiness.  The program also 
features two outstanding invited speakers:  Michael Gertz, from the University of Heidelberg, 
Germany, and Walid Aref from Purdue University, USA. The program is complemented by a 
panel focusing on inter-disciplinary research on privacy.  
We hope that these proceedings will serve as a valuable reference for researchers and practitioners 
and facilitate further research and development in geospatial data security and privacy. 
Putting together SPRINGL 2009 has been a team effort. First of all, we would like to thank the 
authors for providing the content of the program. Additionally, we would like to express our 
gratitude to the program committee for a careful review process. Many thanks are due to Chenyun 
Dai of Purdue University for his excellent work on organizing and managing the workshop web 
site and to Ashish Kamra for assembling the workshop proceedings. We also gratefully 
acknowledge the organization committee of ACM GIS 2009 for the help with the workshop 
planning. Finally, we would like to express our appreciation to the workshop sponsors CERIAS, 
IBM, ACM SIGSPATIAL, the University of Milan and the European Research Project MODAP. 
Last but not least, we would like to thank Elisa Bertino, the general chair of SPRINGL 2009, for 
her guidance and support throughout the review process and program preparation. 
We hope that you will find this program interesting and thought-provoking, and that the workshop 
will provide you with an opportunity to share ideas with other researchers and practitioners from 
institutions around the world. Enjoy!! 
Maria Luisa Damiani 
SPRINGL 2009 Co-Program Chair 
Università degli Studi di Milano,  Italy 
Yucel Saygin 
SPRINGL 2009 Co-Program Chair 
Sabanci University, Istanbul,  Turkey 
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The Role of Security in Scientific Data Management
Michael Gertz
Institute of Computer Science
University of Heidelberg
Heidelberg, Germany
gertz@informatik.uni-heidelberg.de
ABSTRACT
In the past three decades, research and development activities in
the area of data security have primarily concentrated on security as-
pects in traditional domains, such as the business and financial sec-
tors, and, more recently, the medical and health care sectors. Inter-
estingly, compared to major advancements made in these domains,
resulting in comprehensive and flexible data security frameworks,
there is only little work focusing on security aspects specific to the
management of data in natural science domains such as the physi-
cal sciences, the life sciences, and the geosciences. Although one
can argue that security models, techniques, and architectures de-
veloped for the traditional domains can be adopted, scientific data
management activities posses some characteristics where important
and necessary data security features are either non-existent or are
poorly developed. There are several reasons for this. First, scien-
tific data is often complex and go beyond simple record- or XML-
based representations, thus requiring sophisticated access control
models. A typical example is imagery, which can be found in many
such science domains (e.g., GIS-layers in geoscience applications)
and for which fine-grained and context-dependent access control
is non-trivial. Second, scientific data management often involves
complex data life-cycles in which the data undergo transformations
and enrichment, especially in the context of data integration. Such
life-cycles range from diverse data collection methods to complex
computations, often supported by scientific workflows, in which
data collected from observations and experiments are combined in
support of diverse longitudinal data analysis and exploration tasks.
In general, security mechanisms have to be employed at all stages,
covering the data, processes, computations, and the archival of the
data and data products. All this typically has to occur in a collab-
orative environment in which data and computation results need to
be shared in a flexible and dynamic manner.
We present an overview of the role of security in the context
of scientific data management, covering a number of issues re-
lated to data security aspects. Using application domains and data
usage scenarios from the physical sciences, geosciences and life-
sciences, we elaborate on security risks that indicate the need for
advanced data security models and techniques in particular in E-
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Science settings. For complex data processing scenarios, we dis-
cuss opportunities and challenges in developing models and tech-
niques in support of authentication models for data and computa-
tions researchers can use to verify the correctness and completeness
of data and data products, similar to authenticated data publication
schemes developed for traditional relational database. We also take
a closer look at the inference problem for scientific data, which now
can be seen in a new light, given the various ways in which scien-
tific data can be combined and explored in longitudinal data anal-
ysis tasks. This aspect holds in particular true for geo-referenced
data, which occur in a variety of application domains. Finally, we
outline some important security management aspects in the context
of the stewardship and preservation of scientific data.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.2.7 [Database Administration]: Security, integrity, and protec-
tion; H.2.8 [Database Applications]: Scientific databases; D.4.6
[Security and Protection]: Access controls
General Terms
Management, Security
Keywords
access control, data integrity, geosciences, physical sciences, data
publication, data inference, scientific workflows
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ABSTRACT 
We show in this paper that we can use the Or-BAC model [1] to 
express security policies for the visualization of spatial data. We 
first add to Or-BAC some visualization predicates and then show 
how to model various types of spatial data visualization contexts. 
We finally use these newly defined contexts to write security 
policies for the visualization of Geo Data. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
K.6.m [Management of computing and information System]: 
Miscellaneous – Security 
General Terms 
Security 
Keywords 
Access Control, Geo-spatial Data visualization, Or-BAC 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The core RBAC [2] authorization model considers only static 
security rules. However, in many applications, there is an 
increasing need for dynamic security rules. A dynamic security 
rule can be activated/deactivated depending on some context. A 
context can be a temporal condition, a spatial condition (like the 
user location), a provisional condition (like the user previous 
action) etc. Therefore, several extensions to the RBAC model 
have been proposed in order to cope with contexts: the 
Generalized Role Based Access Control (GRBAC) [3] 
incorporates the notion of object role and environment role; in the 
Context-Role Based Access Control (CRBAC) [4] some 
constraints should be fulfilled before a permission is assigned to a 
role; the Or-BAC model [1] allows the security policy designer to 
express various types of contexts, by using first-order logic. Some 
models focus on specific contexts, like temporal contexts: the 
Temporal Role Based Access Control Model (TRBAC) [5] offers 
means to activate roles periodically; the Generalized TRBAC 
(GTRBAC) [6] incorporates various temporal constraints on role 
activation as well as on user-to-role or permission-to-role 
assignment. 
With the growing importance of geographic information in 
various applications, some important security issues such as 
hiding sensible areas also arise. These new security challenges 
involves a new need for dynamic security rules based on some 
spatial contexts. Therefore, security models specifically dealing 
with spatial contexts have also started to appear: the GeoRBAC 
[7] model introduces the concept of spatial role to specify spatial 
condition on user location; the GSAM [8] model introduces the 
extended concept of geo-temporal role. There are in fact different 
types of spatial contexts. A spatial context can be the position of a 
user (in a Location Based System), the zoom level at which a user 
is looking at a map, the filters and enhancement tools used to 
visualize geographic objects, the direction followed by a moving 
object etc. 
In [9], we identified and modelled various types of spatial 
contexts based on the user location and/or the spatial object 
location. We also showed how to model geo-temporal contexts 
and contexts related to movement. In this paper, we focus on 
visualization of geo-data i.e. we show how to model various types 
of visualization contexts for geo-data and how to express dynamic 
security rules based on such contexts. 
In [9], we also showed that GeoRBAC [10] and GSAM [8] were 
more or less designed to express security policies based on the 
user location. They are not suitable to express many of the various 
visualization contexts for geodata. To our knowledge, the Or-
BAC model is the only authorization model which allows the 
security policy designer to express various types of contexts 
within a single framework (see [11] and [12]). Or-BAC is a 
generic security model which formally defines the notion of 
context and offers a language based on first order logic to specify 
them. Therefore, we have decided to use Or-BAC for writing our 
security policies for the visualization of spatial objects. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
recalls the basic principles of the Or-BAC model. Section 3 
defines our geometry model based on the OpenGIS [13] geometry 
model [14] and introduces some useful visualization predicates. 
In section 4, we identify several types of visualization contexts 
and we show how to model them with Or-BAC. In section 5, we 
describe a real-world visualization application and we give an 
example of security policy based on these visualization contexts. 
Section 6 is a comparison of our work with some previous models 
proposed in the literature. Finally, section 7 concludes this paper 
and suggests some future works. 
2. Or-BAC 
In Or-BAC [1], there are eight basic sets of entities: Org (a set of 
organizations), S (a set of subjects), A (a set of actions), O (a set 
of objects), R (a set of roles), T (a set of activities), V (a set of 
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views) and C (a set of contexts). Org Í S (any organization is 
also a subject) and SÍ O (any subject is also an object). Subjects, 
actions and objects are respectively abstracted into roles, 
activities and views. Roles, activities and views are the abstract 
entities and are always created within the framework of an 
organization. Abstract entities are organised into hierarchies [15]. 
Subjects, actions and objects are the concrete entities. Each 
subject (resp. action and object) is linked to one or several roles 
(resp. activities and views). Abstract entities and concrete entities 
are linked together by the relations Empower, Use and Consider. 
Empower is a relation over domains Org×S×R. If org is an 
organization, s a subject and r a role, then Empower(org,s,r) 
means that organization org empowers subject s in role r. Use is a 
relation over domains Org×O×V. If org is an organization, o an 
object and v a view, then Use(org,o,v) means that organization 
org uses object o in view v. Consider is a relation over domains 
Org×A×T. If org is an organization, a an action and t an activity, 
then Consider(org,a,t) means that org considers that action a falls 
within the activity t. Any entity in the Or-BAC model may have 
some attributes. This is represented by functions that associate the 
entity with the value of these attributes. For instance, if s is a 
subject, then name(s) represents the value of attribute name of 
subject s. 
A context is any kind of constraint which may or may not 
involve the subject and/or the action and/or the object. 
Organization, subject, object, action and context are linked 
together by the relation Hold. Hold is a relation over domains 
Org×S×A×O×C. If org is an organization, s a subject, a an action, 
o an object and c a context, then Hold(org,s,a,o,c) means that 
within organization org, context c holds between subject s, action 
a and object o. For example, a context Teacher can be defined as 
follows: 
)()(
),,,,(,,,
sstudentsoname
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that is, at organization UPF (University of French Polynesia), 
context Teacher holds between subject s, action a and object o if 
and only if object o is a record corresponding to a student of 
subject s. There is one default context Default_ctx which is 
always true. 
In [12], the authors show how to represent different types of 
contexts with Or-BAC, namely temporal context, user-declared 
context, prerequisite context and provisional context. They also 
define some simple spatial contexts using a single built-in 
predicate Is_located. 
The security policy is specified using the relationships 
Permission, Obligation and Prohibition. Permission, Obligation 
and Prohibition are relations over domains Org×R×T×V×C. If 
org is an organization, r a role, t an activity, v a view and c a 
context then Permission(org,r,t,v,c) (resp. Obligation(org,r,t,v,c) 
or Prohibition(org,r,t,v,c)) means that in organization org role r is 
granted permission (resp. obligation or prohibition) to perform 
activity t on view v within context c. Instances of Permission, 
Obligation and Prohibition are called abstract rules. These 
abstract rules are propagated downwards in hierarchies of roles, 
activities and views through an inheritance mechanism (see [15]). 
In Or-BAC, the default security policy is closed which means that 
anything not explicitly permitted is prohibited. Note that in this 
paper, for the sake of simplicity, we shall not consider 
obligations. Indeed, our paper focuses more on how to model 
spatial contexts than on how to express security rules. For 
modelling security rules, we apply Or-BAC principles as such. 
The reader who is interested can refer to [12] where obligations 
and related concepts of user declared context and provisional 
context are described in detail. Concrete rules are instances of the 
relationships Is_permitted, Is_prohibited and Is_obliged. 
Is_permitted, Is_prohibited and Is_obliged are relations over 
domains S × A × O. Instances of these relationships are logically 
derived from the abstract rules. The following rule allows us to 
derive instances of Is_permitted from the relation Permission: 
),,(_),,,,(
),,(),,(),,(
),,,,(
,,,,,,,,
oaspermittedIscoasorgHold
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cvtrorgPermission
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that is, if organization org, within context c, grants role r 
permission to perform activity t on view v and if org empowers 
subject s in role r and if org uses object o in view v and if org 
considers that action a falls within the activity t and if, within org, 
context c holds between s, a and o then s is permitted to perform 
a on o. There is a similar rule for Is_prohibited and Is_obliged. 
Specifying a security policy that includes both permissions and 
prohibitions may lead to conflicts. The Or-BAC model makes the 
distinction between the potential conflicts between abstract rules 
and the actual conflicts between instances of the Is_permitted and 
Is_prohibited predicates. The conflict resolution strategy in Or-
BAC acts at the abstract level and is based on two complementary 
approaches : separation constraints and rules priorities, leading 
to the concept of prioritized Or-BAC [16] : 
· Since a subject can potentially be empowered in different 
roles, an object can be used in different views, an action can 
fall within different activities and different contexts can be 
active simultaneously, every pair of Permission and 
Prohibition may be potentially conflicting. Such potential 
conflicts can be eliminated by specifying separation 
constraints. For instance, if a separation constraint exists 
between roles r1 and r2, then no subject can be empowered in 
both roles and a Permission assigned to role r1 cannot get 
into conflict with a Prohibition assigned to role r2. 
· Remaining conflicts are solved by explicitly assigning 
priorities to abstract rules. 
3. Geospatial data and geometry model 
3.1 Geospatial data 
GIS software generally deal with two types of spatial data (vector 
and raster data) but can also accommodate other components such 
as attribute data (information about an object or feature) and 
metadata (data about the spatial data). Each geographic data is 
handled as a layer and layers can be overlaid to get the final 
desired representation of the dataset. Aerial photography and 
satellite imagery are common geographically referenced raster 
data usually used as background layers. Vector layers (see next 
section for details) can be of different types (points, lines, poly-
lines, polygons,…etc) and can represent a large variety of features 
3
themes such as points of interest, roads, buildings, borders of 
states, elevation contours, restricted access areas and so on. All 
GIS layers (either raster or vector) can be stored as files or as 
records in a spatially enabled object-relational database. 
The basic visualization features of GIS software (ESRI ArcGIS® 
for instance) and 3D GeoSpatial viewers (Google earth® for 
instance) include : zoom in, zoom out, pan, x/y localization, 
choice of predefined or user-defined scales, layers overlay, 
hierarchy and re-order of layers, layers transparency or contrast 
and brightness adjustment. 
3.2 Geometric objects 
A georeferenced (geometric) object is a granule of information 
that is relevant to an identifiable subset of the Earth's surface [17]. 
Any geometric object has the following components [18] : 
· A description. The entity is described by a set of 
descriptive attributes (e.g. the name of a city) 
· A geometry which indicates the entity’s location and its 
shape 
The geometry model we consider for vector objects is the 
OpenGIS Geometry Model [14]. In this model, each geometric 
object belongs to a geometry class. In this paper, we do not 
consider the whole class hierarchy defined in [14]. For the sake of 
simplicity, we consider only the branch depicted in figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: OpenGIS Geometry Class Hierarchy 
Let us briefly describe the different classes. For more details, the 
reader can refer to [14]. Geometry is the basis class. It is a non 
instantiable abstract class. It has some attributes such as 
dimension which indicates the object dimension, SRID which 
contains the Spatial Reference System ID for the geometry object 
or geometryType which indicates the type of the geometric 
object. It has also some basic methods such as envelope()  
which returns the minimum bounding box (rectangle) enveloping 
the object. Point represents zero-dimensional entities. It has two 
specific attributes x and y for its coordinates. Curve represents 
one-dimensional entities. A curve is a sequence of points. The 
subtype of Curve specifies the form of the interpolation between 
points. It has two specific attributes startpoint and 
endpoint. It has one subclass Linestring which uses linear 
interpolation between points. Linestring has a method 
pointN(N:integer) which returns the specified point N in 
the linestring. Line is a linestring with exactly two points. 
LinearRing is a linestring that is closed and simple (a linestring is 
simple if it does not pass through the same point twice with the 
possible exception of the two end points). Note that a particular 
case of linearRing is the bounding box. Surface represents two-
dimensional entities. A surface has one exterior boundary and 0 
or more interior boundaries defining some “holes” in the surface. 
A polygon is a planar surface. Polygon has two methods 
exteriorRing() which returns the lineRing defining the 
exterior boundary and interiorRingN(N:integer) which 
returns the specified interior lineRing N in the polygon. 
In section 2, we defined the set of objects O and the set of 
subjects S, with S Í O (any subject is also an object). We assume 
all objects in O to be geo-referenced. Therefore any object has 
some descriptive attributes and some spatial attributes and 
methods. These spatial attributes and methods can be used for 
specifying contexts, like any other attributes. For example, if p is 
an object whose geometry is a point then x(p) and y(p) represents 
its coordinates. If l is a Linestring then pointN(l,3) represents the 
third point of l…etc. If talking about the geometry of an entity is 
irrelevant then the geometry of this entity is the empty geometry 
Æ. Since subjects are mostly users, the geometry of subjects is 
generally a point. However, it could also be a polygon if the exact 
subject position cannot be determined precisely or should not be 
disclosed for privacy reasons. Location and/or shape of any object 
may change over time. This is obviously true for users whose 
coordinates are updated in real-time (thanks to GPS devices for 
example), but it can also be true for any other object. 
3.3 Visualization predicates 
Visualization predicates are used to test for a specific property 
between two geographic objects within the scope of a display-like 
operation. 
We define two predicates: Overlay and StrictOverlay. We 
consider these predicates to be built-in Or-BAC predicates. They 
are both defined over domain O ´ O. Let g1 and g2 be two 
geographic objects involved in a visualization operation. We first 
define Overlay as follows: 
· Overlay(g1, g2) means that geographic object g1 lays 
over geographic object g2 
This predicate means that g1 can be any geographic layer located 
either directly on top of g2 or above any layer itself above g2.  
To express that a geographic object is overlaid directly on another 
one, we define predicate StrictOverlay as follows: 
· 
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4. Using Or-BAC to model contexts related to 
visualization of spatial data 
In this section we try to figure out various types of visualization 
contexts (without pretending to be exhaustive) and we show how 
to model them using Or-BAC. Table 1 summarizes some 
examples of visualization contexts and indicates whether the 
context applies only to raster data or if it applies to both raster and 
Geometry 
Surface 
LineString   Polygon 
    Line LinearRing 
 Point    Curve 
4
vector geographic objects. A reference to the concerned sub-
section is also given to get more details. 
 
Type Definition Security rule Geo 
data 
Sect. 
Zoom-in factor 
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zmzfoasorgHold
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Permission(UPF, Researchers, Display, 
ReefMonitoringView, 
LayOverTiahuraMPA) 
Vector 
& Raster 4.2.1 
Strict Simple 
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Permission(UPF, Researchers, Display, 
ReefMonitoringView, 
StrictLayOverTiahuraMPA) 
Vector 
& Raster 4.2.2 
Composed 
Simple Overlay 
Composition of Simple Overlaying contexts defined 
using operators AND ( & ), or ( Å ) and NOT ( Ø ) 
Permission(UPF, Researchers, Display, 
ReefMonitoringView, 
LayOverTiahuraMPA & 
LayOverLagoonAerial) 
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Permission(UPF, Researchers, Display, 
SpatialObjectsView, 
Monitoring_over_MPA_over_Lagoon) 
Vector 
& Raster 4.2.4 
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Permission(UPF, Students, Display, 
SpatialObjectsView, 
Strict_Monitoring_over_MPA_over_La
goon) 
Vector 
& Raster 4.2.5 
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Permission(UPF, Researchers, Display, 
MPAView , transpinterval(0, 0.5) & 
LayOverLagoonAerial) 
Vector 
& Raster 4.3 
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Permission(UPF, Researchers, Display, 
Aerial_SatelliteView, contrastinterval(-
1, 0.5)) 
 
 
Permission(UPF, Researchers, Display, 
Aerial_SatelliteView, 
brightnessinterval(-0.5, 0.5)) 
Raster 4.4 
Filters 
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Permission(UPF, Researchers, Display, 
Aerial_SatelliteView, 
Linear_stretch(0.02)) 
Raster 4.4 
 
Table 1 : Examples of visualization contexts 
4.1 Zoom-in factor 
In some spatially aware access control models like GSAM, zoom-
in is considered as a separate privilege like read or write. We 
prefer to model the zoom-in operation as a context of another 
operation, like the display operation for instance. We believe that 
this approach facilitates the interpretation of the security rules and 
avoids conflicts. For instance, if display and zoom-in were two 
distinct privileges, a conflict could arise between a rule stating 
that a geographic object can be zoomed-in and another rule 
prohibiting the display of the same object. 
Let Defaultscale be the default scale at which a geometric object 
is displayed. Since defining a function returning a context is 
possible with Or-BAC (see [11] for the definition of functions 
before_time and after_time for instance). In table 1, we define 
function mzf (maximum zoom-in factor) that takes as input a 
zoom-in factor and returns a spatial context. That is, at 
organization org, context mzf(z) holds between subject s, action a 
and object o if and only if the scale parameter of action a is less 
than or equal to the default scale Defaultscale multiplied by the 
zoom-in factor z. Let us note that if action a does not have a scale 
parameter (descriptive attribute) then function mzf will never 
return any context. The given example of permission states that 
employees at UPF have the permission to display aerial or 
satellite photographs of the lagoon with a maximum zoom-in 
factor of 2. 
4.2 Overlaying  
In the field of electronic mapping, overlaying geographic data is 
of main importance to visualize what is called “an electronic 
map”. Each geographic object (see section 3) is handled as a layer 
and layers are overlaid to get the final desired representation of 
the dataset. For instance, geographic objects like state boundaries, 
roads or regions of interest are overlaid on a background image 
like an aerial photography or a satellite image. Being able to 
control which geographic object can be overlaid on which other 
geographic object can be a security requirement. Indeed, since 
each layer is displayed according to a transparency parameter, the 
order in which the layers are displayed can hide/reveal some 
information. In this subsection we try to figure out a typology of 
overlaying contexts and show how to model them. 
4.2.1 Simple overlay 
In the given example (see Table 1), we consider Tiahura_MPA to 
be a geometric object whose geometry is a polygon corresponding 
to the Marine Protected Area located around the Tiahura islet. 
We use the Overlay predicate defined in section 3 to define a 
context called LayOverTiahuraMPA (lay over “Tiahura” MPA) 
which holds between subject s, action a and object o if and only if 
object o lays (strictly or not) over object Tiahura_MPA. The 
permission rule grants researchers at UPF the permission to 
display any object belonging to the ReefMonitoringView view if 
and only if it overlays the Tiahura MPA geographic object. 
4.2.2 Strict simple overlay 
Considering the same geographic object Tiahura_MPA, we can 
use the StrictOverlay predicate to define a new context called 
StrictLayOverTiahuraMPA (Strictly lay over “Tiahura” MPA) 
which holds between subject s, action a and object o if and only if 
object o is the very first object laying over object Tiahura_MPA.  
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4.2.3 Composed simple overlay 
Since the Or-BAC model allows the composition of contexts (see 
[11]) using Boolean operators AND ( & ), or ( Å ) and NOT 
( Ø ), the security policy may include rules involving more than 
one context. This possibility can be used to define multiple 
overlaying contexts. 
Table 1 defines context LayOverLagoonAerial in the same way 
we defined LayOverTiahuraMPA but using object LagoonAerial 
(an aerial photography of the lagoon) instead of object 
Tiahura_MPA. It becomes then possible to compose these two 
contexts to express a new rule granting the permission to display 
any geographic object on top of these two geographic objects. The 
provided example of permission grants researchers at UPF the 
permission to display any object o belonging to the 
ReefMonitoringView view provided object o overlays both the 
Tiahura MPA and the aerial photography of the lagoon. Notice 
that, (i) any other geographic object can be interposed between 
object o and objects Tiahura_MPA and LagoonAerial (ii) there is 
no overlaying order between objects Tiahura_MPA and 
LagoonAerial. 
4.2.4 Multiple overlay 
The example given in table 1 uses the Overlay predicate to define 
a context Monitoring_over_MPA_over_Lagoon saying that 
objects Monitoring_points (some monitoring points where 
scientist conduct regular biological survey), MPA_zones (Marine 
Protected Areas all around the island) and LagoonAerial (aerial 
photography of the lagoon) are displayed in a given order. 
However, these three objects are not strictly ordered, i.e. other 
layers can be interposed between them. 
The corresponding rule grants researchers at UPF the permission 
to display any spatial object if and only if objects 
Monitoring_points, MPA_zones and LagoonAerial are also 
displayed in the order given in context 
Monitoring_over_MPA_over_Lagoon. 
4.2.5 Strict Multiple overlay 
We define the Strict_Monitoring_over_MPA_over_Lagoon 
context in the same manner as the previous one except that the 
three objects are strictly overlaid on top of each other. 
4.2.6 On top Overlay 
Still using the Overlay predicate, we can define a context saying 
that  a given geographic object has no other geographic object 
laid over it. 
The rule given in table 1 grants every user at UPF the permission 
to display any spatial object belonging to view OutliningView 
(User-defined points, lines or polygons) if and only if this spatial 
object is displayed as the topmost object of the map. 
4.2.7 Background Overlay 
In the same way, it is possible to define a context saying that a 
given geographic object lays at the background of a map. The 
corresponding rule grants every user at UPF the permission to 
display any spatial object belonging to view Aerial_SatelliteView 
(aerial or satellite photographs) if and only if this photography is 
displayed as the background object of the map. 
4.3 Transparency 
In addition to the Overlay possibility, any GIS software provides 
the ability to adjust the display transparency of objects. Indeed, as 
already mentioned, geographic objects are overlaid on each other, 
therefore some geographic objects (a colored polygon for 
instance) may hide other objects lying “under”. To gain display of 
objects located “under”, there are two options: either changing the 
overlay order but this may possibly hide/reveal other areas or 
adjusting the transparency (from 0% to 100%) of the upper object 
allowing then the simultaneous visualization of different objects. 
Furthermore, denying the possibility to change the transparency 
of an object is a mean of hiding the information lying under it. 
We model transparency as a parameter of geographic objects and 
we define context transpinterval(z1, z2) (transparency interval) 
which holds between subject s, action a and object o if and only if 
the transparency parameter of object o is within interval [z1, z2]. 
For instance, if we compose the transpinterval context and the 
LayOverLagoonAerial context defined in table 1, we can grant 
researchers the permission to adjust, within a given interval, the 
transparency of the polygons defining any Marine Protected Area 
object when this object is overlaid on the aerial photography of 
the lagoon. This rule makes the assumption that with a 
transparency above 50% some sensitive details on the aerial 
photography would be revealed. 
4.4 Contrast Brightness and Filters 
While transparency applies to all types of data, adjusting the 
contrast and/or brightness of selected geographic objects is a 
common operation used, on raster data, to highlight certain 
characteristics of the geographic object. For instance, a contrast 
setting well suited could reveal some hidden details of an aerial 
photography. Contrast and brightness are usually expressed on a 
scale from -100% to 100%. We also model contrast  and 
brightness as parameters of geographic objects and use these 
parameters to define contexts constrastinterval(z1, z2) (contrast 
interval) and brightnessinterval(z1, z2) (brightness interval). 
There is a large amount of filter operations that may be applied to 
raster images, including linear, Laplacian, Gaussian, high/low 
pass, median, texture, adaptive and so on. We model filters as we 
model contrast and brightness that is, as parameters of geographic 
objects. We use these parameters to define contexts. For instance, 
we can define a context Linear_stretch(z) which applies a linear 
stretch filter with a z % clip on both ends of the displayed. 
5. Example of a security policy 
In this section, we consider an organization called Urbanism 
Service (UrbSv) which is responsible of collecting and updating 
all geographic data over French Polynesia. This service 
distinguishes two types of users of geographic data: users having 
public access only and authorized users belonging to the 
Urbanism service personnel. UrbSv aims at offering to all its users 
an online GIS platform to display some data of interest 
concerning some of the islands of French Polynesia. The data set 
includes some aerial or satellite images, all the zoning of the 
existing Marine Management Plans (MMP) or Urban 
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Development Plans (UDP) as well as the location of some fragile 
and expansive equipments like tide gauges, permanent GPS 
stations or communication devices like satellite antennas. 
Additionally, a visualization prohibition applies on some given 
military zones (barracks, military airports or former nuclear test 
sites) which must always be hidden by means of geographic 
objects of type polygon if aerial or satellite imagery is displayed. 
Figure 2 shows the relationships between abstract entities and 
concrete entities in the Or-BAC model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Synopsis of our example 
Before defining the security policy, we need to define the 
organization, the roles, the activities, the views, the subjects, the 
actions, the objects and the contexts: 
· Organization: Urbanism Service (UrbSv) 
· Roles:  
o User with two sub-roles: PublicUser and 
AuthorizedUser. 
o We assume separated_role(UrbSV, 
PublicUser, AuthorizedUser) i.e. we assume a 
subject cannot be empowered in both roles 
· Activities: Display is the only activity 
· Views: 
o Aerial_SatelliteView  
o MaskingView 
o VectorObjectView with two sub-views: 
§ RestrictedView 
§ PublicView 
o We assume that all views are mutually 
separated using the separated_view function 
of the Or-BAC model. For instance: 
separated_view(UrbSv, Aerial_SatelliteView, 
MaskingView) 
· Subjects: Several public and authorized users 
· Actions: ShowGeometry (implements activity Display): 
for graphically displaying geometric objects. 
ShowGeometry has one parameter scale indicating the 
scale at which objects are displayed. 
· Objects:  
o Various objects of type polygon 
(implementing view MaskingView) masking 
some military barracks or other sensitive 
infrastructures 
o Several objects belonging to the defined 
views. 
· Constants: DefaultScale giving the default scale at 
which a geometric object is displayed. 
The following contexts are also defined: 
· Context mzf defined in section 4 but redefined here in 
the scope of organization UrbSv as follows: 
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· Context Masked_Military_zones expressing that all 
geographic objects belonging to view MaskingView 
must be overlaid on object o1. Using first order logic 
language, this translated by: “whatever the object o1, it 
is not possible to find an object o2 belonging to view 
MaskingView which is not overlaid on object o1”. 
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· Contexts transpinterval(z1, z2) and 
brightnessinterval(z1, z2) already defined in section 4 
but redefined here in the scope of organization UrbSv as 
follows: 
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We can now express our security policy directly inspired by a 
concrete-use case. Basically, the security policy expresses the fact 
that: (i) aerial or satellite imagery can be displayed if some precise 
military zones are masked and (ii) authorized users have the right 
to display any geographic object while general public users have 
some restrictions on displayable objects as well as on potential 
filtering. 
Rule 1: All users are granted permission to display any aerial 
photography or satellite image (view Aerial_SatelliteView) with a 
maximum zoom-in factor of 10 if and only if object 
Military_zones overlay all other objects. Let us notice that, since 
nothing is said about contrast, brightness or filtering, users are not 
restricted to use these operations. 
))10(&__
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mzfzonesMilitaryMasked
elliteViewAerial_SatDisplayUserUrbSvPermission
Rule 2: Users are permitted to display any objects of view 
MaskingView with a transparency only equal to 0% (fully opaque) 
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These first two rules ensure that all users are granted permission 
to display any aerial photography or satellite image provided the 
zoom-in factor is not greater then 10 and all the masks are also 
displayed. 
Rule 3: Authorized users are granted permission to display any 
vector object: 
)
,,,(
ctViewVectorObje
DisplayUserAuthorizedUrbSvPermission
 
Rule 4: Public users are granted permission to display public 
vector data: 
),,,( PublicViewDisplayPublicUserUrbSvPermission  
Rule 5: Public users are prohibited to display aerial or satellite 
imagery with a brightness interval outside [–100%, +20%] 
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Regarding the above security policy, we can make the following 
comments addressing conflicts between rules: 
Thanks to the separation constraints defined above (e.g. a subject 
cannot be empowered in both roles PublicUser and 
AuthorizedUser and all views are mutually exclusive), we avoid 
many potential conflicts. However, a potential conflict still 
remains between rules 1 and 5 if the user is a PublicUser, the 
object belongs to view Aerial_SatelliteView, all the masks are 
displayed, the zoom-in factor is not greater than 10 and the 
requested brightness is outside [-100%, 20%]. We solve this 
conflict by assigning to rule 5 a priority which is higher than the 
priority of rule 1. 
6. Related works 
During the last decade there has been a significant increase in the 
amount of papers dealing with access control to geographic data. 
Among all these papers we distinguish between papers dealing 
with the location of the user (Location Based Systems or LBS) 
and/or geographic objects and papers related to the access and 
visualization of geo-data. 
The first category includes SRBAC [19] and geo-RBAC[10]. In 
the SRBAC [19] model, roles are dynamic in the sense that a role 
is assigned different sets of permissions according to different 
geographical areas. Therefore, the permissions granted to a user 
assigned to a particular role will differ according to the location 
of the user. In SRBAC the space model is very simple and 
targeted to wireless networks applications. The whole space is 
divided into adjacent cells and the logical position of a user is 
simply defined as a set of contiguous cells. Such a space structure 
is very rigid. The spatial granularity is fixed and does not allow 
any refinement regarding the position of the user. The concept of 
dynamic role reduces the number of named roles within the 
security policy but it is at the cost of a poor legibility of roles 
since a named role hides different actual roles. The Geo-RBAC 
model was introduced for the first time in [7] then further 
formalized and extended in [10]. In this model, spatial entities are 
used to model objects, user positions and geographically bounded 
roles. Geo-RBAC defines the concept of spatial role. A spatial 
role is a pair <r,e> where r is a traditional role and e the spatial 
extent of the role. The role extent defines the boundaries of the 
space in which the role can be assumed by the user. Users have 
both a physical position (given by a GPS device for example) and 
a logical position (the road, the building, the region they are 
located in). There is a function mapping the logical position of a 
user to his/her real position. During a session, a user must be 
logically located within the spatial extent of a given role to 
activate this role. Spatial objects, called features according to the 
OGC terminology, are grouped into feature types (for instance 
Road, Town or Car). The authors also define the concept of role 
schema. Authorizations can be either assigned to the role schema 
(and are consequently inherited by all role instances of the 
schema,) or directly to the role instances. Finally, hierarchical 
Geo-RBAC (Geo-HRBAC) adds to Geo-RBAC the possibility to 
organize spatial roles and role schemas into hierarchies. 
In the second category of papers, we find [20], [21] as well as the 
GSAM model described in [22], [23], [24] and [8]. In [20] the 
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authors aim at controlling the way vector-based data are accessed 
through a Web Map Management Service by users having 
different profiles. In this model, an authorization object is a 
spatial feature class (a set of instances or features) and 
authorizations on a given feature class states which instances of 
the feature class can be accessed, in which way and by which 
roles. In addition, authorizations are assigned a geographical 
scope called “window” (a polygon) indicating the portion of 
territory to which the authorization applies. Regarding the 
visualization of geographic data, this model has two main 
drawbacks: prohibitions are not considered and authorisation 
rules for objects at a finer level of granularity (on single features 
for example or on feature class attributes) cannot be expressed. In 
[21], authors allow the specification of rules controlling the 
access to complex structured spatial data stored in spatial 
databases. Although this model also supports the concept of 
authorization window to specify the region on which the 
authorization applies, it differs quite significantly from the model 
in [20]. Indeed, this model: (i) uses a more complex map model 
admitting either a geometrical or topological representation of the 
same spatial object; (ii) supports different propagation rules 
making access control more flexible; (iii) also supports both 
positive and negative authorizations. However, the model does 
not support roles and does not allow to define rules involving 
mobile subjects. The GeoSpatial Authorization Model (GSAM) is 
probably the best access control authorization model for the 
visualization of geographic data. GSAM was one of the first 
models dealing with access control systems for geographical data 
and was first proposed in [22]. The model deals with remote 
sensing imagery and focuses on sensible information revealed by 
high resolution satellite imagery. Objects are either raster 
(satellite or airborne) or vector (points, lines, polygons, …) 
images. Each object (an image) has attributes defining the spatial 
extend of the image, its resolution and a timestamp representing 
either the download date (raster images) or the last update (vector 
images). Additionally, tabular data may be associated to vector 
images. In addition to the usual privileges such as insert, delete 
and update, GSAM also supports actions required to provide 
controlled access to multi-resolution imagery, namely view, zoom-
in, identify and overlay. A GSAM authorization is a triple <sub, 
obj, pr> where sub is a subject, obj is an object, a set of objects or 
a rectangular geographical region and pr is a privilege or a set of 
privileges. The model is primarily used to restrict the ability to 
zoom-in on images or portions of images. The original GSAM 
model was extended in [23] in three ways. Roles were introduced 
in order to abstract the concept of subject, defining negative 
authorizations (ie. prohibitions) became possible and finally 
authorizations were extended with a new condition attribute 
containing a condition expressed over subjects and object 
attributes. In [24], the authors add the possibility to define some 
basic temporal constraints on both subjects and geospatial objects. 
Finally, in [8], the authors introduce the concept of geo-temporal 
role. A geo-temporal role is a pair <r,sc> where r is a traditional 
role and sc a scene. The concept of scene resembles the concept 
of spatial extent in Geo-RBAC except that a scene includes a 
temporal extent. 
We believe that the Or-BAC model has many advantages over this 
last model. Indeed, although GSAM borrows the concept of role 
from the traditional RBAC model, it is an ad hoc model more or 
less designed for a particular type of geospatial application 
namely for regulating access to satellite images. Consequently, 
GSAM has not the flexibility of the Or-BAC model, which is a 
generic authorisation model. Furthermore, the Or-BAC model 
including our visualization primitives inherits the qualities of the 
core Or-BAC model. For instance, we benefit from the useful and 
innovative concepts of activity and view for structuring the 
security policy. We also benefit from the conflict resolution 
strategy of the Or-BAC model. Conflict resolution is barely 
addressed in GSAM and some other models whereas in [16], the 
authors show that conflict detection in Or-BAC is tractable in 
polynomial time. 
7. Conclusion and perspectives 
In this paper we showed how to model security rules for the 
visualization of spatial data. We only extended the core Or-BAC 
first order logic language with two simple predicates Overlay and 
StrictOverlay and introduced a typology of contexts based on 
these new predicates as well as on a visualization parameter of 
activity Display (scale parameter) and some attributes of 
geographic objects like transparency or brightness. Through a real 
life application, we showed how we can easily express various 
kinds of security rules applying to geo data visualization. Finally, 
we showed that many visualization contexts cannot be easily 
handled by existing spatial models like GSAM. Future works 
shall include: 
· Designers of the Or-BAC model have developed 
MotOrBAC [25]. MotOrBAC is a security policy tool 
which can be used to specify, simulate and administrate 
security policies. MotOrBAC has been developed on 
top of the Or-BAC application programming interface 
(API), a java API. MotOrBAC uses the Jena inference 
engine [26] for deriving conflicts and concrete rules 
from abstract rules. We plan to extend MotOrBAC with 
the proposed predicates in order to simulate spatial 
visualization policies. 
· In this paper, we limited ourselves to a two dimensional 
geometric model, future works could also consider a 
three dimensional geometric model. 
· A complete implementation of an enforcement 
architecture is also a great challenge but requires a huge 
amount of human resources that we do not currently 
have. 
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ABSTRACT
Pervasive Computing Environments enable new opportuni-
ties for users to share and to access resources anytime and
anywhere in a more natural way, making access control a
critical issue. These heterogeneous and dynamic sensor-rich
environments characterized by frequent and unpredictable
changes on user’s, resource’s, and environment situations,
call for access control solutions that allow dynamically ad-
just access permissions based on information describing the
conditions of these entities (context), such as location and
time. Some research attempts have been done based on ex-
isting models, which context information is used as an op-
tional attribute for limiting the scope of access control per-
missions. However, these approaches normally exploit iden-
tities and roles dynamically assigned to the users in order to
grant access permissions, which is an inappropriate solution
for open and dynamic environments which we cannot assume
the existence of predefined roles and user-role associations.
In this scenario, we claim that access permissions should
be assigned to the users only based on context information
characterizing the three most important entities of any ac-
cess control framework: owners, requestors, and resources.
Thus, this paper proposes a generalized context-based access
control model for making access control decisions completely
based on context information.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.6.5 [Management of Computing and Information
Systems]: Security and Protection; H.3.4 [Systems and
Software]: Distributed systems
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1. INTRODUCTION
Pervasive Computing Environments (PCE) offer to the
users the possibility for access, to create and to share re-
sources, from anywhere at anytime, interacting dynamically
with other surrounding devices and users. The constant ad-
vancement of sensor-rich mobile devices (e.g. GPS, Blue-
tooth, accelerometer) has enabled to the users for creat-
ing dynamically content (e.g. photos, video, micro-blog),
which can be annotated at creation time with information
characterizing the situation (e.g. location, time, nearby de-
vices)[17].
However, these sensor-rich environments introduce new
access control requirements that cannot be solved by usual
existing models such as MAC (Mandatory Access Control
Model) [1] and RBAC (Role-Based Access Control Model)
[14]. They were initially specified for closed and relatively
unchangeable distributed systems that deal only with a set
of known users who access a set of known services/resources.
Furthermore, they do not take into account information
characterizing the situation of owners, requestors, and re-
sources, such as location and time, when determining whether
access should be allowed or not to the users [8].
In systems implementing RBAC-based access control ap-
proaches, each user should be associated with one or more
roles in order to have permissions on resources. By contrast,
in PCE we cannot assume that access control frameworks
know previously all users and that it is able to apply user-
role associations. For instance, in the scenario of an inter-
national workshop in which the collaboration relationships
between the participants are dynamic and unpredictable,
we cannot determine previously the persons that will inter-
act with us and possibly share/access some resource (e.g.
presentation file). For granting access on resources using
a RBAC-based approach, the administrator or the resource
owner in a user-centric access control framework, should cre-
ate an identity for each participant assigning to it a role
(e.g. visitor), which will inherit role-associated permissions.
However, this administration task could be made simpler
if access permissions are granted to the users only based on
information characterizing their situations (e.g. in the work-
shop), such as location (e.g. the conference room) and time
(e.g. at session time).
In fact, the mobility of devices and users causes continu-
ously changes in the situation (i.e. context) of these entities,
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as well as in the interactions among them. Dey et. al [4]
define context as any information that can be used to char-
acterize the situation of an entity or object relevant to the
interaction between a user and an application. From access
control point of view, context information can characterize
the situation of three main elements present in any access
control system: owners, requestors, and resources. Granting
access on resource to the users without taking into account
the current context associated with these entities could com-
promise the security in PCE.
Some research [2, 12, 11, 13] attempts have been done un-
der context-aware access control models, which context in-
formation is an optional attribute used in order to limit the
scope of access control policies. For instance, CRBAC [12],
GRBAC [11], and TRBAC [2] extended the RBAC model in
order to take into account some context dimensions for re-
stricting access permissions on resources. However, as with
RBAC these models are not suitable to control access on
resources in open and dynamic environments with frequent
and unpredictable changes, which we cannot assume the ex-
istence of predefined roles and user-role associations.
In order to overcome this limitation, new approaches [7,
19, 9, 15] have been proposed where permissions are assigned
to the users completely based on context information char-
acterizing requestor’s situations at access time. However,
context-based access policies supported by these solutions
are generally limited to context information characterizing
requestor’s situations. For example, they do not support
policies based on owner’s and resource’s context informa-
tion as follows: (i) example of resource’s context-based ac-
cess policy: a user grants access of read on her photos to
nearby friends at photo shoot time; (ii) example of owner’s
and resource’s context-based access policy: I grant access of
read on documents created in my desk room to the team
when I am located in company building.
We are mainly motivated by need to extend context-based
access control models for expanding supported context di-
mensions that can be used for defining access policies com-
pletely based on context information. According to our
knowledge, none of existing work take into account requestor’s,
owner’s, and resource’s context together for making access
control decisions. Therefore, in this paper we propose an
access control model that generalize the use of context in-
formation, offering to resource owners (or administrators)
the possibility for defining access control policies completely
based on owner’s, requestor’s, and resource’s context.
The rest of paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents
our context model used by the proposed access control model.
Then, we explain the proposed model in Section 3. Section
4 discusses the related work and, in Section 5, we present
conclusion and future work.
2. MODELING CONTEXT
It is necessary to define a formal context model in order
to facilitate context representation, sharing, and semantic
interoperability in an access control framework implement-
ing the proposed model. With this purpose, we defined an
OWL DL ontology1 for modeling context information that
could be used for defining context-based access control poli-
cies. Our experience shows that using ontologies for context
modeling is well suited for pervasive applications and ser-
1http://www.w3.org/TR/owl-guide/
vices.
Before to present the proposed context model, named Ac-
cess Context Ontology, let us define the concepts of owner’s
context, requestor’s context, and resource’s context,
which describe the situation of access entities2. We have
defined these concepts based on Dey’s definition [4], as fol-
lowing:
• Owner’s context: any information that can be used
for characterizing the owner’s situation of resources
protected by the access control framework, which is
relevant for making context-based access control de-
cisions, such as location, activity, body temperature,
blood pressure, etc. For example, in a context-based
access control framework for Healthcare applications,
a patient would like to grant permission of read on
her medical records to any doctor if she is in a life-
threatening situation characterized by a sudden drop
in blood pressure or in heart rate. We could see in
this example that the permission will be assigned to
the requestors (i.e. any doctor) completely based on
owner’s context (blood pressure and heart rate);
• Requestor’s context: any information that can be
used for characterizing the entity’s situation which is
trying to access resources protected by the access con-
trol framework. For each access request received, the
requestor’s context is identified by the access control
framework and it is used in order to determine ac-
cess policies affected. For example, a user grants ac-
cess of read on presentation file for everyone located in
meeting room during the reunion (10-12h, November
3, 2009). In this case, the requestor’s context (i.e. lo-
cation and request time) is essential for taking access
control decisions;
• Resource’s context: any information that can be
used for characterizing the situation in which the pro-
tected object was created and its current status, which
is relevant for making access control decisions. For ex-
ample, a user grants access of read on their photos
to her friends that were located nearby her at photo
shoot time. In this case, at the moment of a photo
shoot (i.e. the creation time of resource) the resource
is annotated with information describing the situation
of creation (e.g. Bluetooth address of nearby mobile
devices at the photo shoot time, in which will be used
in order to infer the user’s nearby friends).
Moreover, we are classifying the context information re-
lated with each access entity according to five dimensions
considered by us as important for making context-based ac-
cess control decisions: spatial - any information character-
izing the situation from spatial dimension (e.g. location,
place, GPS coordinates); temporal - any information charac-
terizing the situation from time dimension (e.g. timestamp,
period of day, month, year, day, season); spatio-temporal -
any information characterizing the situation that is depen-
dent of both spatial and temporal dimensions i.e. each piece
of information is associated with a particular location at a
particular time (e.g. weather conditions, temperature, noise,
2We use the term Access Entity to refer any implicated el-
ement of an access control system: owner, requestor, and
resource.
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luminosity); social - any information characterizing the sit-
uation from social relationships (e.g. nearby persons and
nearby friends3); and computational - any information de-
scribing the situation from the computational characteristics
(e.g. user’s device capacities).
From our point of view, context information character-
izing the environment (e.g. luminosity, temperature, noise)
could be used for making access control decisions if and only
if it is describing the context of an access entity. Normally
this information is dependent of location and time dimen-
sions, e.g. the value of temperature is valid if and only if this
information is associated with a specific location at a par-
ticular time. We classified this information in our ontology
as concepts describing the spatio-temporal dimension.
We have proposed in previous works the Context top On-
tology [17, 16] for modeling the context dimensions listed
above. We are reusing this ontology as basis to define our
Access Context Ontology4 (see Figure 1), which was extended
in order to describe the context of any access entity sup-
ported by our access control model. Originally, this ontology
was defined for modeling the annotation context of multi-
media resources (see the PhotoMap application in [17, 16]).
Moreover, we are reusing GeoRSS5 concepts to describe GPS
coordinates and spatial geometric relations, OWL-Time6 to
express temporal content, and RDF FOAF7 ontology for de-
scribing social context dimension. From the Context concept
described in the Context Top Ontology, we defined a subclass
named Access Context (i.e. AccessContext ⊆ Context).
This concept capture from the context any information char-
acterizing the access entities, in which is relevant for making
context-based access control decisions, i.e. it can be used for
defining context constraints on access control policies. The
format of context-based access control policies supported by
the proposed model will be described in more detail in Sec-
tion 3.
Figure 1 shows the proposed Access Context Ontology,
which defines the principal context concepts for making con-
text-based access control decisions that are describing the
situation of access entities: Identity, Location (Indoor and/or
Outdoor), FOAF profiles, Activity, Instant (time), period of
day, etc. User’s Identity can be semantically described by
userID, user name, pseudonym, and role/group (i.e. when
is possible to identify it), which are represented as datatype
properties of Identity concept. We are using IETF RFC
41198 for describing semantically indoor and outdoor loca-
tions of users and geo-located concepts. The indoor loca-
tion can be described using the following formats: building
name (LMK); building name and floor (LMK, FLR); build-
ing name, floor, and room (LMK, FLR, LOC). The outdoor
location can be completely stated using 4 (four) standard
notations: (country); country and city (country, A3); coun-
try, city, and street (country, A3, A6-STS); country, city,
3We means by nearby persons or nearby friends the social re-
lationships associated to the situation that the system could
infer from Bluetooth addresses of nearby user’s mobile de-
vices
4http://membres-liglab.imag.fr/bringel/AccessContext.owl
5http://www.georss.org/
6http://www.w3.org/TR/owl-time
7Friend of a Friend Ontology
(http://xmlns.com/foaf/spec/)
8A Presence-based GEOPRIV Location Object Format.
(http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4119.txt?number=4119)
Figure 2: Our context management framework.
street, and house number with suffix (country, A3, A6-STS,
HNO-HNS).
The FOAF ontology was extended in order to define new
subclass for classifying the social relationships existing be-
tween owners and requestors (e.g. family member, friend,
bestFriend, supervisor, team member, etc). These social re-
lationships will be explored by owners in the administration
task of access control policy definition. This process will be
described in more detail in Section 3.
2.1 Managing Access Context Information
In order to deploy a context-based access control frame-
work implementing our access control model, we should have
a context management service providing context informa-
tion. The context information will be verified by the access
control framework for making context-based access control
decisions. Figure 2 shows our context management frame-
work, which was implemented9 in order to support context-
aware applications/services and context-based access con-
trol frameworks developed by our team, such as PhotoMap
[17], QACBAC [6], and SW3A [18]. The key modules of our
framework are:
• Context Provider (CP): CP are brokers present
on environment (e.g. a server controlling sensors dis-
tributed in a building) or on mobile devices (e.g. user’s
sensor-rich mobile devices) sending captured context
information to the Context Information Service (CIS)
(more specifically to the Context Collector - CC ). Each
CP keeps a dynamic list of registered sensors (e.g.
GPS, Bluetooth) controlling synchronous and asyn-
chronous notifications from them. The collected con-
text information is semantically represented using the
Access Context Ontology ;
• Context Information Service (CIS): this entity is
the principal software component of our context man-
agement framework, which is composed by following
sub-services:
9Java technologies: we are using J2EE for implementing the
server side and J2ME to the client side.
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Figure 1: Access Context Ontology.
i) Context Collector (CC): this service collects and ag-
gregates context information sent by CP, storing as OWL
documents that are instances of the Access Context Ontol-
ogy. Moreover, context information described in these doc-
uments is stored by the Global Context Repository (GCR),
which is a postGreSQL database server with the PostGIS10
extensions;
ii) Context Reasoner (CR): CR runs inference and deriva-
tion process on context information described by OWL doc-
uments in order to obtain semantic high-level context in-
formation i.e. enriching the user context. For instance, it is
able to infer the name of nearby user’s friends using the cap-
tured Bluetooth addresses of nearby devices and the user’s
FOAF profiles. This service requests some Web Services
(e.g. georeverse Web Service from Geonames11) in order to
have high-level semantic information from low-level seman-
tic information. For example, it is able to derive the real
address (i.e. place concept) from the GPS coordinates;
iii) Context Obfuscator (CO): this service enforces user’s
privacy policies on context information by running obfusca-
tion and anonymization process based on ontologies. Pri-
vacy policies are represented on our system using SWRL12
(Semantic Web Rule Language) that is a proposal W3C for
a Semantic Web rules language. From the instances of Ac-
cess Context Ontology, only the context concepts, relations,
and datatype properties disclosed by the owner’s context at
request time will be described on the OWL document that
will be sent to context consumers. We named this sub-set
of context information described by this OWL document as
Context View (i.e. ContextV iew ⊆ AccessContext). The
privacy policies are stored by thePrivacy Policy Manager
(PPM), which provides to the users a web interface for writ-
ing easily SWRL rules;
iv) QoC Evaluator (QoCE): it is the principal service for
10http://postgis.refractions.net/
11http://www.geonames.org/
12http://www.w3.org/Submission/SWRL/
evaluating the Quality of Context [3]. It uses Context Views
originated by the CO with QoC information captured from
the environment (e.g. currentTime) and configuration files
(e.g. lifeTime) in order to measure the QoC indicators asso-
ciated with each context concept described by the Context
View instance (e.g. the precision of location, up-to-dateness
of temperature);
v) Context View Provider (CVP): context information
queries are answered by the CVP. He is providing user’s
Context Views describing context information to the con-
text consumers (e.g. the access control framework) as Jav-
aBeans objects, XML files or OWL instances. CIS can yet
to receive/transfer user’s context information to other CIS
belonging to different domains with which maintain trust
relationships.
Moreover, the communication channels established between
S, CP, CIS, and CAA are protected using protocols and secu-
rity services defined on application layer. We are reusing the
security framework [5] defined by us to construct context-
aware security services. This requirement is essential to
save the confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of Con-
text Views, from the capture to its use by context-aware
application and services.
3. A GENERALIZED CONTEXT-BASED
ACCESS CONTROL MODEL
The proposed access control model is centered on the con-
text concept, which is composed by information character-
izing the controlled resources, requestors, owners, and the
environment surrounding them. In this model, the context
act as a mediator between the entities requiring access to re-
sources (i.e. requestors) and the set of permissions assigned
to these resources. Context-based access control policies de-
fined by resource owners (or an administrator) describe the
context conditions, named Access Control, which must be
met in order to obtain access to associated resources, i.e., re-
questor can perform only those operations related with the
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Figure 3: Generalized Context-Based Access Con-
trol Model.
access contexts currently active.
The specification of our model is based on RBAC model
but we are using the Access Context concept defined in the
Access Context Ontology, which represent context informa-
tion sentences relevant for taking access control decisions,
instead of roles as being the main difference. Therefore, the
permissions are assigned to requestor entities taking into ac-
count Access Context assigned to context-based access poli-
cies, which are defined by resource owners or by administra-
tor of access control system.
Access policies are defined describing relationships be-
tween 6 (six) set of elements of our access control model:
Requestor Entities(RE), Context(C), Access Context(AC),
Resources(R), Operations(O), and Permissions(P). Figure
2 shows our access control model and the relationships be-
tween these elements.
Definition 1. The generalized Context-Based Access Con-
trol Model is composed of the following components:
• A set RE of requestor entities, a set AC of access con-
text, a set R of resources, a set O of operations, and a
context condition language CCL.
• A set of permission P (P = 2R×O) = {(r, o)|r ∈ R, o ∈ O},
which each permission is a approval to perform an op-
eration on one resource in a given Access Context.
• The set of context-based access permission CBAP
(CBAP = 2AC×P ) = {(ac, p, e)| ac ∈ AC, p ∈ P, e is a
expression of CCL defined using the values of context
concept in the ac}.
• Requestor entity Assignment (RA): RA ⊆ RE×
AC, it is a many-to-many relationship mapping RE-
to-AC assignment relation.
• Context-based access permission Assignment
(CBAPA): CBAPA ⊆ AC×CBAP . Each AC could
be associated with many CBAP and each CBAP has
only one AC assigned. It is a one-to-many relationship
mapping AC-to-CBAP assignment relation.
• Operation Assignment (OA): OA ⊆ O ×R. Each
operation (O) could be associated many resources, and
for each resource (R) could be granted many opera-
tions. It is is a many-to-many relationship mapping
operation-to-resource assignment relation.
• Assigned requestor entities to access context:
assigned re(re, ac)= {re ∈ RE, ac ∈ AC|(re, ac) ∈ RA},
the mapping of an access context onto a set of requestor
entity.
• Assigned permissions to access context:
assigned p(p, ac) = {p ∈ P, ac ∈ AC|(p, ac) ∈ PA},
the mapping of access context onto a set of permissions.
• Operations associated with permission: (p : P )→
o ⊆ O, the permission-to-operation mapping. It is the
set of operations associated with permission p.
• Resources associated with permissions: (p : P )→
r ⊆ R, the permission-to-resource mapping. It is the
set of resources associated with permission p.
• In this access control model, there is an inheritance
relationship between AC. It is described formally as
below:
IAC ⊆ AC ×AC is an inheritance relation (⇒)ac1 ≥
ac2, which means that ac1 inherits the privileges of
ac2.
→ assigned p(p, ac2) ⊆ assigned p(p, ac1)
In what follows we provide additional details on the context
condition language defined in order to describe condition
expressions based on Access Context concepts defined by
the Access Context Ontology.
3.1 Context Condition Language (CCL)
The proposed model includes a simple language for ex-
pressing constraints based on access context information.
Such context constraints defined by means of expressions
should be evaluated when enforcing context-based access
control policies. The context constraints that could be ex-
pressed by CCL are defined as following:
Definition 2. Let c be a concept of AC (Access Control).
Each c ∈ AC has a domain of possible values, denoted as
Dc. An atomic context condition (acc) defined over AC has
the form (c op v), where c ∈ AC, v ∈ Dc, op ∈ OP =
{>,≥, <,≤, 6=,=}. The set of op can be extended in order
to accommodate user-defined operators as well. The con-
straints of CCL are defined as following:
• An atomic context condition (acc) is a constraint of
CCL;
• Let acci and accj be constraints of CLL, then acci ∧
accj is a constraint of CCL;
• Let acci and accj be constraints of CLL, then acci ∨
accj is a constraint of CCL.
Based on this language, we are able for specifying any com-
plex context constraint in order to describe all kinds of
context-based access control policies supported by the pro-
posed model.
3.2 Policy representation
Policies are used to mediate context-based access control
decisions, which are described as tuples defined by owner’s
resources or by access control administrators. They repre-
sent associations between Requestor Entity, Access Context,
and Permission. They are defined following the format be-
low:
policy(pol) = (re, p, e, enable bit) (1)
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• re is a identity assigned to the requestor entity (e.g.
name, group, role). When omitted or assigned the
value everyone, only requestors associated to the ac-
cess context ac that meets the constraint defined by e
get access to the protected resource;
• p is a permission (p ∈ P );
• e is a context constraint expression defined using CCL;
• enable bit indicates whether the associated policy is
enabled/disabled (1,0).
Owner’s resources could define also a set of policy that is
represented formally as follows:
policy set(polset) = {pi | pi is a policy, i ∈ [1, I]} (2)
3.3 Enforcing request of access
We define a request of access (ReqA) as a triple (req, perm,
ac), where:
• req is a requestor entity who issues this data access;
• perm is the permission that this requestor wants to
acquire.
• ac is a set of values for every context concept c de-
scribed by Access Context at request time. That is,
ac = {v1 of c1, v2 of c2, ..., vn of cn}, where
{c1, c2, ..., cn} is the set of context concept described
by the Access Context.
A request of access ReqA(req, perm, ac) is granted only if
there exists an access control policy pol = (re, p, e, enable bit),
such that enable bit = 1 (i.e. the policy is enabled), req ∈
re, perm = p, and e evaluates to true under ac (i.e. when all
c1 in constraint expression e are replaced with their values
in ac, then the resulted Boolean expression is true).
From this definition, we can design algorithms in order to
determine whether a request of access is authorized or not
based on context values described by Access Context. We
have proposed a solution divided into two algorithms: the
first algorithm (see in Figure 4 algorithm 1) is in charge of
identify the candidate policies (PolsetC) from the policy set
defined by the resource owners, which are been controlled by
the Policy Administration Point of an access control frame-
work in which implement the proposed model (we will de-
scribe in detail this entity in subsection 3.5); the second
algorithm (see Figure 5) evaluates the context constraint
expression associated with each candidate policy in order
to identify if this expression is true for the current access
context.
Algorithm 1 verifies for each Poli in the PolsetC if the
req of ReqA (i.e. request of access) is in the re of Poli.
In additional, it is verified if the perm of ReqA is equal to
p of Poli. If these two conditions are true, the Poli is a
candidate policy. After running the algorithm for identifying
the candidate policy set (PolsetC), this set will be evaluated
by the Algorithm 2 (EvaluateContextConstraint) in order
to verify if the expression e is true for the current access
context, grating/denying access permission to the requestor
entity.
Figure 4: Enforcing request of access.
3.4 Policy Examples
Using the concepts of Access Context Ontology for charac-
terizing the access entities defined in Section 2, we can define
7 (seven) different sets of context-based access policies. In
this section we present example of each set type, showing the
expressiveness in which we could define context-base access
policies using the CCL.
• Owner’s context-based access policy: this type of
policy is taking into account only context information
characterizing the owner’s context.
Example: a patient (owner) grants permission of read
on her medical records to any doctor if she is in a life-
threatening situation characterized by a sudden drop
in blood pressure (blood p) or in heart rate (heart r).
ac1 = {(owner.blood p < 85) ∨ (owner.heart r < 60)} ;
Pol1 : (doctor, (medicalrecords, read), ac1, true);
• Resource’s context-based access policy: this pol-
icy type is taking into account only context informa-
tion characterizing the resource’s context.
Example: a user grants access of read on photo collection1
to everyone nearby her mobile device at photo shoot
time.
ac2 = {(requestor.deviceAddr in
resource.nearbyDeviceAddrs)};
Pol2 : (everyone, (photo collection1, read), ac2, true);
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Figure 5: Evaluating context constraint.
• Requestor’s context-based access policy: this pol-
icy group is taking into account only context informa-
tion characterizing requestor’s context.
Example: a user grants access of read on presentation file
to everyone located in the meeting room.
ac3 = {(requestor.location = “meeting room”)};
Pol3 : (everyone, (presentation file, read), ac3, true);
The following policy examples are defined using context in-
formation characterizing simultaneously one or more access
entities.
• Owner’s and resource’s context-based access pol-
icy: when I am located in my desk room (owner’s con-
text), I grant access of read on the documents created
in this room (resource’s context) to my team.
ac4 = {(owner.location = “desk room”)
∧ (resource.location = “desk room”)};
Pol4 : (team, (resource, read), ac4, true);
• Owner’s and requestor’s context-based access
policy: I grant access of read on photo collection2
to everyone located nearby (owner’s and requestor’s
context).
ac5 = {(requestor.deviceAddr in
owner.nearbyDeviceAddrs)};
Pol5 : (everyone, (photo collection2, read), ac5, true);
• Requestor’s and Resource’s context-based ac-
cess policy: a user grants access of read on photos
taken in Paris (resource’s context) to everyone located
in this city (requestor’s context).
ac6 = {(requestor.location = “Paris”) ∧
(requestor.location = photo.location)};
Pol6 : (everyone, (photo, read), ac6, true);
• Generalized context-based access policy: a user
grants access of write photo taken in Paris (resource’s
context) to everyone located in this city (requestor’s
context), but only when she is located also in Paris
(owner’s context).
ac7 = {(requestor.location = “Paris”) ∧
(requestor.location = photo.location) ∧
(requestor.location = owner.location)};
Pol7 : (everyone, (photo, write), ac7, true).
In this example (Pol7), we can identify yet a inheritance
relationship between ac7 (Pol7) and ac6 (Pol6), which means
that each requestor associated to ac7 (this context is more
restrictive that ac6, and ac6 is included in ac7 ) inherits the
privileges assigned to ac6 (i.e. (photo, read)).
3.5 Implementation
In order to deploy an access control framework support-
ing each type of context information in which can affect
context-based access control decisions, it is necessary that
the following requirements are met:
• Support for sensing and management of context infor-
mation associated with requestors and owners, which
should be available to the access control framework for
making access control decisions;
• Support for sensing context information at creation
time of resources, providing mechanisms to assist the
users in the task of context annotation associated with
the resources;
• It is required to guarantee the security, privacy, and
quality of context information used for making context-
based access control decisions, as we identified in [6].
Compromised context information could cause incor-
rect access control decisions generating security breaches
in the access control system;
• In addition to determining context information at re-
quest time of resources and deciding whether to permit
access, it should be possible to suspend a permission
assigned to the current context when it changes to a
state where the context constraint expression is not
more true [19].
We have identified two implementation approaches for
assigning permissions based on context: the passive and
the active approach. The first approach (passive) is char-
acterized by the context verification only at request time
of resource, identifying the affected permissions and grant-
ing/denying access to requestor, i.e. the access control frame-
work identifies the owner’s, requestor’s, and resource’s con-
text at request time and enforces the affected access control
policies. The second approach is more complex, which it is
necessary constantly verifying context information in order
to identify assigned permissions described in the policies.
When an active permission is identified, the access control
framework notifies the affected users (e.g. the access con-
trol interface shows the resource names when it is active for
the current context). The task of assigning permission is
dynamically context-dependent.
The passive approach is the most implemented solution
by context-based/aware access control systems, primarily
motivated by simplicity of implementation. It requires the
disclosure of the list of resources controlled by the access
control framework in order to allow requestors to query ac-
cess for any listed resources. This approach is lightweight
but presents a security breach resulting of the disclosure of
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the list of resources controlled by the access control system,
even if they do not have permissions to access the resources.
The active approach requires a notification service that
constantly updates the list of resources available to the af-
fected users, taking into account the permissions assigned to
the context conditions (i.e. access policies) that match the
current context.
An intermediate approach is still possible to be imple-
mented, where the process is conducted in two phases. Firstly,
the user requests a list of resources active taking into ac-
count the current context. Posteriorly, she requests access
to the resources from this list, in which the current context
will be verified again in order to validate the permissions
for the requestor’s context. This approach eliminates the
security problem present in the passive approaches, beyond
reducing the consumption of resources and the difficulty for
implementing the active approach.
We are developing our access control model based on the
intermediate approach in order to assign context-based per-
missions. Moreover, we are taking into account the require-
ments identified above. The first three requirements are di-
rectly met through the Context Management Architecture
presented in Section 2. The last requirement is met imple-
menting the algorithm 2 described in Section 3 in order to
evaluate each permission assigned to the users when occurs
changes on context.
Our access control framework is based on Sun’s XACML
Implementation13, which we are considering that all context-
based access control decisions will be performed on server
side. The idea is to validate our approach in a client/server
scenario and afterward propose an access control light-middle-
ware that will be executed completely on mobile devices (i.e.
requesting and enforcing context-based access control deci-
sions on resources). XACML is an OASIS14 standard that
describes both a policy language and an access control deci-
sion request/response language (both encoded in XML).
XACML defines a policy language using attributes for de-
scribing requestors, resources, and environment. From our
point of view, these XACML attributes have the same func-
tion in the XACML access control decision process that con-
text information have on our access control approach. Thus,
we extended the Sun’s XACML implementation in order to
support context information describing the situation of the
access entities as attributes.
Figure 6 shows the proposed access control framework in
which is integrated with our context management architec-
ture. The access control framework mainly contains PEP
(Policy Enforcement Point), PDP (Policy Decision Point),
PCP (Policy Context Information Point), PAP (Policy Ad-
ministration Point). The PCP is a software entity based
in the PIP entity (Policy Information Point) of the Sun’s
XACML implementation, which was modified in order to
support context information as attributes. Originally, this
entity is in charge of transfer the attributes required for
making ACML access control decisions.
The flow of an request of access is as follows (see Figure 6):
(1) the entity (e.g. a user, a service) that tries to access a re-
source sends a request described using the XACML request
language to the PEP; (2) the PEP intercepts this request
and sends the requests to the PDP; (3-6) the PDP makes
13http://sunxacml.sourceforge.net/
14http://www.oasis-open.org/home/index.php
access decisions according to the access policy or policy set
written and managed by PAP, using the context attributes
obtained by querying the PCP (i.e. it request the access
context to the CVP of our context management architec-
ture); (7) the access decision given by the PDP is sent to
the PEP and the PEP permits or denies the access request
according to the decision of PDP (8).
Moreover, the PDP was modified in order to filter the
policy set using global requirements of QoC (QoCR) defined
by the applications and/or users. If an access policy does not
attain these QoCR, it will be out of the policy set that will
be enforced by PDP. As result, we improve the performance
of our access control framework.
The response always includes an answer about whether
the request should be allowed using one of four values: Per-
mit, Deny, Indeterminate (an error occurred or some re-
quired value was missing) or Not Applicable (the request
can’t be answered).
The PEP and PDP might both be contained within a
single application (e.g. on mobile devices), or might be dis-
tributed across several servers. In the current version of
our access control framework, the user devices have only the
PEP deployed and request the PDP contained in a server
for making access control decisions. We offer a graphic tool
(Web interface), called Policy Creator, in order to help users
to build their own XACML policy documents in a friendly
and easy way.
4. RELATED WORK
We have identified and classified access control approaches
that use context information for making access control deci-
sions on two types: i) context-aware access control and ii)
context-based access control. The first group is composed
by approaches that use context information as a way for
assigning dynamically roles/identity and associated permis-
sions to the users, i.e., context information is only used for
improving an existing model that is not context-dependent.
On the one hand, they could work without context informa-
tion. On the other hand, the expressiveness of access control
policies will be limited.
Some research [2, 11, 13, 20, 10] attempts have been done
under the first group, which take into account context infor-
mation as an optional attribute used for limiting the scope
of access control policies, i.e. they are aware of context.
Bertino et al. have proposed in [2] the Temporal Role-
Based Access Control Model (TRBAC) to add up the time
dimension and the concept of role enabling/disabling in or-
der to improve the RBAC model. Ray et al. [13] extended
RBAC towards a Spatial-Temporal Role-Based Access Con-
trol Model for taking into account both spatial and tempo-
ral context dimensions. Moyer et al. presented a General-
ized Role-Based Access Control model (GRBAC) [11], which
extend the context dimensions supported by incorporating
the notion of object roles and environment roles into RBAC
model. In [20] Zhang et al. proposed the Dynamic Access
Control Model (DRBAC) in order to deal with context in-
formation and Kim et al. [10] proposed an similar approach
that extend RBAC model for adjusting dynamically role as-
signments (UA) and permission assignments (PA).
Similarly as occurs with RBAC model, all these RBAC-
based approaches do not work well in PCE where we cannot
assume the existence of predefined roles and user-role associ-
ations, which the relationships between resource requestors
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Figure 6: The proposed Access control Framework.
and resource owners tend to be ad-hoc in nature. For ex-
ample, the complete list of users on the environment may
not be known, making it infeasible to define access control
policies based on role-user associations.
The second group is composed by context-centric solu-
tions where context is the principal entity explicitly guiding
both specification and enforcement of access control poli-
cies. Instead of assigning permissions directly to the users
and defining context-aware restrictions in which these per-
missions should be applicable, resource owners define for
each resource the context conditions that enable someone
to access it, i.e., the access control policies are completely
based and dependent of context information. When a re-
quest on protected resource is done the access control frame-
work identifies the current context in order to enforce asso-
ciated access control policies, grating/denying access to the
requestor.
Some research [19, 9, 15] have followed this direction,
which permissions are assigned to the users based on the
current situation. Yokoyama et al. [19] have proposed an
Anonymous Context Aware Access Control Architecture
(ACA2) based on an analogy to the public telephone service,
where users can anonymously access services supported by
their context through pre-registered software components
(proxies). The main features of this architecture include
anonymity, access suspension caused by context changes,
and active context certificates with stream verification. Since
this solution is focusing on architecture, it is not so clear the
formalization of the proposed access control model. Groba
et al. [9] have presented a context-dependent access control
for context information, which can be characterized by three
basic properties: owner-centric, context-dependent, and in-
dividual role model for each user. However, this solution
has been proposed to control access exclusively on context
information, which limits its use in PCE (resources can be
data, services, etc).
To the best of our knowledge, the work more closer to our
proposition is described in [15], where the authors present
a semantic access control aproach based on a context-aware
policy model, which treats context as a first-class princi-
ple for policy specification and adopts a hybrid approach
to policy definition based on DL ontologies and LP rules.
However, as occurs with the existing approaches from the
second group, this approach present a limited support to the
context dimensions (e.g. resource’s context), mainly based
on requestor’s context and the collocation concept, mean-
ing that the resource owner is located on the same place in
which the resource requestor is (i.e. she is collocated with
the requestor).
Moreover, all these propositions from the second group do
not present a formal definition of the access control model
used in order to implement their solutions. In this paper, we
define clearly and formally the proposed context-based ac-
cess control model, presenting the context dimensions associ-
ated to the owners, requestors, and resources, which could be
used for making context-based access control decisions. This
generalized context-based access control model could be uti-
lized in order to implement and to combine various kinds
of access control concepts using context information, which
could be tailored and extended in order to reduce/enlarge
the support for context-based access control decisions. For
example, the role concept is supported by our access control
ontology, permitting to extend the proposed model to a hy-
brid approach based on both context and roles (i.e. when it
is possible to determine and assigning roles to the users).
5. CONCLUSIONS
Open, dynamic, and heterogeneous pervasive environments
call for new access control solutions, requiring changes in
the focus of access control models from identity/role-based
to the context-based approaches.
With this objective in mind, in this paper we propose
a generalized context-based access control model that of-
fer to resource owners and access control administrators the
possibility for defining context-based access policies taking
into account context information describing the owner’s, re-
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questor’s, and resource’s situations. According to our knowl-
edge, none of the existing work considers the owner’s, re-
questor’s, and resource’s context together for making context-
based access control decisions in PCE.
Therefore, the proposed model extends the support for
defining access policies completely based on context informa-
tion, offering 7 (seven) types of context-based access control
policies.
We are currently working on implementing a prototype
integrating this model with the QACBAC model proposed
by us in [6], in order to enforce access control policies taking
into account both: the generalized use of context informa-
tion and associated QoC requirements. We have identified
in [6] that using context information with inadequate QoC
may increase the probability of incorrect access control de-
cisions. We are integrating a conflict detection mechanism
for
Moreover, we plan to extend the proposed model in order
to take into account the privacy requirements when enforc-
ing access control policies, such as the support to purposes
and obligations. In additional, we plan to integrate a mech-
anism to dynamically and statically detect/resolve conflict
on context-based access control policies.
The focus of our work has been predominantly on context-
based access control, then our idea is to propose a family of
context-based access control models for pervasive environ-
ments that can be implemented taking into account specific
application/service requirements, such as policy hierarchies,
context dimensions, quality of context, and privacy.
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ABSTRACT
Recent advances in positioning and tracking technologies have led
to the emergence of novel location-based applications that allow
participants to access information relevant to their spatio-temporal
context. Traditional access control models, such as role-based ac-
cess control (RBAC), are not sufficient to address the new chal-
lenges introduced by these location-based applications. Several re-
cent research efforts have enhanced RBAC with spatio-temporal
features. Nevertheless, the state-of-the-art does not deal with mo-
bility of both subjects and objects and does not support the utiliza-
tion of complex access control decisions based on spatio-temporal
relationships among subjects and objects. Furthermore, such re-
lationships change frequently in dynamic environments, requiring
efficient mechanisms to monitor and re-evaluate access control de-
cisions. In this position paper, we present a healthcare emergency
response scenario which highlights the novel challenges that arise
when enforcing access control in an environment with moving sub-
jects and objects. To address a realistic application scenario, we
consider movement on road networks, and we identify complex ac-
cess control decisions relevant to such settings. We overview the
main technical issues to be addressed, and we describe the archi-
tecture for policy decision and enforcement points.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.2.0 [General]: Security, integrity, and protection; H.2.8 [Database
Applications]: Spatial databases and GIS; J.3 [Life and Medical
Sciences]: Medical Information Systems
1. INTRODUCTION
The availability of mobile devices with positioning capabilities
has fostered the development of location-based applications that
allow users to access information relevant to their spatio-temporal
context. For instance, visitors of a museum may be able to access a
electronic on-line guide system as long as they are situated within
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are
not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage, and that copies
bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to
republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific
permission and/or a fee. ACM SPRINGL ’09, November 3, 2009. Seattle,
WA, USA (c) 2009 ACM ISBN 978-1-60558-853-7/09/11...$10.00
the museum’s perimeter. Such applications introduce specific secu-
rity challenges that reach beyond the capabilities of traditional ac-
cess control systems, such as Role Based Access Control (RBAC).
Several models have been proposed [1, 2, 5] that extend RBAC
to allow the specification of policies in which the access decision is
determined by the spatio-temporal context of subjects and objects.
However, these models relate the role extents to fixed locations, re-
stricting the policies to static zones. Therefore, they may not be
suitable for dynamic mobile environments where both subjects and
objects are moving continuously. In addition, in certain location-
based application scenarios, the access control decision may de-
pend on complex spatio-temporal relationships among subjects and
objects. Surveys of access control in location-based services can be
found in the literature [3].
In this position paper, we outline an access control framework
for healthcare emergency response that illustrates the requirements
to access control in a dynamic environment with mobile subjects
and objects. In this scenario, a patient who requires an emergency
response triggers an event that results in the creation of an emer-
gency care request in the system. Such an event can be generated
by the patients themselves, or by an automatic system designed to
alert emergency response teams (e.g., in-vehicle GPS-enabled units
such as On-Star provide automatic car crash notification).
The record inserted in the system contains a number of event
attributes, for instance, symptoms, vital signs, as well as the age
and gender of the patient. Based on the patient identifiers (e.g., cell
phone number, or identifier of the reporting On-Star unit) additional
information can be associated with the emergency record request,
such as the patient’s medical history.
The location of the emergency, the patient symptoms, medical
history, etc., represent objects that need to be accessed by several
categories of mobile subjects, such as medical doctors, ambulance
personnel or medical-trained volunteers. Note that the objects may
also be mobile. For instance, a patient suffering from a heart attack
may be in a moving vehicle drove by a family member.
An event may refer to a single patient, e.g., an individual with
a heart attack, or it may involve several patients, e.g., in the case
of a car accident. In response to an event, the emergency response
system must find subjects that are authorized to access the event’s
attributes and provide on-site help to patients. We identify two key
requirements.
First, as medical information is sensitive, the system needs to en-
sure that access to confidential data is thoroughly controlled. Note
that distinct subjects may have different privileges with respect to
information disclosure: For example, doctors may be allowed to
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access medical history, whereas volunteers should not learn con-
fidential information about the patient that it is not related to the
current event.
Second, an emergency requires fast response. The authorized
subjects should be able to arrive at the location of the emergency
within a maximum period of time. Thus, the decision about which
subjects to authorize must take into account the distance between
the event location and the subjects.
Two representative types of location constraints are range and
nearest-neighbor constraints. For instance, the former corresponds
to requirements such as, “A subject is only allowed to access an
event record if its distance to the event site is less than one mile,”
whereas the latter addresses requirements such as, “A subject is
only allowed to access an event record if it is the nearest subject to
the event site.”
In addition, the positions of both subjects and objects may change
over time. Therefore, the spatial relationship between subjects and
objects must be monitored continuously. Note that spatial and non-
spatial (e.g., level of medical education, specialization, required
equipment) constraints may be combined. For instance, if a volun-
teer and a doctor are located at the same distance, only the doctor
should be granted access. Such complex access control decisions
require specialized mechanisms for the design of policy enforce-
ment and decision points (PEP/PDP).
Figure 1: Emergency Response Scenario
The example in Figure 1(a) shows several volunteers vi and off-
duty doctors di driving around a city, in additio to a hospital. Con-
sider that a car accident is reported at location A, and the car crash
victim has a pre-existing heart condition and suffers from diabetes.
In response to the event, the emergency response system takes the
following actions: First, an ambulance is requested from the near-
est hospital. Next, doctor d1 who is nearest to the accident site is
notified, and starts moving towards the site to perform a prelimi-
nary evaluation and treatment before the ambulance arrives. The
notification sent to d1 includes the coordinates of the accident site
together with some basic information about the nature of the emer-
gency, the victim’s age, and pre-existing conditions.
As d1 moves towards the accident site, a traffic jam may occur
at intersection B, so d1 is no longer able to reach the patient in
time (Figure 1(b)). The system considers additional subjects, such
as volunteers v1 and v2. Although v2 is closer to the accident site
than v1, the route of v2 crosses the traffic jam, so v1 is chosen
instead. In addition, doctor d2 is selected, and both are granted ac-
cess to the event record. However, doctor d2 is granted permission
to access more data about the victim, such as medical history. Such
information is not made available to v1.
While the volunteer v1 and the doctor d2 stabilize the patient,
the hospital may not find an available ambulance. Then, the system
may authorize d2 to drive the patient to the hospital, if the patient
is in a stable condition. Otherwise, an additional doctor (e.g., d3)
may be authorized to assist in the emergency. The system may de-
cide on the amount of data to be disclosed to a subject based on
the proximity to the accident site. This prevents the disclosure of
sensitive information to subjects that are not likely to participate
in the emergency, such as subjects that are delayed due to environ-
mental conditions (as d1 in the example above). However, some
general details can be provided to such entities, in order to provide
a backup plan.
This approach applies to location information as well: for in-
stance, only coarse-grained location information may be disclosed
to remote subjects, whereas accurate location data is sent only to
nearby subjects.
The objective of this position paper is to identify the representa-
tive requirements and challenges of location-based access control
in a dynamic environment with mobile subjects and objects. We
investigate access control decisions and enforcement with respect
to a combination of spatial and non-spatial (e.g., role-based) con-
straints.
Although our focus is on healthcare emergency response, many
of the aspects discussed are relevant to other classes of location-
based applications as well (e.g., public transportation). We em-
phasize that our work discusses initial directions and identifies key
challenges in location-based access control; the realization of a
complete access-control mechanism is beyond the scope of this pa-
per. However, we do give an overview of the architectural compo-
nents involved, as well as the main functionality offered by each
component.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the event and policy models. Section 3 illustrates the proposed ar-
chitecture of the system and the tasks performed in each compo-
nent. Section 4 outlines future research directions.
2. EVENT AND POLICY MODELS
As mentioned in Section 1, our envisioned access-control system
is event-centric, meaning that objects are generated following the
occurrence of an event such as a medical emergency (e.g., car acci-
dent). After object creation, the system must decide which subjects
(e.g., medical doctors, volunteers) are granted permission to access
the event-related data based on a mix of spatial and role-based con-
straints.
2.1 Event Model
An event is specified as a tuple:
E = 〈location, category,maxResponseT ime, attributes〉
where
• location indicates the position of the event
• category describes the event type (different types require
different numbers and types of entities)
• maxResponseT ime indicates the maximum allowed time
within which the event must be handled (e.g., the maximum
allowed time for the responders to arrive)
• attributes is a list of event characteristics
Depending on the required functionality of the system, location
may be specified either in physical terms (e.g., as GPS coordinates)
or logical terms (e.g., at the corner of Main Street and Elm Drive).
The use of category determines the number of responders and their
roles. For example, the organization may stipulate that category =
carCrash requires two doctors and one volunteer.
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Indicating a maxResponseT ime authorizes the system to re-
lax the data confidentiality and other constraints if the request can-
not be fulfilled. This mechanism allows flexibility for events that
require immediate focus and response, such as severe automobile
crashes. However, we also assume that most events will provide
this piece of data to ensure that help is provided within a reason-
able timeframe.
The attributes are provided when an event is triggered (e.g., the
cell phone number where the 911 call originated). Based on such
attributes, additional data objects can be originated, such as the age
and gender of the person who owns the cell phone (such data is
relevant if the victim places the call).
2.2 Policy Model
The system must support both traditional (e.g., role-based) and
spatio-temporal policies. Traditional policies can integrate other
access control or RBAC rules, such as “A volunteer is not allowed
to access a patient’s previous medical records.”
Spatio-temporal policies indicate constraints and obligations that
cannot be expressed in traditional policies. Examples of spatio-
temporal policies include “A volunteer is not allowed to access a
patient’s information for more than 10 minutes” or “A volunteer
is not allowed to access a patient’s symptoms if there is a doctor
nearby.” Note that the latter policy must be dynamically instanti-
ated to refer to specific elements in an event. That is, the rule should
only apply to a volunteer and a doctor that are part of the same
emergency call, thus belonging to the same event context. Rules
that are not related to a specific event are described as global. The
attribute scope will distinguish between event and global policies.
An access authorization policy is expressed as a tuple:
P = 〈scope, subject, object, feature, granularity, ST 〉
where
• scope is the context in which the rule applies (global or
event).
• subject denotes the entity (e.g. volunteer) to which the
authorization is applied
• object corresponds to the protected entity (e.g., patient whose
medical record is accessed)
• feature denotes the protected information (e.g., medical his-
tory, location, symptoms, diagnosis)
• granularity captures the granularity of the spatio-temporal
feature, or it can be null (e.g., in the case of location infor-
mation, we could specify an accuracy level of neighborhood
or street)
• ST = {ST1, ..., STk} represents the list of spatio-temporal
constraints that control the policy
A spatio-temporal constraint represents a feature that has a spa-
tial and/or a temporal dimension. Each spatio-temporal constraint
STi can be mapped to the following schema:
STi = {type, attribute, S, object, sign, time}
The elements of the schema are defined as follows:
• Element type is the type of the constraint. We consider range
constraint RC, k-nearest neighbor constraint kNN , reverse
k-nearest neighbor constraint RkNN , or null if there is no
spatial dimension.
• Element attribute denotes an additional parameter of the
constraint. For a range constraint, this represents travel time,
and k for (reverse) k-nearest neighbor constraints.
• Element S represents the list of subjects that participate in
the constraint.
• Element object corresponds to the subject, object, or loca-
tion under consideration relative to S.
• Element sign indicates if the constraint is positive or negative.
• Element time specifies the time validity (expiration), which
varies within the interval (0,∞).
As an example of a policy, consider the rule, “A volunteer is not
allowed to access a patient’s symptoms if there is a doctor in less
than 10 meters.”. This policy would be expressed as the tuple
P = 〈“event”, “volunteer”, “patient”, “symptoms”, φ, S1〉
The spatio-temporal constraint would be expressed as
S1 = 〈“RC”, “10m”, “volunteer”, “doctor”, “negative”,∞〉
Although the subjects in both the policy and the constraint are the
same in this example, this will not always be the case. That is, to
prevent redundant constraint expressions, S1 could also be used in
a policy tuple describing the doctor’s permissions given that con-
straint.
3. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
3.1 Overview
In traditional access control systems, a user initiates a request
and submits his or her relevant credentials, such as a username and
password. The system then evaluates the combination of the sub-
ject, the object requested, the credentials provided, and the relevant
policies, and it grants or denies access accordingly. In our pro-
posed approach, a request is automatically generated in response to
an event. The system then grants permissions to subjects, given the
current spatio-temporal environment and policy constraints.
Our approach encompasses a number of key novelties. First, the
system can grant permissions to multiple subjects simultaneously
as part of a single request. Second, the subjects receiving access
are not known when the request is initiated. That is, the system
must determine the most appropriate subjects in response to a re-
quest. Finally, the dynamic nature of spatio-temporal environments
necessitates continuous monitoring of subjects and objects. For ex-
ample, if the traffic congestion increases in one location, the system
may need to revoke or reassign authorizations in response to this.
Despite these differences, we find that the traditional notions of
Policy Decision Point (PDP) and Policy Enforcement Point (PEP)
are still applicable.
In addition to the PDP and PEP components, we also introduce a
Policy Database (PolicyDB) and a Moving Object Database (MOD).
PolicyDB contains the access control policies as specified by Sec-
tion 2.2. On the other hand, the positions of objects and subjects
are indexed by the Moving Object Database, where the weights of
the edges represent the driving time of each road segment (which
forms a travel time network [4]). In our setting, where a timely
response to an emergency is essential, the use of travel time is a
better choice than the use of network distance, as the former metric
captures and estimates the time that is required for an to travel to
a certain location in the network. Moreover, we assume that the
database is updated with real-time traffic information.
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Figure 2 illustrates the interaction among the PEP/PDP and the
rest of the system components when a new event is created (steps 1
and 2). As stated above, the PDP decides which entities will be
granted access to the event information (step 3). In order to do
this, the PDP queries the MOD to find subjects who have the re-
quired skills and are nearby the event location (the number and
skills of the subjects that are required in each case are determined
by the type of the event). Note that the MOD may need to provide
more subjects than are required by the event type, in case one or
more of the subjects is unable or unwilling to respond to the event.
Then, the access policies involving those subjects are obtained by
querying PolicyDB (step 4). As described in Section 2, these poli-
cies can contain static (organizational) and spatio-temporal rules
that need to be continuously monitored by the PEP. Therefore, the
PEP receives the subjects that will be involved in the event and the
constraints (step 5). Finally, the monitoring of the constraints is
initiated (step 6), and the subjects are notified (steps 7 and 8).
Figure 2: System Architecture
The Application layer abstracts the communication with the users,
the sending of notifications, and the handling of location updates.
In a variant of the scenario, the position of the users may be given
by a external location provider.
3.2 Access Control Decision
The PDP needs to perform two main decision tasks. When an ac-
cess request arrives in the system, it decides whether or not to grant
the access based on the policies that refer to the subject. The second
task, as mentioned previously, finds nearby and suitable subjects
that may respond to a new event. The first operation corresponds
to the functionality of a traditional access control system and is not
considered in this paper.
For the latter, the PDP performs an incremental expansion of
the network from the location of the event, using, e.g., the Incre-
mental Network Expansion algorithm (INE) [7]. This algorithm
retrieves the nearest neighbors from a starting point incrementally
and ordered by distance to the point. We assume that the function
retrieve_Next_NN _INE gets the next nearest neighbor that the
INE algorithm would return.
In addition to the set of subjects, the PDP builds another set that
corresponds to a back-up plan. This set consists of the subjects that
will be deployed if any of the subjects in the primary plan fail to
reach the emergency location. For example, a subject may not reply
to the notification withing a reasonable time limit, or it may get
delayed due to traffic. If this is the case, the system can quickly use
the back-up plan to choose another subject without re-evaluating
the entire request.
The pseudocode for the complete algorithm is shown in Figure 3.
The algorithm performs as follows. First, given the category of the
event, the type and number of required entities is retrieved for both
the primary and the backup plan (steps 2 and 3). These values are
stored in pairs [ti, ni], where ti is a type and and ni is the number of
subjects of that type that are still required (i.e., this value will be at
its maximum at the beginning of the execution, and it will decrease
when subjects are found). The value k represents the maximum
number of subject types in the system.
Then, INE is initialized (step 4). The algorithm executes while
not all the subjects have been found (represented by the condition in
step 5). For the next nearest neighbor that is found (step 6), the type
is extracted (step 7). If there is a subject of that type required for
either the primary plan (lines 8–10) or the back-up plan (lines 11–
13), the subject is added to the corresponding set. The algorithm
terminates when all the required subjects are found.
FindSubjects
Input: event location l and category c
Output: set of subjects for the primary plan Sp,
set of subjects for the back-up plan Sb
1. Sp, Sb = ∅
2. p = {[t1, n1]...[tk, nk]} = entitiesPrimaryP lan(c)
/* ti = subject type, ni = number of subjects */
3. b = {[t′1, n′1]...[t′k, n′k]} = entitiesBackupP lan(c)
4. initializeINE(l)
5. while ∃ni > 0 ∈ p ∨ ∃n′i > 0 ∈ b
/* while more subjects are needed */
6. s = retrieve_Next_NN _INE() /* uses INE algorithm */
7. t = typeOf(s)
8. if p[t].n > 0 then
/* if the plan needs a subject of that type, add it */
9. Sp = Sp ∪ {s}
10. p[t].n← p[t].n− 1
11. else if b[t].n > 0 then
/* if the backup needs a subject of that type, add it */
12. Sb = Sb ∪ {s}
13. b[t].n← b[t].n− 1
Figure 3: Find Nearby Subjects
Recall that the distance used in retrieve_Next_NN _INE is mea-
sured as the expected time to travel from the current position to the
location of the accident. Thus, the distance considered is the travel
time distance instead of road network distance.
If the event has a maxResponseT ime, the algorithm is mod-
ified to maintain a queue containing the discarded subjects (af-
ter line 13). In addition, the loop terminates when the distance
(travel time) from the last nearest neighbor found is bigger than
maxResponseT ime. If no results are found when the expansion
reaches maxResponseT ime or if the results are not enough, the
entities belonging to the discarded queue are considered. We can
assume that in these cases, the confidentiality can be relaxed in or-
der to provide a fast response time. For example, a volunteer may
be sent to the emergency instead of a doctor. Moreover, the system
could create some range constraints that trigger an alert when some
of the required subjects are in the vicinity.
We have illustrated a simplified version of the algorithm in which
the roles are not interchangeable. That is, the algorithm would look
for a volunteer even if there is a doctor nearby that can perform the
same (and more) operations. If roles can be ordered or organized in
a hierarchical manner, the algorithm should be modified to identify
the subjects in a more efficient manner.
3.3 Constraint and Policy Processing
After the subjects that belong to the primary and the back-up plan
are found, the PDP queries the PolicyDB to retrieve the policies
affecting the subjects in both plans. As mentioned in Section 2.2,
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some of these policies will need to be instantiated for the specific
objects of the event. From the set of retrieved policies, the spatio-
temporal constraints are extracted and sent to the PEP, which will
start the monitoring process.
We identify two kinds of location constraints:
• nearest neighbor constraints (e.g., “Volunteer A is a 2-nearest
neighbor of the accident site”)
• proximity (range) constraints (e.g., “Volunteer A is within 5-
minutes of the accident site”)
Note that as the final decision regarding an access request is done
by the PDP, both the PEP and the PDP need to maintain the list of
active constraints with their state (however, recall that the active
monitoring of the constraints is performed only by the PEP). For
example, the policy, “A volunteer is not allowed to access a pa-
tient’s symptoms if there is a doctor nearby,” will initially allow
the volunteer to access the information, but will revoke the access
when a doctor arrives. Similarly, the monitoring of the constraint
of the policy, “A volunteer is allowed to access a patient’s symp-
toms when the arrival time to the patient is less than 1 minute,”
will allow the system to send a notification to the subject when s/he
is close enough, without the subject requesting it. In other cases,
for example if the system detects that a subject is delayed due to
a traffic jam, the PDP may choose to send another subject to the
emergency.
The PEP monitors the spatio-temporal constraints and notifies
the PDP when a constraint changes state (from being met to not
being met or vice versa). The factors that may change the state of
a constraint, and thus need to be monitored, are the following:
1. movement of the subjects and/or the constraints
2. changes in the environmental conditions (e.g., traffic jams,
represented as changes to the edge weights)
3. time expiration of the constraint
4. requirements of the event (e.g., change of the category of the
event)
5. a subject becomes unavailable (subject changes status from
available to not available)
The location constraints at the PEP can be monitored as de-
scribed in the literature [6]. In this work, the authors propose two
methods to monitor kNN’s in road networks, the first of which
maintains the query results by processing only updates that may
invalidate the current NN sets, and the second of which follows
the shared execution paradigm to reduce processing time. More-
over, the methods support object and query movement patterns and
modifications of edge weights (thus supporting factors 1 and 2).
Although the structures presented in this work can be applied in
range queries and RkNN queries, solutions to efficiently support
this functionality still need to be developed.
To monitor the time expiration (factor 3), the PEP can maintain
a queue ordered by expiration time. When a constraint reaches
its expiration time, it is removed from the system, and the PDP is
notified.
For the last two factors (factors 4 and 5), the PEP can main-
tain two indices, based on the events (factor 4) and the subjects
(factor 5). When these entities change status, all the constraints in
which they are involved are eliminated from the system (and the
PDP is notified as in the previous cases).
The PDP maintains a list of the active policies and constraints
and the current state. This list is queried when a subject requests ac-
cess to an object of the system. When a constraint changes its state,
the factor that originated this change is examined. If the reason was
a change of the event requirements (factor 4), the entire plan for the
event needs to be re-evaluated. For the remaining cases, the system
may make use of the back-up plan.
4. FUTURE WORK
In this position paper, we have identified several challenging re-
search issues in location-based access control for helthcare emer-
gency response. In the future, we plan to formalize the proposed
event and policy models and to develop and prototype the func-
tionality that must be implemented in the PEP and PDP. We also
envision extending our proposal to take into account uncertainty in
reporting location data, as well as the privacy issues that arise when
subjects are required to report their location to the PEP.
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ABSTRACT
In recent years, spatio-temporal and moving objects databases
have gained considerable interest, due to the diffusion of mo-
bile devices (e.g., mobile phones, RFID devices and GPS
devices) and of new applications, where the discovery of
consumable, concise, and applicable knowledge is the key
step. Clearly, in these applications privacy is a concern,
since models extracted from this kind of data can reveal the
behavior of group of individuals, thus compromising their
privacy. Movement data present a new challenge for the
privacy-preserving data mining community because of their
spatial and temporal characteristics.
In this position paper we briefly present an approach for
the generalization of movement data that can be adopted for
obtaining k-anonymity in spatio-temporal datasets; specif-
ically, it can be used to realize a framework for publishing
of spatio-temporal data while preserving privacy. We ran
a preliminary set of experiments on a real-world trajectory
dataset, demonstrating that this method of generalization
of trajectories preserves the clustering analysis results.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.2.8 [Database Applications]: Spatial databases and
GIS; K.4.1 [Public Policy Issues]: Privacy
Keywords
k-anonymity, Privacy, Spatio-temporal, Clustering
1. INTRODUCTION
Many Knowledge Discovery techniques have been devel-
oped that provide new means for improving personalized ser-
vices through the discovery of patterns which represent typi-
cal or unexpected customer’s and user’s behavior. However,
the collection and the disclosure of personal, often sensitive,
information increase the risk of citizen’s privacy violation.
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For this reason, many recent research works have focused
on privacy-preserving data mining [2, 13, 6, 7]. In general,
these approaches allow to extract knowledge while trying to
protect the privacy of individuals represented in the dataset.
Some of these techniques return anonymized data mining re-
sults, while others provide anonymized datasets to the com-
panies/research institution in charge of their analysis. The
pervasiveness of location-aware devices, e.g., PDAs and cell
phones with GPS technology, RFID devices enables to col-
lect a great amount of traces left by moving objects and
to analyze their motion patterns. Clearly, in this context
privacy is a concern: location data allows inferences which
may help an attacker to discovery personal and sensitive in-
formation like habits and preferences of individuals. Hiding
car identifiers for example replacing them with pseudonyms
as shown in [13] is insufficient to guarantee anonymity, since
location represents a property that could allow the identifi-
cation of the individual. In particular, sensitive information
about individuals can be uncovered with the use of visual
analytics methods. Therefore, in all cases when privacy con-
cerns are relevant, such methods must not be applied to orig-
inal movement data. The data must be anonymized, that is,
transformed in such a way that sensitive private information
could no more be retrieved.
In this position paper we present a method for the gener-
alization of movement data that can be adopted for obtain-
ing a form of anonymity in spatio-temporal datasets. The
main idea is to hide locations by means of generalization,
specifically, replacing exact positions in the trajectories by
approximate positions, i.e. points by areas. This method
of generalization can be used in a privacy-preserving frame-
work of spatio-temporal data in order to generate an anony-
mous dataset which satisfy the k-anonymity property. In
the literature, most of anonymization approaches proposed
in the spatio-temporal context are based on randomization
techniques, space translations of points and suppression of
some potions of a trajectory. To the best of our knowledge
only the work in [15] uses spatial generalization to achieve
anonymity for trajectory datasets; however, a fixed grid hier-
archy is used in this work to discretize the spatial dimension.
In contrast, the novelty of our approach lies in finding a suit-
able tessellation of the territory into areas depending of the
input trajectory dataset. As a result of our approach, we
obtain anonymous trajectories with high analytical utility,
if compared with previous works (both randomization based
and generalization based): in particular, we show how the re-
sults of clustering analysis are faithfully preserved. The con-
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cept of spatial generalization has been also used in the works
on privacy in location-based services [5, 8, 9], where the
goal is on-line anonymization of individual location-based
queries, while our aim is privacy-preserving data publishing,
which requires the anonymization of each entire trajectory.
A detailed discussion appears in Section 2.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
2 discusses the relevant related works on privacy issue in
spatio-temporal data. Section 3 introduces the problem def-
inition. In Section 4 we describe the generalization approach
for trajectories. Section 5 describes the experimental results
on the clustering analysis. In Section 6 we discuss about the
possible ideas to adapt the proposed generalization method
to anonimyze movement data. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2. RELATEDWORK
Many research works have focused on techniques for privacy-
preserving data mining [2] and for privacy-preserving data
publishing. The first operation before data publishing is to
replace personal identifier with pseudonyms. In [13] authors
showed that this simple operation is insufficient to protect
privacy. In this work, Samarati and Sweeney propose k-
anonymity to make each record indistinguishable with at
least k − 1 other records. k-anonymity is the most popular
method for the anonymization of spatio-temporal data. It is
often used both in the works on privacy issues in location-
based services (LBSs) and on anonymity of trajectories.
In LBSs context a trusted server usually has to handle
the requests of users and to pass them on to the service
providers. In general, it has to provide a on-line service
without compromise the anonymity of the user. The dif-
ferent systems proposed in literature to make the requests
indistinguishable from k− 1 other requests use a space gen-
eralization, called spatial-cloaking [5, 8, 9]. In our con-
text the anonymization process is off-line, as we want to
anonymize a static database of trajectories. To the best
of our knowledge only three works address the problem of
k-anonymity of moving objects by a data publishing per-
spective [1, 10, 15]. In the work [1], the authors study
the problem of privacy-preserving publishing of moving ob-
ject database. They propose the notion of (k, δ)-anonymity
for moving objects databases, where δ represents the pos-
sible location imprecision. In particular, this is a novel
concept of k-anonymity based on co-localization that ex-
ploits the inherent uncertainty of the moving objects where-
abouts. In this work authors also propose an approach,
called Never Walk Alone based on trajectory clustering and
spatial translation. In [10] Nergiz et al. address privacy is-
sues regarding the identification of individuals in static tra-
jectory datasets. They provide privacy protection by: (1)
first enforcing k-anonymity, meaning every released infor-
mation refers to at least k users/trajectories, (2) then recon-
structing randomly a representation of the original dataset
from the anonymization. Yarovoy et al. in [15] study prob-
lem of k-anonymization of moving object databases for the
purpose of their publication. They observe the fact that
different objects in this context may have different quasi-
identifiers ans so, anonymization groups associated with dif-
ferent objects may not be disjoint. Therefore, a novel notion
of k-anonymity based on spatial generalization is provided.
In this work, authors propose two approaches in order to
generate anonymity groups that satisfy the novel notion of
k-anonymity. These approaches are called Extreme Union
and Symmetric Anonymization.
Another approach based on the concept of k-anonymity
is proposed in [11], where a framework for k-anonymization
of sequences of regions/locations is presented. The authors
also propose an approach that is an instance of the proposed
framework and that allows to publish protected datasets
while preserving the data utility for sequential pattern min-
ing tasks. This approach, called BF-P2kA, uses a prefix tree
to represent the dataset in a compact way. Given a thresh-
old k generates a k-anonymous dataset while preserving the
sequential pattern mining results.
Finally, in a very recent work [14], a suppression-based
algorithm is suggested. Given the head of the trajectories,
it reduces the probability of disclosing the tail of the trajec-
tories. This work is based on the assumption that different
attackers know different and disjoint portions of the trajec-
tories and the data publisher knows the attacker knowledge.
So, the solution is to suppress all the dangerous observations.
3. PROBLEM DEFINITION
A moving object dataset is a collection of trajectories D =
{T1, T2, . . . , Tm} where each Ti is a trajectory represented by
a sequence of spatio-temporal points:
Ti = (x1, y1, t1), (x2, y2, t2), . . . , (xn, yn, tn)
and (t1 < t2 < · · · < tn).
Given a moving object dataset D our goal is to provide
an anomymized version of D that guarantees the privacy
of the individuals while preserving some interesting analysis
results such as clustering analysis. For this aim we want to
use a k-anonymity approach based on spatial generalization.
In this position paper we describe a method for general-
ization of movement data that can be adapted for obtaining
anonymity in a moving object dataset. The idea is to hide
personal information by means of generalization, specifically,
replacing exact positions in the trajectories by approximate
positions, i.e. points by areas.
4. TRAJECTORY GENERALIZATION
The approach to generalize movement data consists of two
main steps: (1) generating a division of the territory into
areas and (2) generalizing the original trajectories.
4.1 Division of the Territory into Areas
The generalization method generates an appropriate di-
vision of the territory into areas. The method is based on
extracting characteristic points from the trajectories, which
are the positions of start and end, significant turns (i.e. the
change of the movement direction is above a given thresh-
old), and significant stops (i.e. the time of staying in the
same position is above a threshold). The extracted points
are grouped into spatial clusters. The central points of the
clusters are used as generating points for Voronoi tessellation
of the territory, which produces suitable areas. Since the ar-
eas are built around clusters of characteristic points, the
resulting abstraction conveys quite well the principal char-
acteristics of the movement. The level of the abstraction
can be controlled through the parameters of the clustering
method.
We demonstrate the work of the method by example of a
subset car trajectories got by the European project GeoP-
KDD. Thanks to this project we received a real-world and
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large dataset of trajectories of cars equipped with GPS and
moving in the city of Milan (Italy). For our preliminary
experiments we considered 4287 trajectories. Figure 1(a)
presents a map with the original trajectories. In Figure
1(b), there are the characteristic points extracted from the
trajectories (54362 points in total). Both the trajectories
and the characteristic points are shown with 10% opacity,
to enable the estimation of the densities in different places.
In Figure 1(c), the characteristic points have been clustered.
The clusters are represented by colouring. We use a special
spatial clustering algorithm with a parameter defining the
maximum radius (spatial extent) of a cluster. The clusters
in Figure 1(c) have been obtained for the value 500 metres
of this parameter. Figure 1(d) presents the centroids of the
point clusters and the Voronoi cells, which have been built
using the centroids as generating points. Besides the cluster
centroids, we add generating points around the boundaries
of the territory and in the areas where there are no char-
acteristic points from the trajectories. This is done for the
cells to be more even in sizes and shapes.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 1: a) Original subset of 4287 trajectories
(10% opacity). b) The characteristic points ex-
tracted from the trajectories (10% opacity). c) Clus-
tered characteristic points. d) Centroids of the clus-
ters and the Voronoi tessellation of the territory.
4.2 Generalization method
After obtaining the division of the territory, the trajecto-
ries are generalized in the following way. We apply place-
based division of trajectories into segments. For each trajec-
tory, the area a1 containing its first point p1 is found. Then,
the second and following points of the trajectory are checked
for being inside a1 until finding a point pi not contained in
a1. For this point pi, the containing area a2 is found.
The trajectory segment from the first point to the i-th
point is represented by the vector (a1, a2). Then, the proce-
dure is repeated: the points starting from pi+1 are checked
for containment in a2 until finding a point pk outside a2, the
area a3 containing pk is found, and so forth up to the last
point of the trajectory.
In the result, the trajectory is represented by the sequence
of areas {a1, a2, . . . , an}. There may be also a case when all
points of a trajectory are contained in one and the same
area a1. Then, the whole trajectory is represented by the
sequence {a1}. For each area ai in the sequence, there is a
corresponding time interval starting with the time moment
of the first position in ai and ending with the time moment
of the last position in ai.
As most of the methods for analysis of trajectories are
suited to work with positions specified as points, the se-
quence of areas {a1, a2, . . . , an} is replaced, for practical
purposes, by the sequence c1, c2, . . . , cn consisting of the cen-
troids of the areas {a1, a2, . . . , an}. As a result, we obtain
generalized trajectories. Figure 2 illustrates the generalized
trajectories of the cars from Milan.
Figure 2: Generalized trajectories of cars from Mi-
lan (10% opacity); the line thickness is 2 pixels.
5. CLUSTERING ANALYSIS
An important property of this method for protecting per-
sonal data is that the resulting transformed data are suitable
at least for some kinds of analysis. In particular, it is possi-
ble to analyze the flows between the areas and statistics of
the visits of the areas. One may also analyze the statistics
of the travel times between different pairs of areas, not only
neighboring. Frequently occurring sequences of visited ar-
eas can be discovered by means of data mining techniques.
It is also possible to apply cluster analysis to the modified
trajectories. Thus, we have made several experiments with
clustering of the original car trajectories from Milan and
generalized versions of these trajectories using the generic
density-based clustering algorithm OPTICS [4] with a suit-
able distance function.
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We found that the results of clustering the original and
the generalized trajectories are very similar when the dis-
tance threshold (the parameter of the clustering algorithm)
for the generalized trajectories is about one half of the dis-
tance threshold for the original trajectories. Figure 3 shows
the biggest clusters obtained from the original set of tra-
jectories (the first group of 12 clusters in the figure) and
the biggest clusters obtained from the set of generalized tra-
jectories (the last group of 12 clusters). The clusters are
represented in an aggregated form. The results have been
obtained using the density-based clustering algorithm OP-
TICS with the distance function “route similarity” [3, 12]
and the required minimum of 5 neighbors of a core object.
The distance thresholds used is 500m for the first group and
250m for the second group. The labels A, B, etc. establish
the correspondence between the clusters in two results. The
clusters of the second group corresponding to the clusters G
and L of the first group are not among the largest 12 clus-
ters (they are on the 15th and 14th places, respectively).
Analogously, the clusters of the first group corresponding
to the 11th and 12th clusters of the second group (clusters
with label N and Q in the figure) are on the 14th and 17th
places, respectively.
The results of the experiments allow us to believe that the
idea has a good potential.
6. GENERALIZATIONVSK-ANONYMITY
The approach described in Section 4, given a dataset of
trajectories allows us to generate a generalized version of
it. In order to adapt this method to the anonymization of
movement data, some extensions are required. In particular,
it is necessary to ensure that:
1. each area contains positions from the trajectories of k
different people, where k is a parameter.
2. the dispersion of the positions in each area is not less
than a specified threshold (another parameter).
3. for each pair of areas a and b there are either none or
at least k people who come from a to b (possibly, with
visiting some other areas in between).
The satisfaction of these anonymity conditions is easy to
check. Thus, the map in Figure 4 visualizes the numbers of
different trajectories that visited the areas of the territory
division (Voronoi cells) used for the generalization. The cells
where the first two conditions are not satisfied must be en-
larged to include more positions. This is done by producing
a new Voronoi tessellation after excluding the generating
points of the “problematic” cells. Similarly, when too few
people come from a to b, either a or b is excluded. To choose
between a and b, the total number of incoming and outgo-
ing links with the magnitudes below k is counted for each of
them. Excluded is the area where this number is bigger.
The generalization-based anonymization method is cur-
rently under development. We need to do further investiga-
tions for checking whether any risks to personal privacy are
indeed precluded when trajectories are anonymized in this
way.
7. CONCLUSION
In this position paper, we present an approach for gen-
eralization of movement data. We think that this method
Figure 4: The map shows the numbers of different
trajectories that visited the areas of the territory
division by area coloring. The areas that do not
contain any points from the trajectories are hidden.
can be adopted to realize a framework for anonymization
of spatio-temporal data based on spatial generalization and
the k-anonymity concept. Through a preliminary set of ex-
periments on a real-life mobility dataset, we showed that the
proposed technique preserves clustering results.
In future work, we intend to investigate further the pro-
tection model against the re-identification attack, that can
be obtained using the method proposed in this paper.
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ABSTRACT
The widespread adoption of location-based services (LBS)
raises increasing concerns for the protection of personal lo-
cation information. A common strategy, referred to as ob-
fuscation, to protect location privacy is based on forwarding
the LSB provider a coarse user location instead of the ac-
tual user location. Conventional approaches, based on such
technique, are however based only on geometric methods
and therefore are unable to assure privacy when the ad-
versary is aware of the geographical context. This paper
provides a comprehensive solution to this problem. Our so-
lution presents a novel approach that obfuscates the user
location by taking into account the geographical context
and user’s privacy preferences. We define several theoret-
ical notions underlying our approach. We then propose a
strategy for generating obfuscated spaces and an efficient
algorithm which implements such a strategy. The paper in-
cludes several experimental results assessing performance,
storage requirements and accuracy for the approach. The
paper also discusses the system architecture and shows that
the approach can be deployed also for clients running on
small devices.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.2.0 [General]: Security, integrity, and protection; H.2.8
[Database Management]: Spatial Databases and GIS
General Terms
Design, Experimentation, Security
Keywords
Location Privacy, Location Based Services
1. INTRODUCTION
The ever increasing collection of personal location data,
pushed by the widespread use of location-sensing technolo-
gies, like satellite positioning systems, RFID and sensors,
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Figure 1: Geographical context
and the development of location-based services (LBS), mo-
tivates the great concern for the protection of personal loca-
tion information (location privacy). The communication of
a user’s position to a LBS provider upon a service request
may result in the unauthorized dissemination of personal
location data. Such data, combined with other available in-
formation, may in turn lead to the inference of sensitive in-
formation about individuals. Various approaches have been
thus proposed to assure location privacy. Most of those ap-
proaches are based on obfuscation techniques that aim at
disguising the actual position of the user by forwarding to
the LBS provider fake or less accurate (generalized) location
information. Approaches based on k-anonymization refine
obfuscation techniques by making sure that the generalized
location of each user is indistinguishable from the general-
ized locations of other k − 1 users.
A common problem to all the above approaches is that
they do not take into account geographical knowledge that
the adversary may have about the reference spatial context.
We claim that by exploiting such knowledge, the adversary
may be able to obtain more precise bounds about the ac-
tual user location (referred to as location inference), thus
defeating the obfuscation mechanism. Another major draw-
back of such approaches is that they do not support location
privacy preferences, that is, the specification of which loca-
tions are sensitive for which users. Not all locations may
have the same sensitivity for all the users and therefore a
suitable obfuscation mechanism should be able to generate
obfuscation locations that are tailored to the privacy pref-
erence of each user. We believe that, as we move toward
more personalized LBS, privacy should be one of key per-
sonalization dimensions. Before moving to introduce the key
contribution of the paper, we introduce a running example
to illustrate the location inferences that are possible when
geographical knowledge is available to the adversary.
Example 1. Assume that a user of a LBS is located
within a hospital which for this user is a sensitive place.
Consider the geographical context in Figure 1.a: the hospi-
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tal H is close to a lake L and to a residential district R; all
these places, i.e., the lake, the district and the hospital, cover
a polygonal region. Suppose that no boats are allowed on the
lake and that the adversary has this knowledge. Assume also
that the actual position of the user is obfuscated by region O
containing the user’s position (obfuscated location). From
the observation of the spatial relationships existing between
the obfuscated location and the spatial entities, like spatial
containment, overlaps and disjointness, the adversary can
easily infer whether the user is located in a sensitive place.
In particular consider the following three cases:
i) The obfuscated location is spatially contained in the
extent of the hospital (Figure 1.b). In this case, the
adversary may easily infer that the user is located in a
sensitive place, that is, the hospital, although the actual
position is blurred to a coarser region.
ii) The region corresponding to the user’s obfuscated lo-
cation includes the extent of both the hospital and the
lake (Figure 1.c). Since the user cannot be physically
located inside the lake, because no boats are allowed on
the lake, the only realistic position is within the hos-
pital and thus the obfuscated location is still sensitive.
Notice that in this case information about the user’s
obfuscated location is combined with publicly available
information, i.e., that no boat is allowed on the lake,
in order to infer more precise information about the
actual location of the user.
iii) The region corresponding to the user’s obfuscated loca-
tion overlaps part of the hospital and part of the resi-
dential district (Figure 1.d). Since the hospital is the
only sensitive place, we can say that the obfuscated lo-
cation is “sensitive to some extent”.
Suppose now that the user is a physician. In such case the
fact of being located in the hospital is likely not to be sensitive
for this user.
The example emphasizes the fact that a location, besides a
geometric shape, has a semantics (e.g., hospital) which de-
pends on the entities spatially related to such position. The
example clearly shows that privacy breaches occur because
existing obfuscation techniques are unable to protect against
the inferences made by linking the geometric information
with the semantic location which, depending on the percep-
tions of users, may represent sensitive information. The pro-
tection of sensitive location information thus requires tech-
niques able to take into account the geographical context
in which users are located, in particular the semantic loca-
tions and the spatial distribution of population, as well as
the users’ privacy preferences. To our knowledge, a compre-
hensive approach to this problem has not been investigated
yet.
In this paper we take a step in that direction and present
a novel method for the personalized obfuscation of semantic
locations. A key concept in our approach is the sensitiv-
ity metric which quantifies the sensitivity of a region, i.e.,
“how much private” a region is. The choice of the metric is
crucial, and, indeed, different metrics can be devised. We
define the sensitivity of a region r with respect to a cer-
tain category of semantic locations (e.g., hospitals, religious
buildings) as the probability that a user in r is inside any
place of that category. Users can specify in a profile which
categories of semantic locations are sensitive as well as the
desired degree of protection for each of those categories. We
define the user profile as a set of constraints on the maximum
sensitivity of obfuscated locations which is tolerated by the
user. The privacy-preserving strategy is then articulated in
two stages: in the first stage, an obfuscation algorithm
generates a set of regions (obfuscated locations) masking the
extent of sensitive locations. Each of those regions includes
both sensitive and innocuous semantic locations, and sat-
isfies the user profile constraints. In the second stage, the
user’s position is checked against the obfuscated locations
and, if the user falls inside location r, then r is disclosed
in place of the exact position. It is important to observe
that the obfuscation algorithm does not take into account
the user’s position. This way, an attacker cannot exploit
the knowledge of the algorithm to infer more precise bounds
over the user’s position inside the larger region. Therefore
the method is robust against reverse engineering attacks.
The above elements are combined in the framework, re-
ferred to as PROBE (Privacy-preserving Obfuscation Envi-
ronment). The PROBE framework can be flexibly deployed
on either a two-tier architecture or in alternative, whenever
the client devices have limited capabilities, on a three-tier ar-
chitecture [5]. In the former case, the obfuscated locations
are generated by the client; in the latter case, by a third
system, e.g., a Web application or a laptop, and then down-
loaded on the client. To summarize, the key contributions
of this paper are:
• A privacy model for the specification of privacy pref-
erences on semantic locations. Semantic locations are
defined in compliance with geo-spatial standards. The
privacy model comprises the sensitivity metric and the
user profile model.
• An obfuscation algorithm called SensHil. Experimen-
tal results show that our algorithm is very efficient and
the size of obfuscated maps is very small and thus suit-
able for storage on small devices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next section
overviews related work. Then we introduce the location pri-
vacy model. The obfuscation algorithm is described in the
subsequent section followed by the experimental evaluation.
Final remarks and future plans are finally reported in the
concluding section.
2. RELATED WORK
The bulk of research on location privacy in LBS has fo-
cused on the development of spatial cloaking techniques [3,
21, 4, 7, 12, 9, 10]. In place of the exact user’s position,
spatial cloaking methods disclose a less accurate cloaked re-
gion CR containing the user. Spatial cloaking is extensively
applied to provide spatial k-anonymity [4, 7, 12, 9, 10].
The exact position of an individual is replaced by a CR
containing k users, while the privacy metric is defined by
the probability 1/k of identifying a user in CR. However,
spatial k-anonymity does not provide any protection against
location inferences [1]. For example, if an attacker knows
that John is among k users in the cloaked region CR, and
CR is inside a hospital, then the attacker can promptly infer
that John might have health problems. The reason of this
privacy leak is that spatial k-anonymity only protects users’
identities and not the semantic locations.
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A different approach which provides strong privacy guar-
antees is to encode a location-based query using crypto-
graphic techniques. For example, Ghinita et al. [6] present
a technique based on the PIR theory (Private Information
Retrieval) to compute nearest-neighbor (NN) queries with-
out disclosing any location information about the user and
the requested points of interest. This technique, however,
suffers from two main drawbacks: it is tailored on a partic-
ular class of queries, i.e., NN-queries; furthermore, it incurs
in high communication costs.
The protection of semantic locations has been addressed
by Xue et al. [20]. The goal is to prevent the individuals
inside a spatial k-anonymous region from being located in
a semantic location. The method extends the notion of l-
diversity [11] to the spatial case by adding the privacy con-
straint that a k-anonymous region must contain not only k
users, but also l different semantic locations. This approach,
however, does not take into account the personal preferences
of users (i.e., the hospital is sensitive for a patient, but it is
not so for a doctor). Further the resulting region can be very
broad, especially in geographically homogeneous areas. Our
approach overcomes those drawbacks and provide a flexible
solution in which users can request personalized obfuscation
while limiting the loss of spatial resolution.
Personalized privacy preservation is the major goal of
policy-based approaches. Location privacy policies, in par-
ticular, are commonly applied to control the disclosure of
personal locations to third parties [14, 22, 8, 18, 16]. Those
polices rely on models and protocols which often derive from
the W3C Platform for Privacy preferences (P3P) like in [14]
or that are rooted in access control [18, 22, 8, 16]. Those ap-
proaches, however, are not able to contrast inference chan-
nels, and in particular location inferences. On the other
hand, privacy personalization in the framework of spatial
k-anonymity [4] allows the specification of very simple pa-
rameters, like the value of k and the minimum size of the
cloaked region. More pertinent to our problem, is the ap-
proach by Tao et al. [19] presenting a privacy personal-
ization technique for the protection of sensitive attributes
in non-spatial, k-anonymous datasets. The substantial dif-
ference with PROBE, is that our system not only allows
the specification of user preferences to control location in-
ferences but also is able to generate generalized locations.
To summarize, there are various proposals which aim
to protect location either through spatial cloaking, policy-
based approaches or using strong but expensive solutions
like cryptographic techniques. None of them, however, is
able to provide at the same time a personalized and cost-
effective protection of semantic locations, which instead is
the unique contribution of PROBE.
3. THE PRIVACY MODEL
We now introduce the privacy model defined in PROBE.
The model is articulated in four components, namely the
space model, the sensitivity metric, the user profile, and the
obfuscated location model, that we describe in detail in what
follows.
3.1 Space model
The region of concern for the LBS application is referred
to as reference space Ω. Ω is a possibly bounded and con-
nected area in a two-dimensional space. The geometric ob-
jects in Ω have a spatial type compliant with geo-spatial
standards [15]. The user’s position is a point. Moreover
spatial types are closed under (appropriately defined) geo-
metric union ∪s, intersection ∩s, difference (\s).
Following geo-spatial standards, the semantic locations
are described in terms of spatial features (simply features
hereinafter). Features have a type. Further features have an
extent of region type. Moreover, we assume features to be
spatially disjoint. Note that if two places are one contained
in the other, the corresponding features must be defined so
that they do not overlap. For example, if a restaurant is
within a park, the extent of the park feature should have a
hole corresponding to the extent and location of the restau-
rant feature. We denote with Cov(ft) a function which
yields the spatial union of the extents of all features of type
ft. The pair of sets (FT, F ) representing respectively fea-
ture types and features is referred to as the geographical
database of the application.
Feature types can be classified as sensitive. The classifi-
cation easily extends to regions. Let r be a region and FS
be the set of sensitive feature types. We say that r is sen-
sitive if it overlaps Cov(ft), for some sensitive feature type
ft, that is,
s⋃
ft∈FTS
Cov(ft) ∩s r 6= ∅.
3.2 Sensitivity metric
The distribution of the user’s positions in the reference
space is assumed to be known and is described by the prob-
ability density function pdf . P (r) =
∫
r
pdf denote the prob-
ability that a user, known to be located in Ω, is actually
located in region r; P (Ω) = 1 and P (∅) = 0. We say that a
region r is unreachable if P (r) = 0; instead r is reachable if
at least one subregion r′ ⊆ r exists such that P (r′) > 0. We
refer to such a probability as user’s position probability.
The user’s position probability is used to define the sensi-
tivity of a region. The sensitivity of a region is a value in the
interval [0, 1] which quantifies “how much private” a region
is. Consider a sensitive feature type ft. We define sensi-
tivity of r wrt ft, denoted as Psens(ft, r), the probability
that a user, known to be in r, is actually within the extent
of any sensitive feature of type ft overlapping with r. Such
a sensitivity is expressed in terms of conditional probability
as follows:
Psens(ft, r) =
{
P (Cov(ft)|r) ifP (r) 6= 0
0 otherwise
Note that the sensitivity of an unreachable region is set
to 0 for any feature type because a user cannot be located
in such a region. Further, if the region is entirely covered by
sensitive features of the same type fto, then Psens(fto, r) =
1. The function Psens(ft, r) can be rewritten as:
Psens(ft, r) =
{ ∫
Cov(ft)∩sr pdf∫
r pdf
if
∫
r
pdf 6= 0
0 otherwise
Example 2. Consider the region r in Figure 2. Such a
region overlaps two features H1 and H2 of type Hospital,
which is sensitive feature type. H1 is partially contained in
r and H2 is entirely inside the region. Moreover the region
includes lake L. Assume the following distribution of user’s
positions: L is unreachable; the user’s positions in r \s L
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are equally probable. The sensitivity of r with respect to the
feature type Hospital can be computed as follows:
Psens(Hospital, r) =
Area(H1 ∩s r) +Area(H2)
Area(r \s L)
Figure 2: Example of sensitive region including an
unreachable region
3.3 The privacy profile
The privacy profile specifies the set of sensitive feature
types, i.e., FTS and the set of user preferences. A pri-
vacy preference (preference for short) is a constraint over
the maximum sensitivity that the user tolerates in any lo-
cation wrt a certain sensitive feature type in FTS . Given a
feature type ft ∈ FTS , a preference takes the form
T (ft) = v
where v ∈ (0, 1) is the threshold sensitivity value of ft. We
say that a region r satisfies preference T (ft) = v if the
following inequality holds:
Psens(ft, r) ≤ v.
Note that we do not consider the preference T (ft) = 1
because it would mean that ft is not sensitive, against the
initial assumption. We also rule out the preference T (ft) =
0 because it can be only satisfied if ft has no instances which
is not an interesting case.
The privacy profile takes the form of the tuple:
< FTS , T >
where FTS = {ft1, ..ftn} is the set of sensitive features
types and T = {T (ft1), ...T (ftn)} is the set of preferences,
one for each sensitive feature type.
Example 3. A possible privacy profile of a user who is
concerned with the disclosure of positions in religious build-
ings and in health organizations can be defined as follows:
• FTS = {HealthOrganization,ReligiousBuilding}
• T = {T (hospital) = 0.4, T (ReligiousBuilding) =
0.1}.
It can be noticed that the threshold value is lower for the
feature type ReligiousBuilding than for the feature type
HealthOrganization to mean that the privacy demand is
stronger in the former case.
3.4 Obfuscated location and obfuscated map
At this point, we are able to formally define the concept
of obfuscated location. Consider the privacy profile p =<
FS , T > with FTS = {ft1...ftn}. Let r be a region. We say
that r is an obfuscated location for profile p if and only if r is
sensitive and every preference in the set T is satisfied. The
latter property can be formally expressed as:
∀ft ∈ FTS , Psens(ft, r) ≤ T (ft)
where T = {T (ft)}ft∈FTS are the privacy preferences of the
profile p. A related concept is that of obfuscated map. An ob-
fuscated map for profile p is a set S = {r1, ..rn} of obfuscated
locations which are disjoint and cover the whole set of sensi-
tive features. Since the regions are disjoint, a user can be lo-
cated at most in one obfuscated location. We recall that the
obfuscated locations are disjoint if their spatial intersection
is the empty set, that is: ∀i, j ∈ {1..n}, i 6= j ⇒ ri∩s rj = ∅.
Moreover, since the regions cover the sensitive features, ev-
ery sensitive position falls inside an obfuscated location.
Such a condition is verified if the spatial union of the ob-
fuscated locations is a superset of the sensitive portion of
space, that is:
s⋃
i∈{1..n}
ri ⊃
s⋃
ft∈FTS
Cov(ft)
Note that the obfuscated map does not cover necessarily the
whole space.
4. THE OBFUSCATION PROCESS
Figure 3: Reference architecture
Figure 3 shows the reference architecture of the PROBE
system. PROBE assumes a conventional networked archi-
tecture consisting of a LBS server and a set of GPS-equipped
mobile clients. The core component of the system is the Ob-
fuscation Engine. The Obfuscation Engine computes the ob-
fuscated locations. For the sake of efficiency, the obfuscation
process is organized in two phases called off-line and run-
time, respectively. In the off-line phase the user invokes the
Obfuscation Engine to compute the obfuscated map based on
the privacy profile. We emphasize that this way the obfus-
cated locations are all computed before any request is made
with consequent gain of efficiency at run-time. Moreover,
the obfuscated maps are to be re-calculated only when the
geographical database or the user profile changes. At run
time, upon a service request, the client simply matches the
user’s position against the obfuscated map. If the position
falls inside an obfuscated location, then the actual position
is replaced by the coarser position which is then transmitted
to the LBS provider. Otherwise the position is transmitted
without changes.
A key choice concerns the implementation of the obfus-
cation algorithm. Computing an obfuscated map means to
determine a set of regions which satisfy the constraints speci-
fied in the privacy profile. The problem is not trivial because
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an obfuscated region may have a complex shape depending
on the spatial distribution of user population; moreover, it
is necessary to limit the loss of geometric precision because
an obfuscated position can be arbitrarily large and that may
compromise the quality of location information.
4.1 Outline of the strategy
A flexible approach is to adopt a grid-based representa-
tion of space [1]. Assume space to be subdivided in cells
of regular and sufficiently small size. Features are typically
agglomerates of cells. Given a sensitive feature type FTo
and an instance Fo, each cell c within Fo has sensitivity
Psens(FTo, c) = 1. Since such sensitivity is greater than the
threshold sensitivity value we say that c is over-sensitive.
The idea is to obfuscate each cell c which is over-sensitive by
progressively aggregating neighbor cells. The process devel-
ops by progressively enlarging the region containing c until
an obfuscated location is achieved or the region degenerates
in the whole space. A key question is whether this method
leads to a solution. It can be shown that, for how the sen-
sitivity metric is defined, the method converges towards a
solutions if that exists.
4.1.1 Soundness of the aggregation method
We introduce first some preliminary definitions. Let
GR = {c1, c2, ...cn} be the grid defined over the reference
space and C be a partition (not necessarily the initial one)
of GR. Two cells c1, c2 ∈ C are adjacent if they have a com-
mon border. Given two adjacent cells c1, c2, the operation
which merges the two cells generates a new partition C′ in
which cells c1 and c2 are replaced by cell c = c1
⋃S c2. We
say that partition C′ is derived from partition C, written as
C′ < C. Consider the set PCin of partitions derived directly
or indirectly from the initial partition Cin through subse-
quent operations of merge. The poset H = (PCin ,<) is a
bounded lattice in which the least element is the initial par-
tition while the greatest element is the partition consisting
of a unique element, that is, the whole space (called maximal
partition).
We now show that when two cells are merged, the sensi-
tivity of the resulting cell is lower than the maximum be-
tween the sensitivity values of the two starting cells. Then
it is shown that the maximum sensitivity value in a parti-
tion CA (wrt each feature type and each region) is weakly
anti-monotonic with respect to the“is derived”relation, that
is, that the maximum sensitivity of a partition is equal or
greater than the maximum sensitivity of a derived partition.
Finally we show that whenever the sensitivity of the refer-
ence space Ω is known, one can determine whether at least
one solution exists. Proofs are reported in [2].
Theorem 4.1. Let c1 and c2 be two cells of a partition C,
and c = c1 ∪s c2. Then, the region resulting from the merge
of two cells has a sensitivity which is not higher than the
maximum sensitivity of the initial cells, that is:
Psens(ft, c) ≤ max{Psens(ft, c1), Psens(ft, c2)}
Theorem 4.2. Let CA and CB be two distinct partitions
of PCin and let ft ∈ FTS be a sensitive feature type. Then
the maximum sensitivity of a partition is equal or greater
than the maximum sensitivity of a derived partition, that is:
CA < CB =⇒ max
r∈CA
Psens(ft, r) ≤ max
r∈CB
Psens(ft, r)
Theorem 4.3. Necessary condition for an obfuscated
map to exist is that the whole reference space Ω satisfies
the user’s privacy preferences.
4.2 The obfuscation algorithm
We emphasize that the above aggregation method is ap-
plied to the single cells and not to the whole sensitive feature.
A single feature can thus be obfuscated by several regions,
each covering a portion of such feature. An advantage of this
method is that by fragmenting the original sensitive region
and expanding each fragment separately, one can generate
obfuscated locations which are smaller than the regions that
would be obtained by obfuscating the entire region. The re-
sult is a finer-grained obfuscation and thus a better QoS.
We now present an obfuscation algorithm, called SensHil,
which applies the above strategy to provide fine-grained ob-
fuscated locations. SensHil maps the grid onto a Hilbert
space-filling curve and then performs cell aggregation over
such a space. The Hilbert space-filling curve is a one-
dimensional curve which visits every point within a discrete
two-dimensional space. Similarly to the approaches in [10,
9], we exploit the locality property of Hilbert curves [17] to
generate obfuscated locations. In our algorithm, a cell c is
obfuscated by progressively aggregating the cells which are
close to c in the linear ordering. An obfuscated location is
thus simply defined by an interval in the linear space.
Algorithm 1 SensHil Algorithm
. Obfuscate grid using privacy profile pp
1: function hilObfuscate(grid, pp)
2: S ← ∅ . Obfuscated regions
3: for idx← 0 . . .maxHilbertIdx(grid) do . Hilbert scan
4: cell← getHilbertCell(idx)
5: . Get the current (one-cell) interval
6: if OverSensitive(r, pp) then
7: r ← generalizeForward(cell, grid, pp)
8: add(S, r)
9: idx← r.last
10: else if Sensitive(r, pp) then
11: add(S, cell)
12: end if
13: end for
14: fixBackward(S,pp) . Fix the last interval if needed
15: return S
16: end function
4.2.1 Details of the algorithm SensHil
Algorithm 1 details the function HilObfuscate generating
an obfuscated map. The algorithm consists of two phases.
The first phase is called forward generalization. The algo-
rithm starts scanning the cells sequence (in the linear order-
ing) from the first cell.
As an over-sensitive cell is found, the algorithm attempts
to generate a obfuscated interval r starting from cell (func-
tion generalizeForward in Algorithm 2). If such interval
is found, r is inserted into the result set S and the scan
proceeds until every cell has been examined. In case cell
is sensitive, but not oversensitive, no further generalization
is needed and the one-cell interval representing the cell is
inserted into S.
Upon completion of the scan, it may happen that the
last sensitive cell cannot be generalized, because, for exam-
ple, represents the last cell in the cell sequence. If this is
the case, the algorithm expands the current interval back-
36
Figure 4: SensHil An example. Subfigures numbered from 1 to 16 illustrate the intermediate steps between
START and RESULT.
Algorithm 2 SensHil Algorithm subroutines
1: function generalizeForward(r, grid, pp)
2: for idx← r.first . . .maxHilbertIdx(grid) do
3: r.last← idx . Expand current interval
4: if ¬OverSensitive(r, pp) then
5: return r
6: end if
7: end for
8: return r
9: end function
. Backward expansion if the last interval r violates pp
10: procedure fixBackward(S, pp)
11: r ← last(S)
12: if OverSensitive(r, pp) then
13: r ← generalizeBackward(r, grid, pp)
14: if OverSensitive(r, pp) then
15: S ← ⊥ . Obfuscation failed
16: else
17: add(S, r) . Also remove redundancies
18: end if
19: end if
20: end procedure
21: function generalizeBackward(r, grid, pp)
22: for idx← r.first− 1 . . . 0 reverse do
23: r.first← idx . Expand backward
24: if ¬OverSensitive(r, pp) then
25: return r
26: end if
27: end for
28: return r
29: end function
wards until a convenient interval is found or the entire se-
quence of cells is scanned again from the last cell to the
first one (function fixBackward in Algorithm 2). This
phase is called backward generalization. Note that in or-
der to ensure that intervals are disjoint, the addition of r
to S in the backward phase through the add (S,r) opera-
tion, at line 17, may entail a change of the set S. For ex-
ample, the operation add({[1, 2], [4, 7], [8, 9]}, [5, 12]) results
into the set S = {[1, 2], [4, 12]}. Each cell is examined at
most twice, once per phase. The overall complexity of the
SensHil algorithm is, thus, O(|GR|), where |GR| is the num-
ber of grid cells. It can be shown that the non-empty set
HilObfuscated(GR, pp) is an obfuscated map.
Example 4. Figure 4 illustrates the step-wise execution
of the algorithm applied to a grid containing two sensitive
features. The initial grid is labelled as ’START’ in the figure
(on the left) while the obfuscated map is labelled ’RESULT’
(on the right). The two sensitive features are of the same
type. Further, we set the privacy threshold to 25%. The
reference space is described by a 4 × 4 grid, consisting of
16 cells. Cells are transversed following the Hilbert ordering
(subfigure labeled as ’GRID’, on the left). Subfigures 4.1–16
show the steps of the algorithm. At each step, the region be-
ing examined is labelled either ’OK’ or ’NO’, depending on
whether the privacy preference is satisfied or not. Step 1 and
2 simply skip the first two cells in the ordering because not
sensitive. The 3rd cell, instead, is largely covered by sensi-
tive features. Thus, in the subsequent steps (subfig. 3-6) the
cell is progressively aggregated with neighbor cells until an
obfuscated region is found (subfig. 6). The algorithm pro-
ceeds until the last cell has been processed.
4.3 An example of obfuscation
In Figure 5 we apply SensH il to obfuscate two existing
hospitals located in New Haven (US), named Hospital of S.
Raphael and Yale-New Haven Hospital respectively. The
two hospitals represent two features of the sensitive feature
type Hospital. Figure 5.a. zooms on the two sensitive loca-
tions, situated respectively on the North and on the South.
Figure 5.b shows the cell-based representation of the hos-
pitals extent in a grid of 128 × 128 cells. Cells have a size
of about 20 metres. The cells covering the hospitals have
sensitivity value 1 wrt the feature type Hospital. We gener-
ate the obfuscated map using the profile < FTS , T > with
FTS = {Hospital} and T = {T (Hospital) = 0.3}. The
resulting obfuscated locations are displayed in Figure 5.c in
light grey (light blue in the color version). The obfuscated
map consists of 7 obfuscated locations, covering the two hos-
pitals. It can be noticed the irregular shape of the obfuscated
regions. Each shape can however be simply described by an
interval in the Hilbert space-filling curve.
5. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We have made experiments to evaluate various parameters
using grids of fixed and varying size, with different percent-
age of sensitive cells (referred to as coverage) and privacy
thresholds. We assume that all user’s positions are equally
probable, except in those regions which are explicitly defined
to be unreachable. SensHil is implemented in Java, using
the library [13]. The experiments were run on a laptop PC
equipped with an AMD Turion Mobile MT30 1.6GHz CPU,
1,37GB of RAM and Windows XP.
We have run the experiments over synthetic data. For
the generation of synthetic data we developed the Spatially-
aware Generalization (SAG, for short) tool. SAG enables
the generation of grids randomly populated by features of
user-defined type. Features have a rectangular shape, of
varying size, and are represented as group of cells. Each
cell c is either empty or completely covered by a feature
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 5: Obfuscated map generated by the Senshil algorithm for two hospitals in New Haven, Connecticut
Figure 6: Obfuscated regions created by: (left)
SensPyr, (right) SensHil
of feature type ft. Thus, Psens(ft, c) ∈ {0, 1}. Grids are
generated based on the following parameters: the size of the
grid; the set FT of feature types; for each type ft ∈ FT , the
percentage of cells covered by ft; the features types denoting
unreachable regions, such as lake. Hence SAG populates
the reachable portion of space with rectangles of varying
size. The side of each rectangle is generated on a random
basis using a binomial distribution. The average size of the
rectangle side is 3 cells and the range is [0,6]. SAG also
enables the specification of privacy profiles. The user flags
the features types in the set FT that are sensitive and then
specifies for each sensitive feature the threshold value.
5.1 The experiments
For comparison purposes, we developed the algorithm
SensPyr [2] which provides an alternative implementation
of the PROBE obfuscation strategy. SensPyr uses a pyra-
mid data structure to represent the space grid similar to the
structure used for spatial k-anonymization in the Casper
system [12]. The pyramid takes the form of a tree in which
the nodes represent the regions obtained by recursively sub-
dividing space in four quadrants until the base cells are
reached. The root at level 0 corresponds to the entire refer-
ence space; the leaves are the cells of the finest-grained grid;
a cell c which is not a leaf has four children, one for each
quadrant of the region denoted by c. The process of cell
aggregation works as follows: first, each leaf which is over-
sensitive is aggregated with the cells of the quadrant the cell
belongs to. If the resulting region remains over-sensitive, the
aggregation is possibly recursively applied to the cells of the
grid at the immediately lower level in the pyramid. Figure
6 highlights the different shape of the obfuscated locations
generated by the two algorithms (the red cells are sensitive,
the regions including blue cells are the obfuscated locations).
We have made five experiments with the two algorithms.
Experiments 1,2,3, and 5 use a grid of size 1024×1024 cells.
At a resolution of 10 metres, the reference space is thus
about 10km × 10km which is the size of an average city.
The independent variable in the experiments is the coverage
which ranges in the interval [1, 45], which seems a reasonable
choice; a value of x means that the percentage of sensitive
cells is x%. Further, we consider three possible values for
the threshold function, that is, T (ft) ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.4}. Each
algorithm is run 100 times, for different values of the cover-
age and the threshold value and average values are reported
for each experiment. Experiment 4 evaluates the two algo-
rithms on grids of increasing size ranging between 64 × 64
and 4096×4096 with fixed coverages equal to 0.5% and 10%.
Experiment 1: Success rate. The outcome is the rate
of successful generation of obfuscated maps (success rate).
As the coverage increases and the privacy requirements be-
come more restrictive, the probability of failure in the map
generation increases. The graphs in Figure 7 show that the
generation is successful until the percentage of coverage is
below a breaking value. For example, when the threshold
has value 0.4, the breaking value is nearly 40. It can be
noticed that the breaking values are nearly the same for the
two algorithms.
Experiment 2: Average number of obfuscated re-
gions. The outcome is the average number of obfuscated
locations computed by the two algorithms when the map
generation process does not fail. The two graphs in Fig-
ure 8 show that the number of obfuscated regions generated
by SensHil is significantly higher than the number of ob-
fuscated regions generated by SensPyr. It can be noticed
that the cardinality increases up to a maximum value and
then decreases. The reason of such behavior is that for low
percentages of coverage, the number of cells to obfuscate
is relatively low. The number of obfuscated regions how-
ever increases up to a maximum value. When the density
of sensitive cells is too high the algorithms generate large
obfuscated areas and thus the number of obfuscated regions
globally decreases.
Experiment 3: Average size of the obfuscated lo-
cation. The outcome is the average number of cells in an
obfuscated region. Not surprisingly, the graphs in Figure 9
show that the SensHil generates more precise obfuscated
maps than SensPyr. Quantitative values are reported later
on. It can be noticed that the size of the obfuscated maps
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grows very rapidly, especially for SensPyr, as the percentage
of coverage becomes closer to the breaking point.
GridSize NReg NCell GenTime(ms)
64× 64 28 112 0.49
128× 128 106 120 2.08
256× 256 429 118 11.5
512× 512 1726 118 72
1024× 1024 6943 117 185
2048× 2048 27735 117 758
4096× 4096 111026 117 3255
Table 1: Measures for SensPyr
GridSide NReg NCell GenTime(ms)
64× 64 43 46 0.49
128× 128 175 47 2.17
256× 256 700 47 8.8
512× 512 2835 46 31
1024× 1024 11372 46 177
2048× 2048 45483 46 543
4096× 4096 181920 46 2104
Table 2: Measures for SensHil
Experiment 4: Grid size. Table 1 and Table 2 report
the measures obtained by running the two algorithms over
grids of increasing size ranging between 64× 64 and 4096×
4096 with a 10% coverage. Each table row specifies: the grid
size (GridSize), the average number of obfuscated regions
(NReg), the average number of cells per regions (NCell),
and the map generation time (GenTime). If we look at the
experiments over a grid of 1024× 1024 we observe that:
• The number of obfuscated regions generated by
SensHil is about 40% higher than the number of re-
gions generated by SensPyr.
• The average number of cells per obfuscated regions in
SensHil is 46 against 118 of SensPyr. At the given
resolution (10m× 10m) the average area of the obfus-
cated region generated by SensHilis thus 4600m
2.
• The map generation time for SensHil is 177 ms against
185 ms of SensPyr. Thus, the performance is thus
not significantly different, but the SensHil computes
significantly more precise obfuscated locations than
SensPyr.
The graph in Figure 10 shows that the generalization time
increases linearly with the size of the grid for both algo-
rithms. Moreover, such a time is not significantly affected by
the coverage for coverages that are not close to the breaking
point. Note that the generation time is high (few seconds)
when the grid is 4096× 4096. Consider, however, that these
experiments have been run on a laptop.
Experiment 5: Obfuscation ratio. The outcome is
the obfuscation ratio of an obfuscated map, that is the ratio
of the total number of cells contained in obfuscated locations
over the total number of sensitive cells. Figure 11 reports the
result of the experiment for three different privacy thresh-
olds and a varying average coverage value. For example, for
a privacy threshold equal to 0.1 and coverage equal to 2%,
SensPyr generates an average of about 18 obfuscated cells
for each sensitive cell, whereas SensHil presents an obfus-
cation ratio which is about 10. It is important to observe
Grid size # Obfuscated locations ≈ Size(KB)
512× 512 2835 22
1024× 1024 11372 90
2048× 2048 45483 363
4096× 4096 181920 1455
Table 3: Avg. size of the obfuscated maps
that the obfuscation ratio of the maps generated SensHil is
almost constant and independent of the average coverage.
Notably, such obfuscation ratio is almost always equal to
the best attainable one, i.e., no algorithm can obfuscate the
same sensitive regions and obtain a smaller obfuscated area.
6. RUN-TIME PRIVACY ENFORCEMENT
We consider now the size of the obfuscated map sent to
the client. We recall that the client requests an obfuscated
map by forwarding a request to the Obfuscation Engine.
Such a request contains the privacy profile. The privacy
profile is a set P = {t1...tn} of pairs representing the privacy
preferences, with ti ≡< ft, v >, i ∈ {1..n}. The user can
select the sensitive feature types for example from a pre-
defined list. In order to limit the size of the obfuscated
map, the user can specify the bounding box of the region of
interest. The Obfuscation Engine generates an obfuscated
map, if it exists. Such map consists of a non-empty set of
obfuscated regions, where each region is represented by an
interval [a, b] with a and b Hilbert indexes. The obfuscated
map is then stored on the client as a B-tree.
Regarding the size of map being generated, if the encoding
of the interval representing an obfuscated region requires 8
bytes, the size of an obfuscated map is n × 8 bytes, where
n is the number of regions in the obfuscated map. Based
on the experiments reported the previous section, Table 3
reports the average size of the obfuscated maps generated
for grids of varying size, assuming a 10% coverage.
6.1 Privacy Enforcement
At run time, the client computes the location information
to be transferred to the LBS provider. This operation is
referred to as privacy enforcement. The correspondent algo-
rithm is reported in Algorithm 3. Given user’s position p,
and obfuscated map S, the algorithm maps p onto a Hilbert
index and then checks whether such a value is included in
an interval of the indexed obfuscated map(line 4). Because
the obfuscated map can be stored as a B-tree, the complex-
ity of the operation is O(log n). If p does not fall inside
any interval, then the function simply returns p otherwise
the enclosing interval r. The result is then transferred to
the LBS provider possibly along with the parameters of the
Hilbert-space filling curve.
7. CONCLUSIONS
PROBE is a comprehensive system for the protection of
location privacy against location inference attacks in LBS.
A key feature of the system is that it allows the subscribers
of a LBS to specify location privacy preferences about the
places that they consider sensitive as well as the desired
degree of privacy protection. As part of PROBE we have
also developed a technique for efficiently computing obfus-
cated maps that are personalized based on the user privacy
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Figure 7: Success rate
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Figure 8: Avg. number of obfuscated regions
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Figure 9: Avg. number of cells per obfuscated region
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Figure 10: Avg. time for varying-size grids and different coverages.
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Figure 11: Avg. number of obfuscated cells per sensitive cell
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Algorithm 3 Privacy Enforcer Algorithm
1: function PrivacyEnforcment(p,MBB,Dim, S)
2: CellCoord← GetCellCoord(p,MBB,Dim)
3: . Returns the row and column of the cell containing p
4: idx← GetHilbertIndex(CellCoord,Dim)
5: . Returns the Hilbert index of the previous cell
6: r = GetInterval(S, idx)
7: . Returns the obfuscated region containing idx or null
8: if r = ⊥ then
9: return p . Returns the original position
10: else
11: return r . Returns the obfuscated location
12: end if
13: end function
preferences. The technique has very small storage require-
ments and thus it is suited for use on small devices, such
as cellular phones. We emphasize that the PROBE method
is not antagonist to spatial k-anonymity but rather com-
plementary. Further, PROBE can be used in a wide range
of novel and challenging applications, for example to pro-
tect the privacy of sensitive locations in geo-social networks
applications. Our work leaves room for diverse research di-
rections. In particular we highlight three major issues: a)
the protection of sensitive locations along user’s trajectories.
b) To prevent inferences on the user’s profile. The privacy
profile can be itself sensitive. For example, if Bob detects
that night clubs are sensitive locations for Alice, then Bob
can also infer that Alice is used to go to night clubs. c) To
improve the obfuscation algorithms.
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ABSTRACT 
When a user issues a query, database engines will usually return 
results based solely on the query and the content of the database. 
However, query issuers have a “context” which if taken into 
account will certainly change the outcome of the query. Thus, 
when responding to the query, the database system can consider 
the query issuer's context and return only the objects/tuples in the 
database that not only satisfy the query predicates but also are 
relevant to the query issuer's context. In this paper, we give an 
overview of Chameleon; a context-aware database management 
system. Chameleon introduces SQL-level constructs that describe 
the "context" in which the query is issued as well as the reciprocal 
contexts of the objects in the database. By tying the query issuer's 
contexts with the corresponding contexts of the objects in the 
database, Chameleon can retrieve the objects of relevance to the 
query context. Using Chameleon's general interfaces for context 
definition and awareness activation, we show how database 
systems that offer not only location-sensitive privacy but also 
other forms of privacy, e.g., both location-sensitive and time-
sensitive privacy profiles for their users can be realized easily. 
Several modeling and performance challenges for realizing 
context-aware database management systems are presented. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
H.2 [Database Management]. H.2.1 [Logical Design]: Data  
models.  
General Terms 
Algorithms, Management, Performance, Design, Languages. 
Keywords 
Context awareness, privacy, preferences, personalization, 
database systems 
1. INTRODUCTION 
As applications and application requirements grow in complexity, 
the underlying data management system has to increase in 
sophistication to cope with this complexity. In the early days, 
when applications, e.g., Geographic Information Systems (GIS), 
demanded efficient handling of large amounts of spatial data, 
DBMSs had to increase in sophistication to handle location data 
efficiently. This included the costly development of spatial 
indexing techniques that support concurrency and recovery, 
spatial query processing algorithms, e.g., spatial join algorithms 
with and without spatial indexes, and locality preserving strategies 
for disk placement of spatial data.  
Similarly, Hippocratic databases have been proposed to address 
the privacy policy requirements that users’ data are being used 
only by the intended recipients and only for the purposes 
approved by the data owners [1]. Systems, e.g., Hippocratic 
PostgreSQL [2] have been prototyped to provide controlled 
disclosure of the users’ data according to the users’ approved 
privacy policies. 
In order for database systems to provide users with location-aware 
privacy, tremendous effort has to take place to develop combined 
Hippocratic and spatial database engines, which is very costly. In 
this paper, we present a systems approach to address this issue.  
Chameleon, a context-aware DBMS, is an extensible database 
server that uses contexts to eliminate the need for tailoring 
specialized engines [3], e.g., a spatial database engine, a 
Hippocratic database engine, a location-sensitive Hippocratic 
database engine, a time-sensitive, location-sensitive Hippocratic 
database engine (refer to Figure 1). Instead, using Chameleon, one 
can realize these systems by defining appropriate contexts using 
Chameleon’s context definition and manipulation languages. 
Figure 1: The vision behind Chameleon. 
Chameleon supports two notions of context: the context 
surrounding the query issuer and the reciprocal contexts of the 
objects stored in the database. The query context reflects the 
situation of the query issuer, e.g., the query issuer’s location, the 
time the query is issued, the identity of the query issuer, or even 
the temperature or the weather conditions surrounding the query 
issuer. Chameleon takes these situations into consideration when 
answering a query. For example, in Figure 2, when querying the 
database asking for a close-by restaurant, the user wants the 
database system to return restaurant responses that match the 
user’s current context, i.e., her location, the time the query is 
issued, and her personal diet and dietary restrictions.  
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Database objects have contexts that are reciprocal to the query 
issuer’s contexts, e.g., (refer to Figure 3), the location of the 
database objects, the time duration of an object (or when the 
object can be available for querying), and the identity of the object 
(or the ids of the query issuers or classes of query issuers that are 
allowed to access the object). 
 
Figure 2: Chameleon considers the user’s active contexts (user’s 
time, location, and identity) when responding to the user’s query. 
 
In Chameleon, we can combine multiple contexts into more 
complex ones using the proposed context composition, e.g., a 
Hippocratic DBMS that also is location- and time-sensitive by 
combing the  location-, temporal-, and identity-sensitive 
contextual services.  
 
Figure 3: Illustration of what user and DB object contexts are 
combined in Chameleon to realize various specialized DB engines 
using the same context interfaces in Chameleon.  
 
In this paper, we give several proof-of-concept instantiations of 
Chameleon, e.g., one to realize a privacy-aware (Hippocratic) 
database server, and another to realize a spatial database server 
using the same proposed constructs and interfaces of Chameleon. 
Further, we show how contexts can be combined within 
Chameleon to realize more complex systems, e.g., a server that 
supports location- and time-aware privacy database, i.e., one 
where the privacy profiles of database objects depend not only on 
the identity and purpose of the query issuers but also on the query 
issuer’s location and time when they issue the query (location- 
aware and time-aware privacy).  
 
Chameleon is built using extensions to PostgreSQL that include: 
(1) New syntax and query rewrite components to define 
contexts and to issue queries that use contexts, 
(2) New query operators that process contexts, e.g., the 
Skyline join and FilterMark operators that are vital 
when processing queries that involve contexts, and  
(3) Extensions to the query optimizer to invoke these new 
operators when appropriate.   
 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we 
present the context classes in Chameleon and the dimensions that 
we use to define a context. Section 3 presents the syntax and 
semantics of the extended SQL constructs within Chameleon that 
defines contexts. Section 4 addresses conceptual evaluation of 
context-aware SQL commands and implementation issues. 
Section 5 gives several example instantiations to realize a spatial 
database server, a Hippocratic database server, and a location-
aware and time-aware Hippocratic database server. The latter 
illustrates how contexts can be combined in Chameleon to realize 
more complex servers. Section 6 discusses related work. Section 7 
includes some research challenges and concluding remarks.  
2. CONTEXT CLASSES 
For illustration, we use a simple bookstore example, where users 
express their preferences when accessing the bookstore database. 
Later in the paper, we will show more sophisticated cases, mainly 
for system realizations of location-aware privacy as well as 
location- and time-aware privacy. 
 
Table 1 gives a projection on the table books that contains 
information about books in a certain bookstore. Among other 
pieces of information included in this table, we can find the name 
of a book, the years of its publishing, the category under which 
this book falls, the type of the cover (HC for hardcover or PB for 
paperback), as well as whether or not the book is in stock. Only 
the books in stock that are relevant to the user's context are 
retrieved. 
 
In contrast to existing work on context-aware systems that are 
built on top of a database, we propose to incorporate context 
awareness inside the DBMS. We adopt a broad definition of what 
a context is. For example, the physical location in space of the 
query issuer when he/she issues the query can be part of the query 
context. The time the query is issued and the identity of who 
issued the query may also both be part of the query context. We 
support the following two classes of contexts:  
 
(1) The User Context, i.e., the context of the query issuer.  
 
(2) The Object Context, i.e., the contexts of the queried 
data.  
 
Figure 4 illustrates a high-level view of Chameleon’s context 
model. We classify user contexts according to three dimensions. 
These dimensions will be used when the application developer 
defines a context in Chameleon. These dimensions will reflect in 
the access method selection of any query on the tables that are 
affected by that context. 
 
Dimension 1 - Context Sign: The sign of a user context is either 
“positive” (S) or “negative” (G). A positive context defines what 
the context is. For instance, if the context is location, an instance 
of a positive context is the preferred locations by the user, e.g., 
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specified as a range. On the other hand, a negative context defines 
what the context is not. An instance of a negative location context  
Table 1: The example bookstore database. 
 
is the locations or regions not desired by or prohibited to the user. 
In the running example, an instance of a positive context is the 
willingness to buy hardcover books only. However, trying to 
avoid science fiction books is a case for a negative context. 
 
Dimension 2 - Contextual Relation: The contextual relation is 
the relation among the contextual data. This relation mainly shows 
the order of relevance of the contextual data. The contextual 
relation can be an equivalence relation (Q). In this case, data that 
comply with all contextual values are reported with no special 
ordering. Besides, the contextual relation can also be a total 
ordering relation (T). This relation would reflect on the data being 
reported to the user. The data will be sorted on the rank of the 
contextual values with which the data conform. Moreover, the 
contextual relation can be a partial ordering relation (P). In 
contrast to the previous relation, the rank of the contextual values 
here will follow a partial order rather than a linear order. 
Referring to the books table, an example of an equivalence 
relation is the equal willingness to buy a science fiction book or a 
travel book. However, if the user is interested in new books, a 
total ordering relation would be more appropriate to retrieve the 
latest books first. If the user prefers cooking books over science 
fiction books, and travel books over medicine books, with no 
specific preference among the other combinations, would need to 
specify her context to contain partially ordered contextual values. 
Partially ordered values may be transformed into linear ordered 
values using an appropriate (possibly online) topological sort 
algorithm. This is out of the scope of this work, but we add the 
modeling part here for completeness. 
 
 
Figure 4: Abstraction of Contexts in Chameleon. 
 
Dimension 3 - Listing of Data: By listing of data we refer to how 
the data should be listed. Specifically, should the data that does 
not conform to the user context be excluded from the listed data? 
Or, should those data be included but come last? The former case 
is termed “unlisted excluded” (X), whereas the latter is termed 
“unlisted included” (N).  
 
Consider the bookstore example, if the user context is the 
willingness to buy travel books only, the user context gets the 
“unlisted (other book categories) excluded”. Nevertheless, an 
“unlisted included” context can be illustrated by the preference to 
buy hardcover books but still get the paperback books down in the 
list -- after retrieving all hardcover books). In a location context 
example, if the user context is the willingness to buy houses that 
lie within a certain geometric region, say R, then “unlisted 
excluded” means that houses outside R are not reported to the 
user, whereas “unlisted included” lists the houses outside R after 
listing the houses inside R. 
 
2.1 User Context as a 3D Point 
Based on these three dimensions, each user context is viewed as a 
point in the 3D space defined above.  For instance, in the 
bookstore example, one might be willing to buy only science 
fiction or travel books with no particular preference between these 
two types. This is an example of a positive user context having an 
equivalence contextual relation with the unlisted contextual values 
excluded. Whenever a user with the aforementioned context 
selects all tuples from the table books, only rows 1, 2, 5, 8, 9, 11, 
14, 15, 18, 19, 21, and 25 are retrieved. If the user defines the 
same context to have a total ordering relation instead of an 
row title year category cover instock 
1 book01 2004 Science 
Fiction 
HC √ 
2 book02 2002 Travel PB √ 
3 book03 2001 Medicine HC X 
4 book04 2000 Cooking PB √ 
5 book05 1997 Science 
Fiction 
PB √ 
6 book06 2001 Medicine HC √ 
7 book07 1995 Cooking PB X 
8 book08 1996 Travel PB √ 
9 book09 2000 Science 
Fiction 
PB √ 
10 book10 2003 Medicine PB √ 
11 book11 2005 Travel HC √ 
12 book12 2006 Cooking HC X 
13 book13 2004 Medicine PB √ 
14 book14 2006 Science 
Fiction 
HC √ 
15 book15 2005 Travel HC √ 
16 book16 2006 Cooking HC √ 
17 book17 1976 Medicine PB √ 
18 book18 2001 Travel PB √ 
19 book19 2007 Science 
Fiction 
HC √ 
20 book20 1988 Cooking PB X 
21 book21 1993 Science 
Fiction 
PB √ 
22 book22 2006 Medicine HC X 
23 book23 1999 Cooking PB X 
24 book24 2006 Medicine HC √ 
25 book25 2006 Travel PB √ 
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equivalence relation such that science fiction books have higher 
rank than travel books, the retrieved rows will be: 1, 5, 9, 14, 19, 
21, 2, 8, 11, 15, 18, and 25. 
 
All points in this 3D space are valid when the user context is 
positive. However, when the user context is negative, only 
contextual values with the unlisted included are valid. This 
restriction is due to the definition of a negative user context; the 
user is specifying what context values are not current, and hence 
all the others should be current (or nothing will be ever returned). 
Moreover, for a negative user context, since the user only 
describes the complement of her positive context, no rank is 
explicitly specified for that actual positive context. Therefore, the 
equivalence relation would be implicitly understood for the 
contextual values. Figure 5 summarizes the overall model for 
contexts in Chameleon along with the three dimensions. The next 
section illustrates how these context dimensions can be used to 
specify contexts using newly proposed SQL constructs. 
 
Figure 5: Conceptual Model of Contexts in Chameleon. 
3. SQL EXTENSIONS FOR CONTEXT 
AWARENESS 
In this section, we cover the various constructs that Chameleon 
uses to enable context awareness inside a DBMS. A brief 
overview of these constructs is also presented in [3]. 
 
Creating Object Contexts: Chameleon uses the CREATE 
OBJECT CONTEXT statement to define an object context. 
When the object context is part of the object relation, it does not 
need to be defined explicitly.  
 
CREATE OBJECT CONTEXT context_name (  
  {col_spec | table_constraint} [, . . . ]  
  , table_binding );  
 
Contextual values will be stored inside relations to be easily 
incorporated within the query processor. The CREATE  
OBJECT  CONTEXT statement has similar constructs to those 
in the CREATE TABLE statement and it also creates an object 
context relation. For instance, col_spec refers to the specification 
of a column such as name, data type, default values, and so on. On 
a similar vein, table_constraint refers to any constraints on the 
whole context table such as check constraints.  
 
The construct table_binding is the main construct that connects 
the object with its context. Specifically, table_binding has the 
format below. 
 
BINDING KEY ([col_name [, . . . ]]) 
   REFERENCES ref_table [( ref_col [, . . . ] )] 
   WITH bool_expr 
 
The first part of the BINDING KEY is similar to the FOREIGN 
KEY. There are three main differences between these two types of 
keys. The first difference is that a foreign key in a table has to 
refer to a primary key in another table. This constraint does not 
exist for the binding key. A binding key binds the contextual 
value to possibly more than one object, since more than one object 
may exist in the same context. The second difference is that the 
decision to bind a contextual value with an object does not have to 
be equality with a column value in the referenced table. The 
WITH construct defines a Boolean expression that serves as the 
binder in case the expression evaluates to true. The third 
difference is that the binding key might not contain any context 
attribute referencing an attribute in the base table, but rather only 
the Boolean expression that might also contain attributes from any 
object context to the referenced table. Examples will be shown in 
the case studies section to illustrate these differences further. 
 
Creating User Contexts: Similar to object contexts, each user 
context will materialize to a relation. Chameleon uses the 
following syntax to define a user context. 
 
CREATE  [context_sign] CONTEXT context_name ( 
{col_spec | table_constraint} [, . . . ] 
, table_binding [, . . . ] 
[, substitution_ key [, . . . ] ] 
) [AS contextual_relation] 
[WITH UNLISTED unlisted_status]; 
 
context_sign: positive  |  negative 
 
contextual_relation: equivalence 
| total order [USING ordering_func] 
| partial order 
 
unlisted_status: excluded  |  included 
 
For each table affected by a user context, a binding key is used to 
show how the context reflects on the table. Therefore, there might 
be more than one binding key in a user context. Upon the creation 
of a user context, an implicit column is created to hold the user 
name of the current user. Therefore, each contextual value is 
associated with a certain user. Also, if an ordering relation is used 
for the contextual relation, then another implicit column is created 
to hold the rank of that contextual value. This rank can either be 
input by the application while acquiring contextual data, or can be 
computed using an ordering function ordering_func. In the latter 
case, the rank column does not need to exist. 
 
Chameleon builds default indexes for context relations. Object 
contexts get non-clustered indexes on the context keys. User 
contexts are clustered in a B-tree index using the clustering key 
(user_name, context_key) if the contextual relation is equivalence. 
If the contextual relation is a total ordering relation, then the user 
context is clustered on (user name, context key) if the unlisted are 
to be included and on (user_name, rank) if the unlisted are to be 
excluded. 
 
Context
Object Context 
(Context  of 
Queried Data)
User Context 
(Context of query 
issuer)
User Context Sign
Positive (What 
Context is)
Negative (What 
Context is Not)
Contextual Relations 
(How Contextual 
Values are Related)
Equivalence
Partial Order
Total Order
Listing of Data
Unlisted Excluded 
(out of context 
data are not 
listed)
Unlisted Included 
(out of context 
data have lower 
priority)
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The substituting key will be discussed in detail in the next section. 
Populating the contextual relations will be made using standard 
SQL INSERT statements. Also, other data manipulation 
statements will still work on the contextual relations. 
 
Global Substitution Construct: Some attributes need to be 
modified for presentation purposes if we want to enable context 
awareness. For instance, if the context is the location of a user, 
and the user is currently in France, then we might want all prices, 
in all tables, to be converted to Euro. This conversion is called 
global substitution, since the substitution occurs for all tables 
according to the current context. The substituting key defines such 
conversion, and is specified while defining the user context as 
follows. 
 
SUBSTITUTE table_name (col_name) 
BY expression; 
 
The expression that substitutes the attribute can be any expression 
in which attributes from table_name, its object contexts, as well as 
the user context may appear. The substitute clause is useful in 
limiting the disclosure of an attribute value if the query issuer is 
not allowed to view that value. The substitute expression would 
be to display a null value instead of the original attribute value. 
 
Setting Active Contexts: The application user may have many 
contexts, not all of them need to be current all the time. Therefore, 
we introduce the construct SET ACTIVE CONTEXT to define 
the current contexts to be taken into account for that user. The 
user_name has the CURRENT USER as a default. 
 
SET ACTIVE CONTEXT [FOR USER user_name] 
AS context_name [, . . . ]; 
{ [WITH RANKING ORDER context_name [, . . . ] ] 
   | [WITH RANKING EXPRESSION expression  
   | [WITH SKYLINE OF expression {MAX  |  MIN} [, . . . ] ]}; 
 
Before querying, the command SET ACTIVE CONTEXT is 
issued. This command specifies the contexts to be considered 
when evaluating the query. It also specifies how to prioritize and 
combine multiple contexts. 
 
The SET ACTIVE CONTEXT statement allows composing 
complex contexts from basic ones. If all the basic contexts that are 
used to compose a complex context have equivalence contextual 
relations only, then the order of executing the contexts is given by 
the order the contexts are listed in the AS clause. 
 
In Chameleon, we support three different ways for combining 
contexts (refer to Figure 6). Consider the following two contexts 
C1 and C2 that are set to be active upon issuing a query. We use 
two contexts for simplicity in the presentation.  
 
Figure 6: Examples of Three Ways for Combining Contexts in 
Chameleon.  
Option 1 - Ordering: Using this option, Chameleon can combine 
the contexts by simply listing the contexts in some order, e.g., C1, 
C2. In this case, objects in the database are ordered according to 
Context C1 with ties broken according to the order within C2. 
 
Option 2 - Multi-feature Ranking: We can combine the contexts 
C1 and C2 according to a weighted ranking function of C1’s and 
C2’s individual ranks. 
 
Option 3 - Skyline Ordering: Skyline ordering is needed when the 
multiple contexts are independent and their ranks cannot be 
aggregated together. We can combine the individual contexts by 
returning the tuples that are not dominated by any other tuples 
(see Figure 7). The skyline operator [18] is used for that purpose. 
The WITH SKYLINE clause is used to specify to the skyline 
operation which expressions to use as the input ranks in the 
computation. 
 
Figure 7: Example skyline highlighting the houses not dominated 
by other houses with respect to price and closeness to the beach. 
 
Querying given the Active Contexts: When issuing a query, the 
query issuer invokes the active contexts in the following way: 
 
WITHIN_MY_CONTEXT <Select Statement> 
 
This command invokes the active contexts set by the SET 
ACTIVE CONTEXT command when evaluating the query. 
 
4. CONCEPTUAL EVALUATION 
In this section, we show why the above constructs enable context-
aware query processing. We continue with our running example 
where someone is accessing the database of a bookstore. Only the 
books in stock that are relevant to the user's context are retrieved. 
Examples of contexts are given, their definitions using the above 
constructs are provided, and then we show how they are evaluated 
to give the desired results. First, we start by simple contexts, and 
later we show how these contexts are combined together to 
compose more complex contexts. In all the scenarios below, the 
user is executing the following query, and the results are the 
relevant tuples. 
 
SELECT * 
FROM books 
WHERE books.instock; 
Context 1: The user has a preference for only books of a certain 
category (e.g., Science fiction). 
 
This context may be defined as: 
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    CREATE POSITIVE CONTEXT ctxt_category_SQX ( 
        category varchar(20), 
        BINDING KEY (category) 
REFERENCES books(category) 
    ) AS EQUIVALENCE WITH UNLISTED EXCLUDED; 
 
SET ACTIVE CONTEXT AS ctxt_category_SQX; 
 
We give the suffix SQX to the context name above to emphasize 
that it is a positive [S] context with an equivalence [Q] contextual 
relation and that the unlisted categories in the context are to be 
excluded [X]. For the above example, when the user issues Qu 
above, the actual query that is executed is given below. Typically, 
the binding key is used to join the books table with the context 
table, and only the books whose category exists in the context are 
to be returned. The following query reflects this semantic. 
 
SELECT T.* 
FROM books T 
    INNER JOIN ctx_category_SQX C1 
        ON(T.category = C1.category 
        AND C1.user_name = CURRENT_USER) 
WHERE T.instock; 
 
Context 2: The user's preference is for books published in 2005, 
and then those published in 2006 before all other books. 
 
This context may be defined as: 
 
CREATE POSITIVE CONTEXT ctxt_year_STI ( 
     year integer, 
    BINDING KEY (year) REFERENCES books(year) 
) AS TOTAL ORDER WITH UNLISTED INCLUDED; 
 
SET ACTIVE CONTEXT AS ctxt year STI; 
 
Again, the suffix STI of the current context emphasizes that it is a 
positive [S] context with a total order [T] contextual relation and 
that the unlisted years in the context are to be included [I]. For the 
above example, in response to Qu, the actual query that is 
executed is given below. Typically, the binding key is used to join 
the books table with the context table. In this case, the type of join 
is a left outer join, and therefore, all books will be returned at the 
end. The output rows are to be sorted based on the year rank, 
which is specified implicitly in the context as it is an ordering 
context. Rows with NULL context rank appear later in the list. 
The following query reflects this semantics. 
 
SELECT T.* 
FROM books T 
    LEFT OUTER JOIN ctx_year_STI C1 
        ON(T.year = C1.year 
        AND C1.user_name = CURRENT_USER) 
WHERE T.instock 
ORDER BY C1.rank; 
 
Context 3: The user prefers hardcover over paperback books. 
 
This context may be defined as: 
 
CREATE POSITIVE CONTEXT ctxt_cover_STX ( 
    cover integer, 
    BINDING KEY (cover) REFERENCES books(cover) 
) AS TOTAL ORDER WITH UNLISTED EXCLUDED; 
 
SET ACTIVE CONTEXT AS ctxt_cover_STX; 
 
For the above example, in response to Qu, the actual query that is 
executed is given below. Typically, the binding key is used to join 
the books table with the context table. The output rows are to be 
sorted based on the cover rank, which is specified implicitly in the 
context as it is an ordering context. The following query reflects 
this semantics. 
 
SELECT T.* 
FROM books T 
    INNER JOIN ctx_cover_STX C1 
         ON(T.cover = C1.cover 
         AND C1.user_name = CURRENT_USER) 
WHERE T.instock 
ORDER BY C1.rank; 
 
Context 4: The user does not prefer (wants to avoid) any science 
fiction books. 
 
This context may be defined as: 
 
CREATE NEGATIVE CONTEXT ctxt_category_GQI ( 
    category integer, 
    BINDING KEY (category) 
         REFERENCES books(category) 
) AS EQUIVALENCE WITH UNLISTED INCLUDED; 
 
SET ACTIVE CONTEXT AS ctxt_category_GQI; 
 
In response to Qu, the actual query that is executed is given below. 
Rows in books, whose category exists as any of the contextual 
values of this context, are eliminated from the answer set. 
 
SELECT T.* 
FROM books T 
WHERE T.category NOT IN ( 
SELECT C1.category 
FROM ctxt_category_GQI C1) 
WHERE T.instock; 
 
The basic contexts, which are not composed from other contexts, 
reflect in the actual executed query according to Table 2. This 
table shows whether an ORDER BY clause is necessary, and 
which type of join we need according to the context properties. 
We use the same symbols of the context classification as in 
Section 2 ([G] for negative context, [S] for positive context, etc.). 
 
Next, we compose complex contexts from the above basic 
contexts. We start with the following context. 
 
Context 5: The user prefers books published in 2005, and then 
those published in 2006 before all other books. For the books that 
are similarly ranked, the user prefers hardcover books over books 
with paperback cover. 
 
This context may be viewed as the composition of ctxt_year_STI 
and ctxt_cover_STX. Therefore, we do not need to define a new 
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context. Conversely, we just need to set the active context 
appropriately to reflect to the desired context. 
 
SET ACTIVE CONTEXT FOR user1 
AS ctxt_year_STI, ctxt_cover_STX 
WITH RANKING ORDER ctxt_year_STI, ctxt_cover_STX; 
 
As a result of this combined context, queries to select tuples from 
books will work as if the query below was executed. First, the 
books in stock will be sorted based on the rank of the years, and 
then in case of ties, the cover type will be considered. This 
semantics is given by the following query rewrite. 
 
SELECT T.* 
FROM books T 
    LEFT OUTER JOIN ctx_year_STI C1 
        ON (T.year = C1.year 
                AND C1.user_name = CURRENT_USER) 
    INNER JOIN ctx_cover_STX C2 
        ON (T.cover = C2.cover 
                AND C2.user_name = CURRENT_USER) 
WHERE T.stock 
ORDER BY C1.rank, C2.rank; 
 
Context Class ORDER BY Join Operation 
GQN X NOT IN 
SQN X LEFT OUTER JOIN 
SQX X INNER JOIN 
STN √ LEFT OUTER JOIN 
STX √ INNER JOIN 
SPN √ LEFT OUTER JOIN 
SPX √ INNER JOIN 
Table 2: The type of join used for each context class combination. 
5. CHAMELEON PROOF-OF-CONCEPT 
INSTANTIATIONS 
In this section, we illustrate how one can instantiate and realize 
specialized database servers using Chameleon. We begin with the 
first case study: privacy-aware databases. Then, we present spatial 
databases as our second case study. Finally, we conclude with two 
case studies that illustrate the ideas of context composition. 
5.1 Realizing a Privacy Database Server 
In this section, we show how we can limit disclosure, as what 
happens in Hippocratic Databases, using context awareness in 
Chameleon. In Table 3, we use the same patient table used in [33]. 
This table contains patient personal information. 
 
Consider a healthcare facility that owns this data. Whenever a 
patient is admitted to the facility, he/she has to sign a privacy 
policy. The privacy policy specifies which information is to be 
released to which recipient. Moreover, the policy also specifies 
for which purposes the information is to be released. On an opt-in 
basis, the healthcare facility also allows patients to choose if they 
want any of their personal information to be released to other 
recipients. For instance, a nurse who is treating a patient is 
allowed to see the patient's name, age, and phone, but is not 
allowed to see his/her address for any reason. The patient may 
opt-in and choose that only his/her age is to be released to charity 
for solicitation.  
 
pid name age address phone 
1 Alice Adams 10 1 April Ave. 111-1111 
2 Bob Blaney 20 2 Brooks Blvd. 222-2222 
3 Carl Carson 30 3 Cricket Ct. 333-3333 
4 David Daniels 40 4 Dogwood Dr. 444-4444 
Table 3: The Patients Table. 
 
Beside limited disclosure, limited retention is also modeled using 
context awareness. For simplicity, and without loss of generality, 
we assume that patient data is to be retained for 90 days only. By 
the end of this period, the patient data should have fulfilled the 
purposes for which the data has been collected. After this period, 
different recipients cannot retrieve the data. 
 
It is important to make it clear that the patients in this context are 
the objects. Object contexts are the contexts of the patients. 
Moreover, users are those that use an application at the healthcare 
facility to retrieve patients' data. To model the above example of 
limiting the disclosure and retention of patients' data in 
Chameleon, we define the object contexts patient_privacy_pref 
and policy_signature as follows. 
 
CREATE OBJECT CONTEXT patient_privacy_pref ( 
        recipient varchar(30), purpose varchar(30), 
        pid integer,  pid_pref boolean, 
        name_pref boolean, age_pref boolean, 
        address_pref boolean, phone_pref boolean, 
    BINDING KEY(pid) REFERENCES patient(pid)); 
 
CREATE OBJECT CONTEXT policy_signature ( 
        pid integer,  sign_date date, 
   BINDING KEY(pid) REFERENCES patient(pid)); 
 
Let the object context patient_privacy_pref contain the contextual 
data in Table 4. The following user context enforces the limited 
disclosure and limited retention of patients' data. Table 5 gives the 
context of three users. If the three users execute the query 
"SELECT * FROM patient;", they retrieve the data in Table 6. 
 
CREATE POSITIVE CONTEXT identity_activity ( 
    job varchar(30),  activity varchar(30), 
BINDING KEY(job, activity) REFERENCES 
    patient_privacy_pref(recipient, purpose) 
SUBSTITUTE patient(pid) 
    WITH (CASE WHEN patient_privacy_pref.pid_pref 
            AND today() <= policy_signature.sign_date + 90 
            THEN patient.pid ELSE NULL) 
SUBSTITUTE patient(name) 
    WITH (CASE WHEN patient_privacy_pref.pid_pref 
            AND today() <= policy_signature.sign_date + 90 
           THEN patient.name ELSE NULL) 
... 
) AS EQUIVALENCE WITH UNLISTED EXCLUDED; 
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charity solicitation 1 √ √ √ √ √ 
nurse treatment 1 √ √ √ X √ 
account clerk billing 1 √ √ X √ √ 
charity solicitation 2 X X X X X 
nurse treatment 2 √ √ √ X √ 
account clerk billing 2 √ √ X √ √ 
charity solicitation 3 √ X X √ √ 
nurse treatment 3 √ √ √ X √ 
account clerk billing 3 √ √ X √ √ 
charity solicitation 4 √ √ X X X 
nurse treatment 4 √ √ √ X √ 
account clerk billing 4 √ √ X √ √ 
Table 4: The patient_privacy_pref object context. 
 
user_name job activity 
user1 charity solicitation 
user2 nurse treatment 
user3 account clerk billing 
Table 5: identity_activity contextual values 
 
 pid name age address phone 
u1 
1 Alice Adams 10 1 April Ave. 111-1111 
3   3 Cricket Ct. 333-3333 
4 David Daniels    
u2 
1 Alice Adams 10  111-1111 
2 Bob Blaney 20  222-2222 
3 Carl Carson 30  333-3333 
4 David Daniels 40  444-4444 
u3 
1 Alice Adams  1 April Ave. 111-1111 
2 Bob Blaney  2 Brooks Blvd. 222-2222 
3 Carl Carson  3 Cricket Ct. 333-3333 
4 David Daniels  4 Dogwood Dr. 444-4444 
Table 6: Result of "SELECT * FROM patient;" for all users u1, 
u2, and u3. 
5.2 Realizing a Spatial Database Server 
Spatial databases are optimized to store and query data related to 
objects in space. This type of databases has more complex 
geometrical data types, e.g., points, lines, and rectangles. 
 
Consider a real-estate database containing information about 
houses. The houses table has the following schema: houses (id, 
bedrooms, price, city). An application developer is interested in 
providing some spatial queries to this database, but has no 
privileges to add the location of the house to this table. An object 
context is created to add the location of houses. 
5.2.1 Range Queries 
Let the user context be the willingness to buy a house in certain 
regions. Hence, a user context is created in Chameleon to declare 
that only houses contained in relevant regions are to be returned.  
 
The definitions of the object and user contexts, house_loc and 
houses_in_region, respectively, are given below. The function 
“contained” retrieves any house with location (x, y) that exist with 
the rectangular region (x1, y1, x2, y2). The binding between 
object and user contexts is through the scalar function “contained” 
that retrieves only the database objects within the query issuer’s 
range context. Notice that there is no prioritization for the objects 
within the range, and hence the EQUIVALENCE keyword 
specifies the lack of any ordering. 
 
CREATE OBJECT CONTEXT house_loc ( 
id integer,  
x integer,  y integer, 
    PRIMARY KEY(id), 
    BINDING KEY id REFERENCES  houses(id)); 
 
CREATE POSITIVE CONTEXT houses_in_region ( 
x1 integer, y1 integer, 
x2 integer, y2 integer, 
    BINDING KEY() REFERENCES house_loc 
    WITH contained (house_loc.x, house_loc.y, x1, y1, x2, y2) 
) AS EQUIVALENCE WITH UNLISTED EXCLUDED; 
 
5.2.2 Nearest Neighbor Queries 
Another class of queries in spatial databases is the nearest 
neighbor query. In this class, the user wants to retrieve the object 
that is nearest to a pivot location. An extension to this class of 
queries is the k nearest-neighbors query. The answer of this query 
is the k objects that are nearest to the pivot location. In the real 
estate database, a user willing to retrieve the houses listed by 
proximity to a point may declare her context as follows: 
 
CREATE POSITIVE CONTEXT nearby_houses ( 
x integer,  y integer, 
    BINDING KEY() REFERENCES house_loc 
    WITH true 
 ) AS TOTAL ORDER USING  
dist(x, y, house_loc.x, house_loc.y) 
WITH UNLISTED EXCLUDED;  
 
Notice that the clause WITH UNLISTED EXCLUDED can be 
omitted since all the houses are totally ordered based on distance.  
 
The equivalent SQL query with the awareness of this context 
would be: 
 
SELECT T.* 
FROM houses T 
    INNER JOIN house_loc OC1 
                 ON(T.id = OC1.id), 
     nearby_houses C2 
ORDER BY dist(C2.x, C2.y, OC1.x, OC1.y) 
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Notice that for finding nearest-neighbors to a user’s location, the 
binding between the database objects and the user’s focal point is 
via a total order based on a scalar function “distance”. 
 
5.3 Combining Contexts 
5.3.1 Skylines 
Skyline queries emerge in spatial databases. Assume that user2 
wants to buy a house that is close to his work in downtown and 
that is also cheap (or at least reasonable) in price. Since it is not 
easy to combine such preferences in a ranking expression, user2 
decides to select from the skyline houses. 
 
Such context is defined as the composition of several contexts, 
namely houses_in_region, nearby_houses, and the context price 
already in the houses table. The first context will include a 
bounding box representing downtown. The second and third 
contexts will be used to compute the skyline. This composition is 
instantiated by setting the active context as follows: 
 
SET ACTIVE CONTEXT FOR user2 
    AS houses_in_region, nearby_houses 
WITH SKYLINE OF nearby_houses.rank MIN,  
    houses.price MIN; 
 
Notice that after defining the houses in certain areas, and then 
defining the closeness to pivot points, the SET ACTIVE 
CONTEXTS combines both of these contexts (the range context 
and the nearest-neighbors context) together along with an object 
context (price) that is part of the house relation to get the 
SKYLINE of distance and price. This illustrates a more complex 
usage of contexts to answer conjunctions of spatial predicates. 
 
5.3.2 Location-aware Privacy 
Consider an application scenario where a query issuer, e.g., a 
doctor, may be allowed to access a database object’s record, e.g., 
patient’s record, only when the doctor is in the hospital premises. 
Otherwise, the doctor is not allowed to access the records.  
In order to realize a location-aware privacy database server, we 
make use of the two contexts patient_privacy_pref and 
identity_activity that we define in Section 5.1 to realize the 
privacy context. For the location context, we make use of the two 
simple object and user contexts (valid_location and 
current_location, respectively). In this example, the location is 
modeled by a string value that gives a high-level description of 
the user’s or the object’s location (in contrast to physical 
coordinate locations). The mapping from the physical location to 
the named location is skipped here for simplicity. 
 
CREATE OBJECT CONTEXT valid_location ( 
    pid integer, 
    location varchar(30), 
    BINDING KEY (pid) REFERENCES patient(pid) );  
  
CREATE POSITIVE CONTEXT current_location ( 
     location varchar(30), 
     BINDING KEY (location)  
          REFERENCES valid_location (location) 
) AS EQUIVALENCE WITH UNLISTED EXCLUDED; 
   
SET ACTIVE CONTEXT identity_activity, current_location; 
 
Notice that only the user contexts are listed since the binding 
activates the corresponding object contexts. 
5.3.3 Location-aware and Time-aware Privacy 
The example below gives a more complex context composition of 
the identity, location, and time contexts for both the database 
objects and the query issuers to realize a database server that 
provides both location-aware and time-aware privacy. This server 
would be useful in guaranteeing that, for example, a doctor may 
be allowed to access a patient’s record only when the doctor is in 
the hospital but not after the hospital’s regular hours.  
 
We make use of the contexts patient_privacy_pref and 
identity_activity (defined in Section 5.1) to realize the privacy 
context, the contexts valid_location and current_location (defined 
in Section 5.3.2) to realize the location context, and the temporal 
contexts valid_time, current_time_not_expired, and 
current_valid_time, defined below. 
 
CREATE OBJECT CONTEXT policy_signature ( 
     pid integer, 
     sign_date date, expire_date date, 
     BINDING KEY(pid) REFERENCES patient(pid) ); 
 
CREATE OBJECT CONTEXT valid_time ( 
     pid integer, 
     from_time date, to_time date, 
     BINDING KEY(pid) REFERENCES patient(pid) ); 
 
CREATE POSITIVE CONTEXT current_time_not_expired ( 
    BINDING KEY() REFERENCES patient  
         WITH today() >= policy_signature.sign_date 
         AND today() <= policy_signature.expire_date) 
 
CREATE POSITIVE CONTEXT current_time_valid ( 
    BINDING KEY() REFERENCES patient  
        WITH now() >= valid_time.from_time 
        AND now() <= valid_time.to_time) 
 
SET ACTIVE CONTEXT identity_activity, current_location, 
current_time_not_expired, current_time_valid; 
 
Notice that the user context current_time_not_expired provides 
limited retention, i.e., that data is made available only for the 
duration agreed upon by the data owner. 
 
6. RELATED WORK 
There have been several definitions of context and context-
awareness (e.g., see [4, 6, 7, 17, 25, 40, 43, 44]). Most of these 
definitions define the context in terms of examples with special 
emphasis on the location context. Similarly, there have been 
several definitions of context-aware applications that include 
various synonyms, e.g., adaptive applications [44], reactive 
applications [16], responsive applications [19], situated 
applications [25], contented-sensitive applications [42], and 
environment directed applications [21]. In this paper, we adhere 
with the most formal definitions given in [17]. Recently, there has 
been interest in adding the context-awareness to relational 
database systems and query processors (e.g., see [30, 46]). 
However, the main focus is either on the modeling of the context 
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information and how to integrate it into the query definition, or on 
very specific examples that consider only one type of context. 
None of the previous work have discussed or proposed a full-
fledge realization of context-awareness inside a DBMS. 
 
There has been several work for presenting preferences in terms 
of relational calculus, first order logic, and query languages (e.g., 
see [14, 28, 32, 50]). In terms of query processing, there are two 
extremes for preference-aware queries, namely, top-k and skyline 
queries. Top-k queries have been well studied in various fields 
(e.g., [9, 12, 20, 38]). Also, there have been numerous algorithms 
for embedding top-k queries into database operators (e.g., see [8, 
13, 22, 26, 34]). On the other hand, the term skyline queries has 
been coined in the database literature [5] to refer to the secondary 
storage version of the maximal vector set problem [31, 36]. Due 
to its practicality, various versions of skyline queries have been 
studied in the literature, e.g., sorted data [15], partially-ordered 
domains [10], high-dimensional data (e.g., [11, 41, 49, 52, 53]), 
progressive and online computations (e.g., [29, 39, 47]), sliding 
window [35, 48], continuous skyline computations [24, 37, 51], 
mobile ad-hoc networks [23], spatial skylines [45], and data 
mining [27]. Unlike the case for top-k queries, there is no 
previous work in integrating skyline queries at the core of query 
operators or database systems. 
7. RESEARCH CHALLENGES AND 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
A working demonstration of the Chameleon context-aware 
database management system is currently available based on 
extensions to PostgreSQL. In the resulting context-aware DBMS, 
Chameleon, we also implement several operators to combine 
multiple contexts, mainly, the SkylineJoin, the RankJoin, and the 
FilterMark operators. Figure 8 illustrates the components we 
modified in PostgreSQL to realize Chameleon. 
 
Figure 8: Extensions to PostgreSQL at Various Modules. 
 
Based on this prototype of Chameleon, the authors have identified 
the following research challenges: 
Performance: In the authors’ opinion, the introduction of 
context-aware database management systems as outlined in this 
paper (and as depicted in Figure 1) is a profound and an important 
step. The declarative approach in defining the queries in relational 
databases (in contrast to the procedural approach in network 
databases) was one of the main factors that made the relational 
model prevail. Analogously, the declarative approach in defining 
contexts in context-aware database management systems can have 
a strong impact. Over thirty five years of efficient implementation 
and tuning has made the relational model overcome the efficiency 
hurdle. Similarly, efficient realization is the main challenge in 
context-aware database management systems. Efficient realization 
and execution are the authors’ main focus for future work.  
 
Dynamic Contexts: Another important challenge is that of 
dynamic contexts. So far, what Chameleon offers is static 
contexts. In many application scenarios, changes take place in the 
contexts, e.g., some active contexts may become inactive, inactive 
ones may become active, or new contexts get introduced. Another 
form of change is that the contextual values themselves within a 
context may change, e.g., the surrounding temperature may 
change or the location of a moving object may change, etc. These 
changes may affect the query being executed. This is similar in 
spirit to mid-query reoptimization [54]. However, the difference is 
that when the contexts change, the system may need to augment 
the query being executed by additional predicates that reflect that 
change in contexts.  
 
Expressiveness and Completeness: Finally, issues related to the 
expressiveness and completeness of the context-aware model 
presented in this paper need to be studied.  
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ABSTRACT 
Privacy and security issues within geospatial information systems 
are of growing public and scientific interest. Especially with the 
launch of Google Street View and Google Earth, geospatial data 
has come to the attention of the public, thereby not only raising 
support for these technologies, but also massive concerns. It is the 
duty of science to pick up today‟s uprising debates and to help 
structuring them, providing clarifications and different solutions. 
Thus, the aim of this paper is to contribute in form of an 
interdisciplinary discussion about privacy issues, both from a 
philosophical and an engineering point of view. Privacy and its 
importance are outlined as well as different privacy issues raised 
concerning the nowadays so popular 3D city models. In addition, 
technical solutions are shown which allow data providers to 
preserve privacy, but that won‟t interfere with the advancements 
of these technologies. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
K4.1 [Computers and Society]: Public Policy Issues - Privacy 
General Terms 
Human factors, legal aspects, algorithms 
Keywords 
Ethics, privacy, privacy-enhancing technologies, 3D city models, 
street views 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Technological developments usually come forth with a vast 
amount of new opportunities. But at the same time, technological 
innovations are also prone to novel, unknown problems and 
threats–for its latter users and/or society in general. It is the 
unavoidable, janus-faced nature of technology, which has also 
recently drawn a lot of attention to geospatial information systems 
and services. Especially in a lot of European countries–where 
privacy and data protection laws are far stricter than in the United 
States–some early kind of geospatial information system has 
proven to be highly controversial. The launch of Google Street 
View has caused many citizens to issue complaints to government 
officials about the project thereby claiming that it is a massive 
intrusion upon privacy and thus a violation of existing data 
privacy laws [1]. In this quite emotional, heated and sometimes 
even irrational debate, it is the job of the sciences to pick up the 
raised questions, to think about them, to analyze, and to 
restructure them in joint, interdisciplinary research and finally to 
think of adequate solutions. It is the main aim of this paper, to 
make a basic contribution to this debate and to shed some light on 
fundamental questions. Therefore, in section 2, it is first 
elaborated on what privacy is at all and which role privacy plays 
in western societies. In section 3, different privacy issues within 
geospatial information systems are identified and outlined. 
Section 4 presents techniques that offer the potential to better 
preserve privacy in 3D city models, but also discusses their 
limitations. Section 5 concludes our work, which we regard as a 
stepping stone to future research directions.  
2. PRIVACY AND ITS IMPORTANCE 
Privacy and the right of privacy is central for all liberal, 
egalitarian, and democratic societies [2][3]. Privacy assures 
personal freedom and autonomy, guarantees freedom from 
governmental interventions, or other societal institutions, parties 
or persons and thus allows a person to build his own individual 
scheme of life. It is privacy that establishes a sphere of non-
intervention which is also crucial for self-fulfillment and the 
development of a personal identity. So-called decisional privacy 
concerns therefore basic decisions of a person about who he wants 
to be and how he wants to live. Decisional privacy is the core of 
one‟s personal freedom and the possibility to form one‟s own 
authentic identity. It is also the core of political freedom in the 
form of the absence of interferences with the sovereignty 
(negative freedom as “freedom from”) and the assistance in 
fulfilling one‟s own potential (positive freedom as “freedom to”). 
On the contrary, so-called informational privacy deals with the 
fact that a person wants to be in control of personal information 
about intimacies of his life. In this clearly information-based or 
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knowledge-based conception of privacy, privacy intrusions are 
defined therefore as situations in which personal information is 
collected or disseminated without consent of the person who is 
topic of the information. Informational privacy is crucial for 
regulating personal relationships and establishing different social 
roles one plays in society: “If everyone knew everything about 
everyone else, differentiated relations and self-presentation would 
no longer be possible, nor would autonomy and the freedom to 
determine one‟s own life” [3]. 
However purely information-based conceptions of privacy are 
clearly flawed: There are also other privacy violations, which are 
not of a cognitive nature but of a physical one: Local privacy is 
the right of a person to restrict physical access of others to his 
body, his personal belongings and his home. Local privacy 
assures therefore a sphere of non-intervention, a protected, 
secured, private place or shelter. This definition of privacy 
corresponds well with the famous description of Samuel D. 
Warren and Louis D. Brandeis of the right of privacy as the right 
to be left alone [12]. Not only is it important to be left alone from 
the gaze and opinions of others, but also the right to control 
physical interference by others into one‟s private affairs. 
To conclude, we could say, with Ferdinand Schoeman, that “a 
person has privacy to the extent that others have limited access to 
information about him, limited access to the intimacies of his life, 
or limited access to his thoughts or his body” [4]. The right of 
privacy is then the right of a person to be protected against 
intrusions (negative form of privacy as being free from) and to be 
able to control cognitive or physical access to his personal things 
and affairs (positive form of privacy as being able to decide freely 
to). Thus, privacy allows for inner and outer freedom of an 
individual, helps building and assuring the personal integrity and 
autonomy, helps protecting his reputation, is enabling different 
forms of social self-representation in different social contexts. 
If you have a look at the history of privacy, it becomes obvious, 
that what counts as “public” or “private” depends largely on the 
social tradition and varies from culture to culture [3]. Privacy is 
therefore of “conventional nature” only and subject to an on-
going societal negotiation process. The personal right of privacy 
is delimited and overridden by other rights and competing moral 
principals so as to protect interests and rights of other parties or of 
society in general. (E.g. at the workplace, privacy is neither totally 
free from restrictions nor does a contract of employment nullify 
privacy claims at all. Or as Anders J. Persson and Sven Ove 
Hansson put it, taking another form of contractual relation as 
example: Having a rental contract will give the owner of the house 
the right to enter the house for certain purposes, but not to open 
closets and read private papers that are kept in there [5].) 
All in all, from a theoretical point of view, this societal balancing 
and negotiation process could be best described by the concept of 
so-called reflective equilibrium [6]. On the one hand, certain 
“given” values or norms do restrict our social practices. On the 
other hand, looking at the practical effects of these norms, we do 
also change certain norms and values we consider as too restrict, 
inadequate or outdated. In our case this means: On the one hand 
personal privacy rights are weighed against other rights 
restricting/enlarging personal privacy. On the other hand existing 
rights and social norms are also changed, because we are not 
willing to accept them anymore (since they restrict privacy too 
much). 
3. PRIVACY ISSUES IN GEOSPATIAL 
INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
According to the directive 2007/2/EC of the European Parliament 
and Council, geospatial data is “any data with a direct or indirect 
reference to a specific location or geographical area” thereby often 
describing a spatial object which is further defined as an “abstract 
representation of a real-world phenomenon related to a specific 
location or geographical area” [7]. Geospatial data is therefore 
only object-related data and not initially subject to data protection 
laws [9]. However–under certain circumstances–geospatial data 
could become personal data [8][9]. This is the case, if 1) photos 
or photo-realistic views/models of spatial objects (i.e. a building 
or an estate) could be easily located by geo-coordinates and thus 
easily matched to its owner or residents and/or if 2) the data is–to 
put it more generally–able to describe personal or factual affairs 
[8][9]. In these cases, geospatial data is also subject to data 
protection laws. Then, the collection, storage, processing and 
dissemination of the data is only allowed, if the interests of the 
individuals, which are subject of the data, are not harmed and/or 
are not superseded by other rights and interests (such as homeland 
security) [8]. 
Picking up the above mentioned “dimensions” of privacy, privacy 
intrusions in the realm of geospatial data are of cognitive nature 
only and therefore mainly intrusions on informational privacy 
(with possible effects on decisional and local privacy in the 
future): 
1) Geospatial data showing faces of people, license plates of cars 
(as Google Street View does) could be seen as problematic, since 
it conveys a lot of information on personal affairs, such as 
personal habits, preferences, circumstances [8][10]. Even 
obfuscating faces or license plates is often not sufficient, as a lot 
of things still remain recognizable because of other distinctive, 
individual characteristics [10]. 
2) The same is true for showing house numbers and detailed, 
photo-realistic images or representation of spatial objects, since it 
tells a lot about personal circumstances and thus could allow for 
geo-marketing or scoring of creditworthiness [8][10]. 
3) Especially Google Street View is criticized for having a 
“privileged view” on the spatial object: Pictures are taken at the 
height of 2.5m and not at the height of the eyes of a pedestrian, 
thus allow to look inside an estate or home–a per se secured, 
protected, intimate space [10]. 
However, data protection officials also agree on this: If the spatial 
object is obfuscated or the presentation of the spatial object is of 
abstract manner only, no interests of individuals are violated [8]. 
Therefore, in the following, different methods and techniques are 
to be presented and outlined, which meet these requirements and 
“remove” certain privacy issues. However, one has to bear in 
mind, that the core of data protection is not met by that: 
Especially in Germany, the data protection officials want to force 
Google not just to obfuscate images and grant individuals the 
right to get certain pictures removed from the database, but also to 
delete all non-obfuscated raw-data (so as not to be able to use the 
data anymore for e.g. commercial purposes in countries where 
data protection laws are not as strict as in Europe) [11]. And 
indeed this is the case: Google has collected data in Germany but 
has transferred all data for storing and further processing to the 
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US thereby not willing to delete the raw material and thus the data 
still being open for abuse and possible privacy violations [11]. 
All in all, it should be highly appreciated, that privacy and 
geospatial data is discussed more and more on a broad public 
basis. It is the duty of society in general to decide, which 
technology to adopt (respectively how to adopt a technology): We 
need not do all the things we are (technically) capable to do. It is 
the job of philosophy and the engineering sciences to accompany, 
support and guide these debates, to clarify things and to outline 
and provide different solutions. 
4. PRIVACY-ENABLING ABSTRACTION 
AND OBFUSCATION TECHNIQUES 
As already mentioned, the obfuscation of faces and license plates 
still leaves a lot of information in the image, so that a person or 
one person‟s property could still be recognizable. The distinct 
characteristics could be very small or unusual, which makes it 
nearly impossible to automatically detect and remove them all by 
processing a single image at a time. Even if it would be possible, 
the resulting images would depict scenes where large parts are 
blurred or missing. As such images are not attractive to anyone 
this is obviously not a viable solution. The only alternative is 
therefore to use image sequences that show the same scene at 
different times and/or from different angles. Then the critical 
objects are hopefully gone or at least are located in a different part 
of the image and have cleared the view to the formerly occluded 
area. Multiple images allow for an image fusion to produce new 
ones without people and private objects. 
Most comparable work has been done for the automatic 
generation of façade textures from terrestrial images, where 
occlusions from cars and pedestrians are avoided by a filtering of 
multiple images. Böhm [13] e.g. blends per-pixel registered 
images in a color clustering approach in order to synthesize 
occlusion-free texture images for building façades (see Figure 1 
left). By only capturing a handful of images from multiple stations 
or a sequence of images from one point, both moving and static 
objects that are in front of the façade can be completely 
eliminated. However, each pixel must exactly point to the same 
planar part of the façade as the corresponding pixels of the other 
images. Such image correspondences can be reliably determined 
by the SIFT operator [14], which has also been implemented to 
run in real-time [23]. Although an automatic retouching of façade 
images is only possible if the underlying façade geometry is 
known, the necessary methods for a reconstruction from stereo 
imagery and laser scanning data at street level has long been 
shown (see e.g. [20][21][22]). And as recent reports have stated, 
the Google Street View vehicles of Google have been spotted with 
laser scanners mounted on the roof. 
Until now, we have only regarded objects that are in front of the 
façade and not on the façade. This applies to house numbers, 
name plates and billboards. And although stores, firms and 
companies place them by the majority for advertising purposes, 
private persons and small firms might feel their privacy violated 
by this unwanted publicity. Such objects could be detectable by 
optical character recognition (OCR), which has reached a level 
where letters and numbers are reliably recognized. The question 
remains what to do with these areas? In contrast to persons and 
cars, a blurring of the characters would in most cases be sufficient 
to make them unrecognizable. Again, such an approach is not very 
appealing as it degrades the quality of the façade textures. Better 
would be to retouch these areas by copying similar parts of the 
façade image (see Figure 1 right, bottom). 
Once the objects in front of the building have been eliminated and 
the façades been cleared, the next level of anonymization is to 
remove what can be seen of the interior of the building. The major 
intrusion into private homes can be expected coming from the 
windows. To counteract this, the glass parts could be grayed out 
and given a bright streak of reflected light to keep a realistic 
appearance. Another option would be to store the semantic 
information, so that a visualization application can adapt the 
window glass to better reflect the environment and weather 
conditions. However, before the relevant pixels can be altered, the  
 
                                           
Figure 1: Left: Occlusion-free texture (bottom) by multiple 
image fusion. Right: Two abstraction levels (1st image, 2nd 
geometry) from a photo-realistic 3D building model (top). 
55
locations and shapes of the windows must be detected. Several 
publications have addressed this problem. By using the Förstner 
operator [15], Mayer matches façade images to a database 
containing images of common window types. This enables the 
identification of the position and dimensions of the windows [16]. 
Ripperda and Brenner reconstruct the arrangement of doors and 
windows in a stochastic Reversible jump Markov Chain Monte 
Carlo process using formal grammars of façades [17]. Becker and 
Haala detect 3D edges in image pairs to do a hypothesis test on 
the existence of glazing bars and fanlights of windows and doors 
[18]. Also Wenzel et al. detects repetitive structures in facade 
images by using the SIFT operator in conjunction with a heuristic 
search method [19]. 
A photorealistic visualization might not always be necessary in all 
applications. Döllner and Kyprianidis e.g. present an automatic 
image abstraction approach that, applied to image sequences of 
3D city models, results in a realistic, but cartoon-like presentation 
of virtual environments [24] (see Figure 1 right, center). On the 
one hand, such a presentation of real-life objects features enough 
details to recognize the spatial situation, but on the other hand 
changes enough to make re-identification of persons impossible 
and the judgment on people‟s living conditions inconclusive. In a 
last image abstraction step, the facades and roofs could be colored 
in a single color only. 
The abstraction of (façade) images is only one aspect concerning 
the privacy of geospatial data. Another is the geometry, which can 
be regarded both by single buildings, but also by their 
arrangement into building blocks. 
Over the last decade, quite some work has been dedicated to the 
simplification of 3D building models for cartographic purposes 
(e.g. [25][26][27][28]). In contrast to surface simplification 
algorithms known from the field of computer graphics, these 
algorithms are specifically designed for buildings. They strictly 
maintain global symmetries and enforce geometric properties like 
the co-planarity, parallelism and rectangularity of façade walls 
with the purpose to avoid that they become tilted in the 
simplification process. 
Because not every application needs highly detailed models, as 
long as the final outcome is the same, we suggest using such a 
geometric abstraction as a way to protect peoples‟ privacy. During 
route guidance, e.g., only those details that assure a high 
recognition rate of the landmarks and that are necessary for a 
particular route should be presented to the user. Objects that are 
of no interest in the application‟s context must not be exposed to 
the public in every detail (see Figure 1 right, bottom), because a 
highly detailed representation could reveal private information 
about someone‟s living condition. For the driver of a vehicle, the 
single colored flat façade of a building has the same informative 
value as a detailed façade with windows, dormers, doors, etc. 
However, if highly detailed façade models are a requirement, their 
appearance could be obfuscated by a generalization that changes 
the number and arrangement of façade elements [26]. 
The above mentioned generalization algorithms try to maintain 
the object‟s shape characteristics as best as possible. This is 
especially useful for landmarks and other buildings with unusual 
architectures. For residential buildings, which are generally of 
higher concern regarding privacy issues, an even stronger shape 
simplification can be achieved by the use of 3D building symbols 
or standard roof shapes (see e.g. [29][30]). 
At this point, we want to leave single buildings behind us and take 
a look at spatial situations with several buildings. There are two 
alternatives for an abstraction: typification and aggregation. 
Typification is a generalization technique where the spatial 
situation is analyzed to detect similar objects and their 
arrangement. Then the number of objects is reduced while 
maintaining the global appearance. For example, two buildings in 
a row of five similar looking houses could be removed and the 
remaining three re-located and increased in size to fill the idle 
space. Traditionally, such a technique is used to make room in a 
map when its scale changes and all objects won‟t fit anymore in 
the same space. This technique, however, could well be used to 
obfuscate a spatial situation or even hide buildings that are at risk 
concerning their security. As typification of 3D city models is 
really only a 2D problem, an algorithm like the one described in 
[31] could be used. 
While such an abstraction approach still results in models that 
comprise of several entities, the aggregation operation replaces all 
buildings with a building block. Anders shows e.g. an approach 
that works on 3D building models [32]. Glander and Döllner 
aggregate building blocks while highlighting landmarks [33]. 
Such approaches could be context-sensitive, thus presenting only 
the detailed information that is vital to the task. The remaining 
objects are simplified to protect the privacy of residents, owners, 
public and private facilities. 
5. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we gave an in-depth discussion on privacy in 
general and privacy issues in special within geospatial information 
systems. Furthermore, different abstraction and obfuscation 
techniques have been presented helping to circumvent possible 
(re-) identification of people and their living conditions and shield 
institutions that are at risk from prying eyes, which otherwise 
would be possible from highly accurate and detailed 3D city 
models. 
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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we discuss research issues concerning data
provenance for streaming environments. In data streams,
especially in sensor networks, data provenance is a key in-
formation for assessing data quality since it gives important
evidence about the origin of the data. We first show our
initial approach for assessing trust scores of streaming data
based on provenance. We then discuss open researches issues
about using and delivering provenance in data streams.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.2.8 [Database Management]: Database Applications—
Spatial databases and GIS ; K.6.5 [Management of Com-
puting and Information Systems]: Security and Protec-
tion
General Terms
Management, Measurement, Security
Keywords
Data Provenance, Data Stream, Security, Trustworthiness
1. INTRODUCTION
Pushed by recent advances in areas such as sensor net-
works, embedded systems, and ubiquitous/mobile comput-
ing, streaming management environments are being adopted
in many applications. Such applications include traffic con-
trol systems monitoring data from mobile sensors, location
based services (LBSs) based on user’s continuously chang-
ing location, e-healthcare systems monitoring patient med-
ical conditions, and realtime financial analysis. Sensor net-
works, which are a typical example of data stream environ-
ments, are also widely deployed in many different application
domains from monitoring environments, such as pollution,
temperature, and earthquake monitoring, to controlling au-
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tomated systems, such as manufacturing facilities and power
plants.
In these applications, data provenance is crucial for as-
sessing data quality since data is originated by multiple
sources and is processed by multiple intermediate agents.
Here, data provenance refers to information documenting
how data came to be in its current state - where it originated,
how it was generated, and the manipulations it underwent
since its creation. The location of sensors and nodes is a
crucial component of provenance in that it may affect the
quality of data. Data and service mashups accelerate the
importance of data provenance since these applications in-
tegrate data from various sources and provide the combined
data to users.
The use of provenance in data streams is relevant in many
real applications. Two application examples are the follow-
ing ones:
• A battlefield monitoring system gathers enemy loca-
tions from various sensors deployed in vehicles, air-
crafts, and satellites and processes the monitoring queries
over these streaming data. In this system, we need to
assess the collected data since we must make sure that
mission critical applications only access highly trust-
worthy data in order to guarantee accurate decisions
by these applications. Since sensors and communica-
tion lines have different accuracy and confidence, it is
essential to know the provenance of each data for as-
sessing its trustworthiness level.
• A Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA)
system collects real-time information from data collec-
tion points such as sensors, and, based on analyses
performed by a management system, performs process
control tasks and monitors equipments from remote
locations [8]. In this system, we must use only highly
trustworthy data in order to prevent critical damages
due to wrong control decisions because of wrong data.
For example, in an electric power grid which consists of
270 utilities using a SCADA system that can contain
up to 50,000 data collection points and over 3,000 pub-
lic/private electric utilities, any single point of failure
can disrupt the entire process flow and can potentially
cause a domino effect that shuts down the entire sys-
tems [8]. As mentioned for the battlefield monitoring
system, data provenance is a key information to pre-
vent such destructive accidents.
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These examples show the importance of data provenance
from the viewpoint of assessing trustworthiness of data items.
For the sake of simplifying the presentation, in the rest of
the paper we will focus on the use of provenance for as-
sessing trust even though there are many other usages for
provenance such as identifying/clustering data, comparing
information from various sources, and detecting injections
of malicious data.
Nevertheless the importance of data provenance, there are
lots of challenges concerning the use of information in data
streams due to the unique nature of the environment. The
primary characteristic of data streams is that they arrive
rapidly and should be processed in real-time [10, 14]. In
real applications, data stream management systems (DSMSs
for short) consume hundreds or thousands of data items per
minute and process a large number of continuous queries
which are registered in advance and run repeatedly whenever
a new data item arrives [1, 14]. Therefore, high performance
processing of data provenance is essential in data streams.
Data streams are also potentially unbounded in size. This
means that it is not possible to store the entire set of data
items [14]. Therefore, we can only sequentially access data
provenance and cannot refer to the past data provenance.
The size of data provenance also complicates its manage-
ment in that it tends to increase as it is transmitted from
the source to the server. The reason is that data provenance
must also includes annotations concerning the intermediate
processes performed on the data items. Such increasing size
can slow down the network since the network bandwidth is
usually limited in data stream environments, especially in
wireless sensor networks.
Only a few research efforts have been reported concerning
data provenance in data streaming. The first one is the IBM
T.J. Watson’s Century [3, 13], which is a biomedical data
stream system for online healthcare analytics. Century pro-
vides a framework for analysis of sensor-based medical data,
in which provenance plays a central role [13]. The main goal
of the system is to support scalable automated near-real
time analysis of high volumes of medical sensors. The sys-
tem uses both data provenance and process provenance to
describe which data and operators contributed to the gen-
eration of a particular data item. Century also supports
historical data reply which recreates the processing graph
that created the output.
Recently, Vijayakumar and Plale [18] have proposed a sys-
tem architecture for near-real time provenance collection in
data streams. They focus on identifying information which
represents provenance of a data item from real time data
streams, capturing provenance history of streams, tracing
the source of a stream long after the process has completed.
The system has been proposed for a specific application do-
main, that is, meteorology forecasting.
In this paper, we discuss research issues concerning data
provenance in streaming environments. Specifically, we fo-
cus on two issues: 1) using data provenance in data streams
and 2) delivering data provenance via low-bandwidth and
insecure networks. We start with the first issue by present-
ing an overview of our initial solutions for assessing trust
scores of streaming data based on provenance. In describing
our solution, we first present the novel notion of confidence
policy which controls the use of data based on the purpose of
use and trust scores of the data, and then present the over-
all framework for enforcing the confidence policy in DSMSs.
Then, based on our solution, we discuss the open research
challenges.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
briefly presents our initial approach for assessing trust scores
of streaming data in DSMSs. Section 3 discusses open re-
searches issues related with data provenance in data streams.
We finally summarize and conclude the paper in Section 4.
2. PROVENANCE-BASED CONFIDENCE
POLICY CONTROL IN DATA STREAMS
In this section, we briefly survey our initial solution for
enforcing confidence policies in data streams which is ad-
dressed in the previous work [12]. We focus on sensor net-
works since they are typical examples of data streams and
have many interesting features related with provenance such
as network topology and in-network processing issues.
We propose the novel notion of confidence policy that
specifies the minimum trust score that a data item, or set
of data items, must have for use by an application or task.
Here, the trust score is associated with each data item and
provides an indication of the trustworthiness of the data
item. Confidence policies are integrated with query process-
ing in that query results are filtered by the policies before
being returned to the application. Our approach is based on
the concept of provenance since more trustworthy sources
generate more trustworthy data.
We first introduce a basic provenance model for sensor
networks, and then, describe a DSMS-based framework for
confidence policy management. We then introduce a sys-
tematic approach for assessing trust scores.
2.1 Data provenance model
We model the sensor network as a graph of G(N,E) where
N is a set of nodes (i.e., sensors) and E is a set of network
connections between nodes. We assume that the sensors are
in ad-hoc networks which send data items to DSMSs by re-
laying due to the insufficient capability of data transmission.
In this kind of network, the sensors are categorized into three
types according to their roles: 1) a terminal node generates a
data item and sends it to one or more intermediate or server
nodes; 2) an intermediate node receives data items from one
or more terminal or intermediate nodes, and passes them to
intermediate or server nodes; it may also generate an aggre-
gated data item from the received data items and send the
aggregated item to intermediate or server nodes; 3) a server
node receives data items and evaluates continuous queries
based on those items.
We introduce two types of data provenance: the physical
provenance and the logical provenance. The physical prove-
nance of a data item shows where the item was produced and
how it was delivered to the server. We exploit the physical
provenance to compute trust scores. The physical prove-
nance can be represented as a path from a terminal node
to a server node or a tree if there are more than two termi-
nal nodes involved in the generation of the data item. The
logical provenance of a data item represents the semantic
meaning of the data item in the context of a given appli-
cation. For example, the logical provenance can be a chain
of employees who used the data item, or a trail of business
logics that processed the data item. The logical provenance
is used for grouping data items into semantic events with
the same meaning or purpose.
59
2.2 Confidence policy control
Figure 1 shows our overall framework for confidence pol-
icy management. The framework shows how sensor data
are processed and managed by a DSMS and how they are
delivered to users. As shown in the figure, the proposed
framework consists of three major components: trust score
computation, query and policy evaluation, and data quality
management. The role of each component is as follows:
• The trust score computation obtains trust scores of
data items based on those of network nodes and (peri-
odically) updates the trust scores to reflect the effect
of the newly arrived data items. It also maintains and
updates the trust scores of network nodes based on the
scores of data items.
• The query and policy evaluation executes continuous
queries, each of which has its own confidence range.
We assume that each continuous query Q is given with
its confidence range [qmax, qmin]. For each Q with
[qmax, qmin], this component first obtains the result-
ing data items by evaluating the given query Q and
then returns the data items for which the trust scores
are in the range [qmax, qmin].
• The data quality management tries to control the data
quality (manually or automatically) by adjusting data
rates, increasing/decreasing the number of sensor nodes,
or changing delivery paths. Obviously, the data qual-
ity affects the trust scores, and many approaches [7, 11,
15] in the context of sensor networks have addressed
the issue of controlling data quality.
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Figure 1: The overall framework for confidence pol-
icy control over data streams.
2.3 Computing trust scores
In data stream environments 1) data elements arrive in-
crementally and 2) trustworthiness of sensors can dynami-
cally change as time goes on. Therefore, to provide accurate
confidence information, we need a new framework that sup-
ports incremental assignment of trust scores for nodes and
data items whose situations dynamically change.
To obtain trust scores, we propose a cyclic framework
based on the interdependency [2, 6] between data items and
their related network nodes. The interdependency means
that the trust scores of data items affect the trust scores
of network nodes, and similarly the trust scores of network
nodes affect those of data items. In addition, the trust scores
need to be continuously evolved in the stream environment
since new data items continuously arrive to the server. Thus,
a cyclic framework is adequate to reflect these interdepen-
dency and continuous evolution properties. Figure 2 shows
the cyclic framework according to which the trust score of
data items and the trust score of network nodes are contin-
uously updated. The trust scores are computed for the data
items of the same event (identified by logical provenance) in
a given streaming window.
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Figure 2: The cyclic framework for computing the
trust scores of data items and network nodes.
As shown in Figure 2, we maintain three different types
of trust scores, that is, current, intermediate, and next trust
scores, to reflect the interdependency and continuous evo-
lution properties in computing trust scores. We note that,
since new data items are continuously added to the stream,
executing the cycle once whenever a new data item arrives is
enough to reflect the interdependency and continuous evo-
lution properties in the stream environment.
Our framework works as follows. Trust scores are initially
computed based on the values and provenance of data items;
we refer to these trust scores as implicit trust scores. To ob-
tain these trust scores, we use two types of similarity func-
tions: value similarity inferred from data values, and prove-
nance similarity inferred from physical provenances. Value
similarity is based on the principle that the more data items
referring to the same real-world event have similar values,
the higher the trust scores of these items are. We observe
that most sensor data referring to the same event follow
the normal distribution, and propose a systematic approach
for computing trust scores based on value similarity under
the normal distribution. Provenance similarity is based on
the observation that different physical provenances of similar
data values may increase the trustworthiness of data items.
In other words, different physical provenances provide more
independent data items.
To the best of our knowledge, our approach is the first
supporting the enforcement of confidence policies in DSMSs.
However, there are still lots of open issues to be addressed.
We discuss them in the next section.
3. OPEN RESEARCH ISSUES
We categorize open research issues into two categories:
using data provenance and delivering data provenance.
3.1 Using data provenance
As we have seen in Section 2, data provenance can be
used to guarantee the quality of results by enhancing the
knowledge about data quality such as accuracy, confidence,
and trustworthiness. Here, the most interesting issues are
1) how to exactly get the knowledge from data provenance
and 2) how to efficiently use data provenance in data stream
processing. In this discussion, we point out the differences
between static databases and dynamic data streams.
3.1.1 Measuring data quality
Data provenance representation. In our initial ap-
proach [12], we use a simple representation of data prove-
nance: a path from a terminal node to a server node or a
tree with two or more terminal nodes. However, this simple
model is not enough for complex applications which have
more than two outgoing directions (e.g., a data item can be
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transmitted to more than two intermediate nodes) or loops
(e.g., a same process can be repeatedly conducted on a data
item) in data flows. Because this kind of complex prove-
nance often arises in applications such as document workflow
systems and manufacturing processes, we need to consider
a more general representation for both physical and logical
provenances.
Provenance similarity. The provenance representation
also affects the similarity measure between provenances. One
of the popular similarity measures in graph theory is the edit
distance which uses the minimum amount of distortion that
is needed to transform one graph into another [4]. We also
use a variety of edit distance since it well captures simi-
larity or dissimilarity for both physical and logical prove-
nances. However, computing the edit distance for general
graphs is known to be an NP-hard problem [9]. Therefore,
we need an approximate similarity measure method which
efficiently compares graph-shape provenances for streaming
data whose input rate is very high. If the number of possi-
ble provenance patterns is limited and small, pre-calculating
the similarity among all possible provenances can be a fea-
sible approach to reduce the runtime latency for calculating
similarity.
Multiple data provenances. Even though we only use
a single physical provenance and logical provenance [12],
there can be multiple provenances in many real applications.
For example, in the battlefield monitoring system mentioned
in Section 1, the physical provenance can be a GPS location
of sensors and an ID of the vehicle where the sensor is de-
ployed. Also, the logical provenance can be the unit name
of the troops formation and a sensor category where the
sensor is classified into. In this multiple provenance situa-
tion, trust score assessment becomes more complex since all
these provenances should be considered together. For ex-
ample, there can be a conflict between two scores calculated
based on two different provenances. However, the availabil-
ity of multiple provenances can improve the data precision
and the robustness for calculating trust score.
Dynamic data provenance. In our previous work [12],
we assumed that the provenance of a sensor does not change.
However, in the battlefield monitoring example, we can see
that the physical provenance of a sensor can change because
of mobility. The GPS location of a sensor deployed in an
aircraft continuously changes during the sensing process. It
means that data items from the same sensor can have dif-
ferent physical provenance. To handle such dynamic prove-
nance, we need to combine variable provenance (e.g., GPS
location) with fixed provenance (e.g., sensor ID) and use
their relationship to calculate trust scores.
Quality measurement model. In our initial solution [12],
we use a simple model for calculating trust scores: a nor-
mal distribution to model data similarity, a weighted sum
to calculate data trust scores from node trust scores, and
a simple method to reflect provenance similarity into the
scores. However, if the application becomes more complex,
this simple model cannot yield accurate trust scores. For
example, sensed data may not follow the normal distribu-
tion, and choosing weights in the weighted-sum may not be
possible in some applications. Therefore, we need to investi-
gate more sophisticated and accurate quality measurement
models with real applications.
3.1.2 Combining data provenance with query pro-
cessing
Improving performance. Addressing the problem of
efficiently computing trust scores is essential in data streams
due to fast input rates and realtime processing requirement.
In principle, trust scores should be evaluated whenever a new
data item arrives. However, such a strategy is not applicable
when input rates are very high. To address this problem, we
need to develop methods to reduce the number of evaluations
without sacrificing accuracy of trust scores. A possibility is
to use a batch method which recalculates trust scores only
when recent input data items do not follow current data
distributions any longer.
Improving data quality. We can use data provenance
for not only measuring but also improving data quality. As
we discussed in Section 2, the data quality management com-
ponent tries to improve data quality when the number of
results satisfying a confidence policy is too small. In data
stream environments, we can systematically improve data
quality with provenance information. Along with our qual-
ity measurement model, we can more clearly identify which
data from which sensors should be improved to increase the
trust scores of results.
3.2 Delivering data provenance
Until now, we have assumed that the correct data prove-
nance arrives with stream data and have focused on how to
use them for stream processing. In this section, we focus
on how to efficiently and securely deliver data provenance
through networks.
3.2.1 Efficient delivery
Reducing the size of data provenance. Because net-
work bandwidth is limited, we need to minimize the size
of data provenance. The first method we can consider is
eliminating redundant information. For example, if two
contiguous data items have the same provenance, we can
transmit the provenance only once for the two data items.
If two contiguous data items have similar provenance (e.g.,
only differ with respect to the terminal nodes), we can only
transmit the difference. For this purpose, we can exploit
the concept of punctuation [17] which describes annotations
for data items. Another method to reduce the size of data
provenance is to use a bit-map representation with com-
pression techniques. If the network structure is fixed during
processing, we can use bit-maps to describe provenances in
the network and use compression techniques to reduce the
size of the representation.
Controlling the granularity of data provenance.
If partial loss of provenance information can be tolerated,
we can use the granularity of data provenance to reduce
the amount of information. For example, in a geographical
provenance, we can use state level provenance (i.e., coarse
granularity) instead of city level provenance (i.e., fine granu-
larity). Here, the city level source information can be omit-
ted in the provenance and data items from the same state
can share the provenance if the punctuation scheme is used.
The provenance granularity has to be chosen according to
the semantics of applications so that the loss of provenance
semantics is minimized
3.2.2 Secure delivery
Avoiding unauthorized modification. Since data prove-
nance is a key evidence for measuring the quality of data
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items, it should be protected from malicious and unautho-
rized modification. For example, if the provenance of an
untrustworthy data item is modified to a trustworthy node,
the quality of the data item is assessed as high, even though
in reality the data item has a low quality. However, it is not
easy to protect data provenance from such attacks due to
the nature of data streams, fast input rate and real-time re-
quirement. Conventional digital signature and cryptography
techniques cannot be used in fast data streams since their
cost is too high compared with the cost of ordinary continu-
ous query processing. We can reduce the cost by using these
techniques only for data provenance and not for data values.
However, we still need to develop new light-weighted digital
signature techniques for data provenance in fast data stream
environments.
Handling loss of data provenance. When using a
punctuation scheme to describe data provenance, dropping
punctuations can be a mean by an attacker to increase the
trust scores of certain data items. For example, if a malicious
user intentionally drops a punctuation which precedes data
items that are from an untrustworthy source, the provenance
of the data items can be misinterpreted by other punctua-
tions which are not related with them. To avoid this kind
of attack, one approach is to use digital watermark tech-
niques which embed provenance inside the data. Since dig-
ital watermark techniques provide robustness against drop-
ping partial information, data provenance can be sustained
even when some data provenance information (or punctua-
tion) is omitted.
4. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have discussed open research issues con-
cerning data provenance in data stream environments. We
have focused on two issues: 1) using data provenance in data
streams and 2) delivering data provenance in low-bandwidth
and insecure networks. We believe that the relevance of re-
search in this area will become higher with the the growth
of data stream applications and ubiquitous computing envi-
ronments.
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ABSTRACT
The knowledge of node positions is a core concept in any
Wireless Sensor Network context. Several localization algo-
rithms were devised, but secure localization of sensor nodes
is still a challenging task to achieve with a high level of per-
formance. In fact, location information might be the tar-
get of different kinds of malicious attacks and several secure
localization approaches were proposed. In this paper we
analyze the impact of false data in a secure localization al-
gorithm, known as Verifiable Multilateration. We found that
the strategy used to compute the positions of nodes might
have an impact both on the computational effort needed to
achieve acceptable measures and the precision of the detec-
tion of malicious nodes.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.6.5 [MANAGEMENT OF COMPUTING AND IN-
FORMATION SYSTEMS]: Security and Protection
General Terms
Wireless Sensor Networks, security
Keywords
WSN, security, localization
1. INTRODUCTION
Several researchers are proposing information systems based
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), that provide a flexible
and effective means to monitor large and diverse geographi-
cal areas. However, WSNs are composed by individual nodes
with very limited capabilities and energy consumption is a
major concern, thus unorthodox solutions are required for
many situations, especially aimed at minimizing the commu-
nication overload. Moreover, the monitoring activity greatly
relies on data about the positions of nodes, which are often
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deployed randomly, thus a great challenge is represented by
localization at time of operations [12].
Various location services have been proposed. The Global
Positioning System (GPS) is the most well-known location
service in use today, but it is unsuitable for low-cost, ad-hoc
sensor networks since GPS is based on an extensive infras-
tructure (i.e. satellites) that requires frequent transmissions
and devices are still quite expensive and heavy. Likewise the
solutions developed in the area of robotics [1, 13, 24] and
ubiquitous computing [10] are generally not applicable for
sensor networks as they require too much processing power
and energy. Recently a number of localization systems have
been proposed specifically for sensor networks [3, 4, 7, 9,
23, 16, 19, 22]. Ideally, these approaches aim at large-scale
ad-hoc sensor networks (100+ nodes) and their design goals
are:
• to be as much as possible self-organizing, thus that
communication happens mostly locally, without the
need of a globally accessible infrastructure;
• to be tolerant to node failures and range errors;
• to require little computation and, especially, commu-
nication effort.
Unfortunately, most of the current approaches omit to
consider that WSNs could be deployed in an adversarial set-
ting, where hostile nodes under the control of an attacker
coexist with faithful ones. In fact, from a security point of
view, the wireless communications and the deployment in
uncontrolled environments rise several issues: the confiden-
tiality, the integrity, and the availability of data might be
put at risk by malicious tampering of sensors and/or traffic.
Node position is a really critical information due to the
strict relation with the quality of the provided services. In
fact, the location information is sometimes target of different
kinds of malicious attacks, classified in internal and external
attacks. So the trustworthiness of node position information
is a challenging task for wireless sensor networks since clas-
sical solutions based on access control and strong authenti-
cation, are problematic to implement with limited resources
and short battery life. Also, nodes are prone to physical
attacks and is pretty easy to clone a sensor device and its
on-board keys: thus cryptography provides only a partial
protection and should be used with care.
In this paper we analyzed an approach to the secure local-
ization of nodes known as Verifiable Multilateration (VM) [5].
VM potentially uses untrusted information to derive the po-
sitions of nodes, together with a measure of their trustwor-
thiness. VM relies on lateration to compute positions, a
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generalization of triangulation to multiple nodes: several
techniques to do lateration are known and VM is largely
independent from the choice of one of them. We found,
however, that the choice is not neutral. Lateration algo-
rithms can be computationally heavy in order to get very
precise results or very trivial if only gross data are needed.
One could legitimately ask if and when the additional efforts
are needed and at what level, since computation in WSNs
is a scarce resource. In this paper we try to answer to these
questions by analyzing three lateration algorithms and as-
sessing their impact on VM. We will show that in general
the precision is worth the computational price, but, under
some hypotheses, even a trivial solution can be acceptable.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a
short state of art about the sensor node localization solu-
tions; Section 3 describes the reference scenario in which we
performed our analysis; Section 4 introduces the Verifiable
Multilateration for secure localization; Section 5 analyzes
three different approaches to lateration and their impact on
secure localization and finally, Section 6 draws some conclu-
sions and provides hints for future works.
2. RELATEDWORK
All the proposed localization algorithms for wireless sen-
sor networks have to face the particular context in which
sensor nodes are deployed. More specifically, there is in gen-
eral no fine control over the placement of the sensor nodes
when the network is deployed (e.g., when nodes are dropped
from an airplane) and some self organization of the commu-
nication overlay is needed. Moreover, the connectivity of the
nodes in the network (i.e., the average number of neighbors)
is another important parameter that has a strong impact
on the accuracy of most localization algorithms. In fact,
the main node position approach is based on node density
and radio range, and in some cases it can be dynamically
adjusted by changing the transmit power of the RF radio.
So taking into account the domain constraints, any localiza-
tion algorithm has to address three main requirements: self
organizing, robustness and energy efficiency.
Existing localization schemes may be classified in range-
based methods, which use exact measurements of distances,
and range-free methods, which only need beacon signals.
Typical techniques to obtain the measurements between two
nodes include Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI),
Time of Arrive (ToA), Time Difference of Arrive (TDoA),
and Angle of Arrive (AoA). Range-based localization schemes
in sensor networks include those in [21, 22, 17, 15, 9]. Sav-
vides et al. developed an ad-hoc localization system local-
ization protocol based on TDoA [21]. Extension of this work
can be found in [22]. Doherty et al. presented a localization
scheme based on connectivity induced constraints and the
relative angle between neighbors [9]. AoA is also used to de-
velop localization schemes in [17] and [15]. Range-free based
schemes are proposed to provide location estimation services
for those applications with less required location precision
[3, 14, 23]. Estrin et al. proposed a simple range-free, coarse
grained localization scheme where each sensor estimated its
location by centering the locations contained in the received
signals [3]. All of the current localization schemes become
vulnerable when there are malicious attacks. In all these
schemes, the accuracy of location estimation depends on
the accuracy of the origins of the beacon signals and certain
measurements obtained from the beacon signals, including
distances and/or angles in range-based schemes, and the ex-
istence of beacon signals in range-free schemes. Though the
above measurements are directly obtained from the physical
signals, the locations of the beacon signals’ origins can be
easily forged. As a result, a malicious attacker may intro-
duce large errors when a node estimates its location. More
specifically, an attacker can introduce arbitrarily large errors
by declaring false locations in beacon packets, arbitrarily
introducing large errors into a non-beacon node’s location
estimation. Such attacks cannot be simply prevented by
cryptographic techniques due to the threat of compromised
nodes and replay attacks. In order to overcome such a limit
localization algorithms adopt some techniques able to reveal
malicious behavior.
We focus our attention on the secure localization algo-
rithm, named Verifiable Multilateration (VM) [5] that is a
range based approach using MMSE as one criterium for re-
vealing malicious behavior. Our choice of MMSE is due to
the robustness towards attacks and the capability to reveal
malicious behavior and then the accuracy of the obtained
results as we show in details in the following sections. We
aim at analyzing in some depth the computational effort of
minimization, by comparing MMSE with other available so-
lutions. Since a weak assessment of localization information
may damage service performance, our goal is to understand
the trade-off between the computational cost and the overall
trustworthiness of the obtained results.
3. REFERENCE SCENARIO
We consider a dense network composed of nodes ni, where
ni ∈ N, 0 < i ≤ |N | and a base station b in which all the
collected data sink. We consider two subsets of N :
• S, composed by nodes si, 0 < i ≤ |S|, which perform
sensing functions;
• V , composed by nodes vi, 0 < i ≤ |V |, which work as
verifiers in the secure localization protocol.
N = S ∪ V and V may overlap S (in principle every node
whose position can be taken for granted might be used as a
verifier).
Each si node senses a given type of data (e.g., tempera-
ture, pressure, brightness, position and so on). Each node (
sensing, and verifier) directly communicates with its closer
neighbours (at one hop distance).
4. SECURE LOCALIZATION
The node positions can be evaluated by using a multilat-
eration technique, which determines the node coordinates
by exploiting a set of landmark nodes, called anchor nodes,
whose positions are known. The position of the unknown
node u is computed by using an estimation of the distances
between the anchor nodes and the node itself. The distance
is not measured directly; instead, it can be computed by
knowing the speed of the signal in the medium used in the
transmission, and by measuring the time needed to get an
answer to a beacon message sent to u. If the computation
is carried on without any precaution, u might fool the an-
chors by delaying the beacon message. However, since a
malicious node can delay the answer beacon, but not speed
it up, under some conditions it is possible to spot malicious
behaviors. Verifiable Multilateration (VM) [5] uses three or
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Figure 1: Verifiable multilateration
more anchor nodes to detect misbehaving nodes. In VM
the anchor nodes work as verifiers of the localization data
and they send to the sink b the information needed to evalu-
ate the consistency of the coordinates computed for u. The
basic idea of VM is shown in Figure 1: each verifier vi com-
putes its distance bound [2] to u; any point u′ 6= u inside the
triangle formed by v1, v2, v3 has necessarily at least one of
the distance to the vi enlarged. This enlargement, however,
cannot be masked by u by sending a faster message to the
corresponding verifier. Therefore, if the verifiers are trusted
and they can securely communicate with b, the following
algorithm can be used to check the localization data:
1. Each verifier vi sends a beacon message to u and records
the time τi needed to get an answer;
2. Each verifier vi (whose coordinates < xi, yi > are
known) sends to b a message with its τi;
3. From τi, b derives the corresponding distance bound
dbi (that can be easily computed if the speed of the
signal is known) and it estimates u’s coordinates by
minimizing the mean square error
 =
X
i
(dbi −
p
(xu − xi)2 + (yu − yi)2)2
where < xu, yu > are the (unknown) coordinates to be
estimated1.;
4. b can now check if < xu, yu > are feasible in the given
setting by two incremental tests:
(a) δ-test: For all verifiers vi, compute the distance
between the estimated u and vi: if it differs from
the measured distance bound by more than the
expected distance measurement error, the estima-
tion is affected by malicious tampering;
(b) Point in the triangle test: Distance bounds are
reliable only if the estimated u is within at least
one verification triangle formed by a triplet of ver-
ifiers, otherwise the estimation is considered un-
verified.
If both the δ and the point-in-the-triangle tests are posi-
tive, the distance bounds are consistent with the estimated
node position, which moreover falls in at least one verifica-
tion triangle. Thus, the sink can consider the estimated po-
sition of the node as Robust; else, the information at hands
1In an ideal situation where there are no measurement er-
rors and/or malicious delays this is equivalent to finding the
(unique) intersection of the circles defined by the distance
bounds and centered in the vi (see Figure 1) and  = 0
is not sufficient to support the reliability of the data. An
estimation that does not pass the δ test is considered Mali-
cious. A sensible value of δ depends on the expected error
in time measurement and the number of available verifiers.
The simulation reported below should clarify the consider-
ations involved in the choice of δ. If the δ test is passed,
but the point-in-the-triangle one fails, the sink marks the
estimation as Unknown, meaning there is no sufficient infor-
mation for evaluating the trustworthiness of node position.
Thus, the localization phase ends up, for each unlocalized
node ui, with an estimation of the position of ui and a qual-
ity Wi ∈ Robust, Unknown,Malicious.
5. THE IMPACT OF LOCALIZATION IN-
FORMATION
Summing up, VM aims at assessing the trustworthiness
of a node position by checking the consistency of the data
received by the sink:
• the δ test establishes a threshold incompatible with
highly deceptive data;
• the point-in-the-triangle test rules out geometrically
infeasible deceptions.
As stated above, the original VM approach requires (step 3)
the minimization of the mean square error . This function,
however, is not linear and minimization is far from trivial. In
fact, no exact solution is possible and some approximation is
needed. In our experiments, we found that most of the com-
putational effort of the approach was in the minimization.
Thus, we considered three alternatives:
1. use a probabilistic heuristic to approximate the search
for the minimum  (MMSE approach)
2. use a function easier to deal with (exact lateration ap-
proach)
3. use a trivial estimate of the position (min-max ap-
proach)
In order to analyze the feasibility of these simplifications
in an adversarial context, we used OMNet++ (ver. 3.3p1,
[8, 18]) to set up a simulation of the secure localization al-
gorithm. A claimant node u to be localized resides at the
center of a 100m×100m field, i.e., at point < 50, 50 >. Since
the best approach to lay out three verifiers is on the vertexes
of an equilateral triangle [5], we fixed their coordinates to be
the points < 1, 1 >,< 99, 1 >,< 50, 85 >. If u is faithful, it
answers to verifiers’ beacons without any delay. Otherwise,
if u is malicious it adds a variable delay to the answers, in
order to dissimulate a fake position u′: i.e., for each vi, if the
distance ¯viu′ is greater than ¯viu a proper delay is added by u
to the answer beacon to vi. We assumed that signals travel
at the speed of light and that time can be measured with an
error whose standard deviation is 2ns. As described above,
the timing information collected by verifiers vi can be used
by the base station to classify the claimant as Malicious,
Unknown, or Robust.
In a preliminary study, we discovered that the error intro-
duced by the localization heuristic is indeed critical, since it
could cause an unexpected behavior in the algorithm. Fig-
ure 2 shows a number of anchors vi and the distance bounds
they estimate in color. The actual position of the malicious
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Figure 4: Deception when a node is classified as
Unknown (δ = 35)
claimant node is u and the estimated position u′. In Fig-
ure 2(a), with three verifiers, the node results as Unknown
since it is outside the unique verification triangle. How-
ever, when a fourth verifier is added to the system (see Fig-
ure 2(b)) the estimation u′ falls inside at least one of the four
verification triangles and the node ends up to be Robust.
Thus, we decide to analyze the sensitivity of VM to the
localization heuristic used. In particular, we considered as
a quality metric the deception that can be induced by an
attacker, i.e., the distance between the actual node position
and the estimated one, when node are classified as Robust
or Unknown.
5.1 The MMSE approach
The original proposal of VM, relies on the minimization
of the mean square error (MMSE). In our simulation, we
used simulated annealing [11, 6] heuristic to approximate a
solution.
Figure 3(a) shows the effect of the choice of the δmax in
the δ-test on 10000 runs with 3 verifiers: the only sensible
value is about 35, since lower levels have an overwhelming
rate of false positives (i.e., faithful nodes classified as Mali-
cious), and a higher δ gives too much false negatives (i.e.,
malicious nodes classified as Robust) and unknowns. About
50% of malicious claimants and 90% of faithful ones were
classified as Unknown: the error in taking the estimated po-
sition instead of the real one is pretty high, as one can see
from Figure 4 that plots the density of deception: most of
the time by accepting an estimation classified as Unknown
one has to deal with a deception of about 35 m. The sit-
uation is clearly improved when a fourth verifier is added
(see Figure 3(b)): the setting is now with a verifier at each
corner of the field and all the values less than 2.5 give ac-
ceptable results; there are no Unknowns. It is worth noting
that the range of δ considered is different, since by increasing
the number of verifiers, the maximum acceptable error δmax
should decrease. There are still some false negatives, but
the deception induced by a malicious node taken as Robust
is always less than 1m with δ ≤ 1. Figure 5 plots the density
distribution of the deception — i.e., the distance between
the real position and the estimated one — at different values
of δ. Adding a fifth verifier randomly deployed significantly
decreases the rate of false negatives, as shown in Figure 3(c).
5.2 The exact lateration approach
An easier estimation to compute is exact lateration (used
for example by [16, 20]) that considers the system of equa-
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tions
∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ |V | : (xi − xu)2 + (yi − yu)2 = dbi (1)
The system (1) can be linearized by subtracting the last
equation (the one corresponding to verifier |V |) from the
other |V | − 1 ones.
∀i, i 6= |V | :
x2i − x2|V | − 2(xi − x|V |)xu + y2i − y2|V | − 2(yi − y|V |)yu
= db2i − d2|V |
The system above can be expressed in the matrix form
A(|V |−1,2)x(2,1) = b(|V |−1,1)
where
A(|V |−1,2) = [2(xi − x|V |) 2(yi − y|V |)]
b(|V |−1,1) = [x
2
i − x2|V | + y2i − y2|V | + db2|V | − d2i ]
The system can be solved by using a standard linear al-
gebra least-squares approach: x = (AT ·A)−1 ·AT · b. A
measure of the quality of the solution is then given by
rlat =
P
i(dbi −
p
(xu − xi)2 + (yu − yi)2)2
|V |
In order to evaluate this approach to localization with
respect to the MMSE one described in Section 5.1, we con-
sidered the relation between the residue rlat (analogous to 
in the MMSE case) and the deception induced by assuming
< xu, yu > as the position. Figure 6 shows the correlation
between the quality of the estimation and deception for both
MMSE (Figure 6(a)) and exact lateration (Figure 6(b)): the
latter is more spread, thus indicating that MMSE  is a bet-
ter proxy indicator for deception. In fact, deception by a ma-
licious claimant evaluated by an exact lateration approach
gives results fairly uncorrelated with the ones obtained with
MMSE (see Figure 7).
5.3 The min-max approach
Sometimes an even easier estimation used is the min-max
method ([21], the name is coined in [12]). Its computation
is almost trivial: for each verifier one considers the bound-
ing box defined by < xi − dbi, yi − dbi >–< xi + dbi, yi +
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Figure 3: Classification by secure localization
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Figure 6: Correlation between estimation quality and deception with 3,4, and 5 verifiers
Figure 7: Deception by a malicious node evaluated
by exact lateration with 3,4, and 5 verifiers
dbi >. The intersection of all bounding boxes is then com-
puted as < max(xi − dbi),max(yi − dbi) >–< min(xi +
dbi),min(yi + dbi) > and the final position estimated is
<max(xi−dbi)+<min(xi+dbi)
2
, <max(yi−dbi)+<min(yi+dbi)
2
>. We
measured the quality of the estimation as
rmm = |
max(xi − dbi) −min(xi + dbi) + max(yi − dbi) −min(yi + dbi)
2
|
Again, we found that MMSE  is a much better proxy
for deception in an adversarial setting (see Figure 8(a)).
However, with four verifiers (posed on the vertexes of the
rectangular field) the results would be consistent with the
ones obtained via MMSE, but with a considerable saving in
computation (see Figure 8(b)). However, this result is not
confirmed in the 5-verifiers case: in fact, the fifth verifier
— randomly deployed — destroys the symmetry of bound-
ing boxes, and it has an unexpected detrimental effect. The
setting with four verifiers, instead, could be a good alterna-
tive to the MMSE corresponding solution since it can give
proportionally equivalent result with a much reduced com-
putational effort.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Reliability of node positions is a core requirement in most
Wireless Sensor Networks. Verifiable Multilateration uses
potentially untrusted information to derive the positions
of nodes, together with a measure of their trustworthiness.
However, VM itself relies on node positions deduced by lat-
eration. We analyzed different approaches to lateration in
order to understand when the computational effort needed
by the most sophisticated algorithms is really needed. Our
results show that in general the precision provided by the
most onerous algorithm (MMSE) is indeed needed. How-
ever, if a careful position of verifiers is possible, the much
simpler min-max method could be useful. The aim of secure
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(a) Correlation between estimation quality and de-
ception
(b) Deception with a malicious node via MMSE
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Figure 8: Estimation quality and deception in the min-max approach with 3,4, and 5 verifiers
localization algorithms is to define some criteria in order to
identify and remove malicious positions. False positive may
always occur, however, and one has to spend in verifiers and
communication to increase the quality of the collected infor-
mation. We are currently investigating the use of cross-layer
information to assess the overall quality of the monitoring
performed by the WSN and a game theoretical approach
to model malicious behavior, in order to reason about the
rational strategies open to the system designers.
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1. PANEL OVERVIEW
The newly starting MODAP project (www.modap.org),
funded by EU FP7 Future and Emerging Technologies Pro-
gramme with nearly one million euro funding for three years,
aims to coordinate and boost the research activities in the
intersection of mobility, data mining, and privacy. The key
challenge is to gather an interdisciplinary community of peo-
ple including, lawyers, psychologists, computer scientists,
geographers, and end-users. This panel discusses opportu-
nities, challenges and risks.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.2.8 [Database Applications]: Data Mining,
Spatial databases and GIS; K.4.1 [Public Policy Issues]:
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General Terms
Management, Security, Legal Aspects
Keywords
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2. MOTIVATION
Capturing the mobility behavior of individuals for on-line
or historical data analysis with GPS enabled devices and
other positioning systems is an area of increasing interest
for both researchers and industry. A typical example from
industry is car insurance policy pricing. Recently car insur-
ance companies have started to issue policies with respect to
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the driving behavior which is captured through a GPS de-
vice installed under a special agreement. Traffic authorities
are also interested in historical mobility data collected over
longer periods for better planning of traffic and emergency
scenarios. However, the fact that mobility data is mostly
about people associates a high risk with this technology,
since it can be used to infer where individuals have been, at
what times, how often, and with whom. Therefore, privacy
issues need to be addressed in order for the opportunities of
mobility data mining to be fully harvested.
A recently completed EU project, GeoPKDD (Geographic
Privacy-aware Knowledge Discovery and Delivery,
www.geopkdd.eu) was funded by the Future and Emerging
Technologies programme which supports high risk, high im-
pact, interdisciplinary research projects. GeoPKDD is one
of the first large-scale research projects on mobility data
mining with the aim of harvesting knowledge from mobility
data. The newly starting MODAP project (www.modap.org),
funded by EU FP7 Future and Emerging Technologies Pro-
gramme with nearly one million euro funding for three years,
aims to continue the efforts of GeoPKDD by coordinating
and boosting the research activities in the intersection of mo-
bility, data mining, and privacy. For that reason, MODAP
aims to create an interdisciplinary platform for technical as
well as non-technical people who are interested in mobility
data mining together with privacy issues. Such efforts are
timely and still needed since privacy risks associated with
the mobility behavior of people are still unclear, and it is
not possible for mobility data mining technology to thrive
without sound privacy measures and standards for data col-
lection, and data/knowledge publishing.
The key challenge is to gather an interdisciplinary commu-
nity of people including, lawyers, psychologists, computer
scientists, geographers, and end-users. As an initial effort
to notify the public authorities, a privacy observatory was
created within the GeoPKDD consortium. A privacy obser-
vatory will also be one of the key bodies of the MODAP
project and this time it will include people from different
disciplines such as law and ethics. In this panel we will dis-
cuss if and how such efforts to build interdisciplinary bodies
and communities could be successful in resolving the privacy
issues in location data in general and mobility data mining
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in specific.
Promoting the development of an interdisciplinary com-
munity raises important questions about ”Why” and ”How”
to proceed. The ultimate goal is to achieve a comprehensive,
holistic view of the privacy issues in mobility which makes
possible the development of more effective privacy protection
solutions and policies, and at the same time contributes to
expand personal and social awareness of privacy rights. Yet,
the key question is how to achieve this goal. This question
has important research and organizational challenges. From
the research viewpoint, a key issue is how to draw the atten-
tion of researchers from different disciplines. Which are the
benefits that researchers with different backgrounds would
obtain from collaboration to the MODAP project? How can
researchers agree on which are the research problems that
need to be addressed in order to have a real impact and
shape this field? Another crucial issue is how to create a
platform where these people from different backgrounds can
communicate and which kind of initiatives are best suited
to foster this collaboration. From an organizational perspec-
tive, it is important to establish which institutional bodies
and government officials to involve and at what stage. More-
over, what is the ”size” of the international dimension, Eu-
rope, US, both, Asia? Another concern is what could be an
appropriate spectrum of disciplines to consider and which
the priorities.
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